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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the pattern of deployment of wind power across the
United States, focusing on the influence of wind resources, incentives/supportive
government and governance policies, supportive/confounding infrastructures, and
economic factors. The effects of these factors are considered for 35 states from the year
2001 to 2012. Effects are estimated using fixed effects regression models, forward stepwise between modeling, and lead-lag models. The results indicate that demand, electrical
transmission availability, and complementary generation assets, as well as the importexport of electricity are important factors in determining where wind energy deployment
occurs. In addition, elevated levels of wind energy deployment are associated with
policies that provide price support and increase demand for wind energy. This study
concludes that while policies play a role in the development of wind energy,
policymakers can also increase wind deployment by incentivizing infrastructures
including transmission, complementary forms of generation and retirement of
competitive generation assets.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Background of the Problem
Wind energy generation capacity in the United States has expanded rapidly since
the beginning of the millennium to present. However, despite this overall brisk pace for
development, growth rates across the 50 states have been uneven (Carley, 2009).
Uniform economic incentives provided for wind energy production at the federal level
extend to all 50 states; however, variation does exist in state-level regulatory and
incentive structures for renewable energy production, thus providing differentiated
inducements (DSIRE, 2011). In addition, each state possesses different resources,
governance for development, and supportive infrastructures that shape the development
of the wind energy resources.
The uneven growth of wind energy deployment raises questions about the
determinants that shape the deployment of wind power. Enhancing the importance of
these differentiated results is the call by scholars and political institutions to increase
renewable energy as part of the solution to the problems of global climate change, health
and other environmental issues (Edenhofer, et al. 2011; Ezzati, et al. 2004; UN 2005).
Scholars investigating wind energy deployment have primarily investigated the
correlation between the level of megawatts (MWs) of renewable energy or wind deployed
in each state with the existence of state and federal policy instruments while controlling
1

for economic, social, and resource factors (Bohn & Lant, 2009; Carley, 2009, Doris,
Busche, et al., 2009; Gong, 2011; Kneifel, 2008; Yin & Powers, 2010). These
investigations have primarily focused on the question of whether particular state policies
are or are not effective in increasing wind or renewable energy deployment. The results
of these efforts has been somewhat mixed and researchers are just beginning to explore
broader questions to understand the factors that determine the deployment of wind energy
in a particular jurisdiction (Hitaj, 2012; Maguire, 2010;).
Current research is shifting the focus from the correlation of policies to wind
energy deployment to the determination of the underlying factors that increase or
decrease wind power development. This study extends the research by including an
examination of the effects of the existing and changing stocks of the complementary
electrical infrastructures in each state. This research compares the strength of electrical
infrastructures, state level governance, and supportive policies while examining the level
of the wind energy resources and economic/contextual factors to determine the effects on
the deployment level of wind power within a state. The results of this research identify a
constellation of policies and supportive infrastructures that leads to elevated levels of
wind energy deployment. The determination of this constellation of factors is important
for policymakers concerned with accelerating deployment within the U.S. and in other
countries.
The electrical infrastructure considered by this study is often termed hard
infrastructure while the policies and processes that govern the sector are referred to as
soft infrastructure. This study therefore proposes to examine effects of the hard
2

infrastructure compared to the soft infrastructure while controlling for contextual factors
that include economic and wind energy resources. The hard infrastructures are essential
elements of the electrical system. Transmission is a hard infrastructure that is necessary
to bring energy to market from areas where wind resources exist. Additional generation
assets are also required to balance the grid when wind energy is not produced. Therefore,
transmission and generation assets are economic complements to wind generation and
should be investigated in concert with supportive and governance policies, economic
factors, and wind resources to understand the deployment of wind energy. In addition,
with all else equal, the retirement of generation assets increases the demand1 for
additional generation facilities. It is essential to examine the electrical sector
systematically to understand the determinants of wind energy deployment.
Research Questions
Simply stated, the overarching question is how do soft infrastructures, hard
infrastructures, wind energy resources, and contextual factors interact to increase or
decrease the deployment of wind energy? To examine this question, this study proposes
to examine how policies, electricity transmission, asset depreciation, wind resources,
wind energy prices, and generation characteristics influence the selection for investment
in generation assets. The logic behind this approach is simple: differing governance
regimes and infrastructure stocks exist within each state that influence the patterns of
investment for new electrical generation assets. For example, transmission and generation

1

Demand in this study refers to total demand
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assets are economic complements and these stocks vary across states. Furthermore, the
investments in the stock of generation assets are influenced by the economic
characteristics of the good, path dependencies, the existing policies, the pricing of future
generation facilities, electricity demand, and the existing resource base that varies across
each jurisdiction. Therefore, each of these factors should be examined concurrently in
order to understand how renewable energy policies influence the future mix of electrical
generation resources and either provide for or diminish wind energy deployment.
These factors can be classified into three categories of determinants. The
categories are (1) soft infrastructure or institutional factors and policies; (2) hard
infrastructure or transmission and generation assets and (3) contextual factors. The soft
infrastructure category includes policies that increase the capacity of wind deployment
(requirements for renewable energy production or sales), the support production
(monetary production incentives), and the governance policies (permitting regimes and
regimes that govern access to transmission). The hard infrastructures include the stock of
electrical transmission assets, existing generation assets, and depreciation/retirement of
generation facilities. The contextual factors consist of wind energy resources and
economic factors. These economic factors include demand for electricity, wind energy
price, and electricity price, as well as the import and export of electricity between states.
A typology of these factors is presented on Table 1, below.
Soft Infrastructure
Permitting Procedures
Grid Governance
Capacity Incentives
Production Incentives

Table 1: Wind Energy Determinants
Hard Infrastructure
Contextual Variables
Electricity Transmission
Wind Resources
Existing Generation Flexibility
Wind Energy Prices
Depreciation of Generation Stocks Electricity Demand
Electricity Import/Export
Electricity Price
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This study therefore seeks to determine how soft and hard infrastructures along
with contextual factors interact to influence the development of the wind resource base
within a state. This study focuses on comparing the influence of policies with the
influence of infrastructure—particularly the stocks of transmission and generation within
a state— since the existing infrastructure should, in conjunction with policies, influence
the development of wind resources. This study is to determine the constellation of factors
best predicts a state’s wind energy development. To answer this overarching question,
specific questions should be explored which include the following:
1. What are the relative strengths of the policy factors to the contextual factors?
2. What are the relative strengths of the infrastructure variables in comparison to the
contextual factors?
3. What are the comparative strengths of the policy and infrastructure variables
when including the contextual factors?
4. What is the constellation infrastructure, policy, and contextual variables that
foster the growth of wind energy generation?
These questions are nested within the overall question of what accelerates or
provides barriers to the development of wind energy. In other words, why is there a
marked differentiation across states? Many of these questions have been explored
recently by scholars conducting research into the effectiveness of various policies in
promoting renewable energy (Doris, McLaren, et al., 2009; IEA, 2011; Mitchell, et al.
2011). This study adds to previous work by focusing on policies in comparison to
5

supportive infrastructures to determine what constellation of system attributes is
favorable for the deployment of wind energy. By identifying these factors, policy
advancements providing incentives to actors outside of the wind energy industry may be
identified to foster a more favorable environment for the implementation of wind energy.
This study will add significantly to previous research by exploring: (1) the hard
infrastructures including transmission, existing generation assets, and depreciation of
existing generation assets, (2) the effects of siting, infrastructure, and economic policies
that promote or detract from wind generation, and (3) the influence of actual wind energy
prices. To accomplish these tasks, this study uses three novel datasets to represent the
existing electrical generation assets, depreciation of these assets, and transmission stocks.
Systematically Examining Wind Energy Deployment
Researchers have taken a similar approach when examining the determinants of
wind energy development. The research tends to presume that policy is causal or at least
correlative with wind energy deployment and tests the correlation of policy requirements
to wind energy deployment outcomes across states. In conjunction with this correlation,
the researchers also examine other variables hypothesized to influence the outcomes.
Researchers have not explicitly proposed theories or comprehensively explored
systematic explanations for wind energy development. However, the causal chain of
events for wind energy deployment includes the site selection and permitting,
procurement of transmission and integration of produced electricity into markets. This
chain of events has not been examined in previous research. As a result, the influence of
hard infrastructures such as transmission, complementary generation, and depreciation of
6

generation assets on wind energy deployment has been under examined in previous
studies.
This study therefore takes a different direction from previous policy oriented
research and proposes a systematic approach to examining wind energy deployment. This
approach starts by assuming that wind energy generation is a portion of the total stock of
generation assets and that all generation assets are subject to investment and depreciation
(Figure 1). In other words, this study views generation as a stock of depreciating assets
that requires investment to meet increased demand and generation retirement. The
deployment of new generation assets is therefore required in order to maintain a flow of
electricity in response to depreciation and demand requirements.

Figure 1: Proposed Relationships of Infrastructures and Contextual Factors

However, the existing generation asset mix also influences the technology
selection for investment in generation. For example, existing generation stocks must be
able to supply additional energy when the wind does not blow to meet demands in load.
Therefore, reserve generation must be available to balance supply and demand
accordingly. Without the appropriate mix of resources and reserves to balance wind
7

energy variability, wind cannot be added to the system. Thus, the stock of generation
assets must be able to adjust to wind energy’s variable output to maintain flows of
electricity, since supply and demand must balance on the electrical grid. Generation
assets also retire and with all else equal these retirements would create market
opportunities for other forms of generation. Therefore, generation assets that retire open a
“market space” and represent opportunities that wind energy or other technologies may
also take advantage of.
Interconnection to the grid is necessary and transmission infrastructures are
essential economic complements to generation that permits the flow of electricity to
markets. Therefore, transmission must have sufficient capacity and be accessible to wind
energy resources. Thus, the existing stock of generation and transmission assets
influences the investment selection, since the new assets must be connected and
integrated in a manner that allows for delivery to markets.
The stocks of generation and transmission exist within a complex milieu of
subsidies, set-asides and prescriptive governance processes that influence the selection of
the various technologies that may be used to generate electricity. In addition, the
contextual factors within a state also shape to deployment outcomes. The outcomes in
turn add to and influence the mix of generation stocks over time.
Importantly, this study examines the selection of generation assets. In other
words, this study is not concerned with selection of how existing assets meet
instantaneous demand for electricity (or load) within markets, but it instead focuses on
investigating the determinants of the selection of wind generation facilities to meet future
8

demand. Studies that have previously examined the relationship of wind energy
deployment to various determinants have often not clarified the distinction of selection of
generation assets for meeting future demand versus supply for instantaneous demand
(e.g. Maguire, 2010). In other words, researchers have often examined factors related to
electricity dispatch from existing facilities rather than factors that determine the selection
of future generation technologies. The intent of this study is to explore the selection of
future generation facilities and not to explore factors related to the utilization of existing
assets meets load demand.
To consider how future generation assets are selected, it is important to
understand how decisions are made as influenced by the economics of the investment.
Investments in generation and transmission assets are highly capital intensive and often
considered “lumpy” investments. In other words, to obtain the service that the
infrastructure provides, the entire facility must be constructed. For example, a
transmission line must extend from the generation location to the area with load/demand.
This facility must be complete with all required ancillary equipment in order to function
and be of a specific size, which is often prohibitively expensive to upgrade. Therefore,
the price of these transmission investments is not incremental and the provision usually
does not match the incremental increases in demand. As a result, the price for the use of
an uncongested facility should be equal to the short-run marginal costs with any higher
price that recovers the capital at risk resulting in under-utilization of the facility. As the
facility becomes congested prices rise; nonetheless, when the facility expands the
developer incurs capital costs that must be passed on to the consumers at the same time
9

that prices decline to the short-run marginal costs. This “lumpy” characteristic of
infrastructure leads to a jagged price pattern that is problematic for the return of invested
or risk capital. The lumpy characteristics of infrastructures have several effects on the
ability of the investors to obtain returns and imply long siting and construction times and
“schizophrenic” investment patterns (Schuler, 2012).
Investments and depreciation in generation facilities are also related to the “lockin” effect of existing technological, economic, system-level infrastructure, and
institutional factors. Infrastructure investments are usually very long lasting. For
example, generation assets typically are in service for a period of 30 to 50 years. This
characteristic leads to institutional structures that may not be favorable to new market
entrants. For instance, utility operators have been trained in an environment that consisted
of large, conventional central power plants. This training may bias operators to reject
variable renewable energy resources (Sovacool, 2009). In addition to institutional lock-in,
geographic lock-in also occurs. The location of transmission assets are based upon the
generation assets and technologies that existed at the time of transmission construction.
In other words, conventional fossil plants were located as needed on the transmission
network with fuels transported to that location, or transmission was located to suit the
development of the large-scale fossil plants near the available fossil resources. Wind
energy is site-specific and must be located with the resource, thus providing additional
challenges to the developer resulting from transmission path dependency. This difference
between wind and fossil generation has influenced the geography of the grid and
potentially disadvantaged the development of wind resources.
10

Wind energy does not enter into a virgin market but instead must compete with
existing technologies that provide similar services. As previously stated, the
infrastructure that exists has evolved to accommodate existing technologies and therefore
may be less (or more) favorable to the market entrant. Proximate causes, such as resource
levels and price differentials (as influenced by policies), may therefore only have limited
explanatory power. Indeed, case study research on the deployment of wind power has
argued that the catalysts for breaking technological lock-in for wind development include
not only high wind resources and wind energy cost reductions but also supportive and
stable institutional frameworks. Factors characterized as barriers to wind include
cumbersome and lengthy authorization processes, difficulties accessing the grid, and
obtaining authorizations to interconnect (del Rio & Unruh, 2007). These factors may lead
to lock in of the existing technology in preference to the new market entrant. These
factors are coincidental with the main variables considered in this study (Table 1 and
Figure 1); however, the previous studies that considered these factors have done so
qualitatively through case studies while this study will examine these factors
quantitatively.
Hard infrastructures. Investment in generation plants is influenced by the
existing and ongoing investments in hard infrastructures, including transmission2.
Transmission is a capital stock in this study, subject to investments and depreciation. The
study does not consider the drivers of the stock level of transmission, but instead

2

A glossary of terms is provided in Appendix A.
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develops an indicator for the stock level. Augmenting the complementary nature of
transmission, the generator is often required to pay upgrades to accompany new
generation, including upgrading existing transmission and provision of transmission to
the nearest substation. The upgrades and generation tie lines (or gen tie lines in industry
parlance) increases the costs for developers and influences the investments in electric
generation technologies. Consequently, the investments in wind energy generation are
influenced by the stock of transmission. Therefore, these stock levels should be
considered. Hypothetically, increased transmission availability across a state and
corresponding increase in capacity would be positive for the deployment of wind
generation.
Another hard infrastructure that influences selection of future generation assets is
the existing generation assets available to balance the demand and supply of electricity.
Consumers of electricity are primarily atomistic actors that create demand through
individual actions, while suppliers are coordinated to balance the variable load.
Therefore, the ability to adjust supply through the management of generation output is
critical. Different technologies have differentiated abilities to adjust output. Balanced
against these operating constraints is the variable nature of wind energy generation.
Therefore, the stock of generation assets must not only balance against the variability in
demand, but also variability in wind energy production or supply of electricity. The
ability to balance loads is therefore essential in the selection of the future assets,
including wind. This study hypothesizes that states with higher levels of generation assets

12

that can quickly adjust to supply or demand changes are able to integrate higher levels of
wind energy development.
The depreciation or retirement of the existing generation assets is another facet of
the hard infrastructure to consider. Depreciation decreases the supply of electricity to the
market on a long-run basis, thus affording a “market space” for new entrants.
Depreciation may also be lumpy, since large generator retirements can open a large
market space for new entrants. While many plants have a certain life expectancy,
depreciation must be considered in conjunction with policy. For example, the
implementation of new air quality standards may accelerate the depreciation of plants
with higher emissions. This study examines facility retirements by collecting the statelevel data for the period of the study. Increased retirements are hypothesized as favorable
for additional wind energy deployment.
Soft infrastructures. Soft infrastructure consists of the policies and governance
structures that influence the patterns of development. Policies either accelerate or retard
the development of wind energy by influencing the return on investment. Wind energy
return on investment is influenced by policy in two ways: (1) through economic support
and (2) through favorable permitting or governance procedures. Developers should prefer
environments with higher levels of economic support and governance procedures that
accelerate the approval of developments and access to transmission, thus increasing the
returns to investor and decreasing the risk capital associated with the cost of licensure.
This study also considers the influence of soft infrastructures that govern access to
the grid. Grid access procedures can either accelerate or retard the development of wind
13

power. In this study, developers are assumed to prefer areas where governance of the grid
affords non-discriminatory access, thus enhancing the opportunity to connect to markets.
Areas where non-discriminatory practices are required are within the territories of
relatively new independent grid governance structures known as Independent System
Operators (ISOs) or Regional Transmission Authorities (RTOs)3. Wind energy
deployment is hypothesized to increase in areas subject to these governance structures
relative to the areas without independent governance.
Contextual factors. Wind resources are obviously an important factor to control
for in this study since where wind resources are not present wind energy development
cannot take place. On the other hand, where wind resources are prolific, the number of
potential sites may encourage development. The presence of higher levels of wind
resources is hypothesized as positive for deployment. This study will account for wind
resources across states and limit the study population based upon the resource
availability.
The relative prices of various generation assets should influence the selection of
wind energy versus other technologies. Relative prices are self-explanatory, since with all
else equal, profit maximizing firms will select the lowest cost type of generation to
maintain the level of capital stocks necessary to generate sufficient flows of electricity.
Yet, significant debate exists regarding the determination of the lowest cost technology
for generation and there significant complicating factors to directly comparing

3
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technologies. These complicating factors include various subsidies for each type of
technology, intermittency for renewables, variable and fixed cost differences, and
differences in capital costs. This study summarizes this debate in Chapter Three and
proposes to examine the effects of wind energy prices to the deployment of wind. This
examination will provide evidence of whether markets are sensitive or insensitive to price
signals. Lack of price sensitivity would indicate that economic supports and/or policies
distort the market for selection of future generation technologies to the point where
technological cost comparisons are not valid.
Electricity demand is also another obvious contextual factor to examine when
exploring the determinants of wind energy deployment. Since increased demand requires
increased supply, opportunities for additional capacity additions would be created, that in
turn provide opportunities for wind generation. These areas would be where demand
growth is most rapid and therefore, where wind may develop at an accelerated rate,
because of greater opportunity. On the other hand, should increases in efficiency or a
reduction in economic activity decrease demand, then opportunities to construct new
generation facilities should be less. In-state electricity demand will be examined to
determine the influence of wind energy deployment.
Import and export of electricity should considered, since states with large wind
assets may export power through transmission networks. Conversely, states with lower
levels of wind energy may also import the energy to meet policy or load requirements.
These imports and exports determine whether wind power deployment is occurring
resulting from in state or out of state demand. In addition, should states with higher
15

imports and exports show increased deployment, the transmission links between states
are an important factor.

Dependent Variable – Wind Energy Generation
This study examines the level of stocks of wind energy generators. Wind energy
deployment is the dependent variable for this study, since we are concerned with what
factors influence the stock level. For the dependent variable, variation must exist within
the selected unit of analysis. This section examines the various indicators to measure the
stock level and demonstrates variation in stock levels across US states.
The measurement of the level of wind energy development within a state presents
a challenge for researchers, since wind is an intermittent resource and output varies
according to the wind regime, variability of the climate and the turbine model. Each wind
turbine model has a nameplate capacity, which refers to the full-load output of the turbine
under ideal conditions. Therefore, the nameplate capacity refers to what the instantaneous
turbine electrical output would be at an optimal wind speed. This capacity is expressed in
megawatts (MWs). Wind speeds vary over time; therefore, the maximum capacity of the
turbine is not produced throughout the year. The actual production is measured in
megawatt hours (MWh), which is the actual output of the turbine through the various
wind conditions during a period. Production varies over time from wind speed variability
and the turbine’s power curve. The power curve is essentially the output of a particular
model of turbine as a function of wind speed. The ratio between the ideal full load output
over time and actual generation over time is the gross capacity factor. Specifically when
16

accounting for losses that occur from conditions related to energy production, such as
icing and soiling of turbine blades or other factors, the net capacity factors is determined.
Net capacity factors typically range in modern turbines from 20% to 40% but may be
over 50% for superior wind sites. In comparison, fossil fuel or nuclear plants typically
have higher capacity factors greater than 70%, with the downtime typically associated
with scheduled maintenance (Energy Information Agency, 2013).
The differentiation in the capacity factors for wind versus fossil plants is
problematic when comparing either the nameplate capacity within a state for all sources
of electricity, or the percent of total generation by source. Comparing fossil and wind
resources strictly on nameplate capacity leads to the perception that the nameplate wind
generation capacity is actually higher than nameplate conventional energy, since wind
energy has a lower capacity factor. On the other hand, comparison by MWh of output is
also somewhat problematic since wind production varies from year to year from annual
variations in weather patterns. This variation obviously affects the total output of other
producers as well, since electricity supply and demand must balance. Balancing the grid
by accepting more wind generation requires decreasing production from other sources
(with all else being equal), thus, reducing the production from other generation types
during the year.
Research specific to wind energy deployment has utilized nameplate capacity and
generation output measures in a number of ways to handle the issue of wind power
intermittency. Researchers have utilized dependent variables that include: the nameplate
capacity per state, nameplate capacity additions per county, nameplate capacity divided
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by state wind energy potential nameplate capacity, growth in capacity and number of
large projects (>25 MW) (Bohn & Lant, 2009; Hitaj, 2012; Maguire, 2010; Shrimali &
Kneifel, 2011). Notwithstanding these considerations, consensus has emerged among
researchers in wind energy that total nameplate MWs capacity is the appropriate measure
for exploring wind energy determinants and policy influence.
Following the standard methods for describing wind energy development this
study will use the total nameplate capacity of deployed wind in power a state as the
dependent variable. Considering nameplate capacity, this measure does indicate in
absolute terms the total MWs of wind energy development within a state despite the
concerns with production. With all else equal, the total MWs should be equivalent to
where investment capital is being deployed, and therefore, indicate where favorable
environments exist for investment.
Wind energy deployment across states. Wind energy deployment across the US
has varied across space and time. The level of total deployment across states in the year
2012 shows that several states have achieved relatively high levels of deployment, while
others have lagged in the levels of wind energy deployed. In 2012, Texas was the leader
in terms of MWs of nameplate capacity deployed with a level more than double the next
state, which was California (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Total MWs Deployed per State - 2012 (States>250 MWs)
Source: (US Department of Energy 2014)

Nonetheless, these two leading states have taken very different development
paths. At the turn of the century, California was the leader in deployed MWs of wind
energy and thus started the century with relatively high levels of deployment. Texas, on
the other hand, started with very little development but rapidly overtook California.
Deployment in Texas than accelerated making the state the US leader in wind energy
deployment. Other states have shown varying patterns in the deployment of wind (Figure
3). These differentiated paths to the outcomes provide variation across time for the
dependent variable.
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Figure 3: Cumulative MWs Deployed 1999-2012 States with >1000 MWs in 2012
Source: (US Department of Energy 2014)

Independent Variables
The measurement and operationalization of the factors that influence wind energy
deployment are essential to this study. The following sections provide an overview of the
factors that influence wind energy deployment. Further details regarding the
operationalization and data collection for all variables are found in Chapter Three.

Wind resource availability and variation. Obviously, a large factor to consider
is the wind resource availability. Wind resources are mapped and the distribution of these
resources is heterogeneous across the United States (Figure 4). As the map clearly shows,
large swaths of the central United States, including parts of the states of Texas, Kansas,
Oklahoma, Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, and North
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Dakota and South Dakota have large areas of high average annual wind speeds at a height
of 80 meters above ground level. However, in the southeastern states, large areas are
relatively devoid of resources. In the northeast and western US, resources are spotty, but
many of these states have wind resources that would support development. Thus, while
some areas are devoid of resources, large areas of the United States are amenable to wind
energy development. Consequently, this study will be limited to states that possess
sufficient wind energy development potential, as discussed in the section for the selection
of the population for analysis (below).

Figure 4: Average Wind Speeds at 80 meters Above Ground Surface
Source: (US Department of Energy, 2014)

In addition to mapping the resource availability, the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory has calculated the potential for wind energy deployment (in MWs of
nameplate capacity) across all fifty states (US Department of Energy, 2014). The
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resource availability calculation considers the land area within each state that has a gross
capacity factor of at least 30%. The researchers also excluded wilderness areas, parks,
urban areas, and water features from the potential. The resource estimates reflect the
resource availability at an 80-meter hub height, the standard for turbine height during the
period of this study. From this analysis, approximately 10,956,912 MWs of potential
wind energy capacity exists across the United States (US Department of Energy, 2014).
Examining these resource endowments more closely, Texas has nearly twice the
estimated nameplate capacity as the next state, Kansas (Figure 5). Two tiers are apparent
for the resource endowments below Texas before the number of potential MWs declines
in a relatively rapid fashion. In the first tier of states, Kansas has relatively the same
resource base as Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota with wind
resource capacities ranging from 952,000 MW to 770,000 MW of nameplate capacity.
The next tier of states consists of Iowa, Wyoming, Oklahoma, Alaska, and New Mexico,
with potential wind development ranging from 570,714 MWs to 489,270 MWs of
nameplate capacity. Resource availability then rapidly declines with Wisconsin and
Arizona demarking the 100,000 MW and 10,000 MW potential, respectively.
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Figure 5: Potential Nameplate Capacity by State (>10,000 MW potential)
Source: (US Department of Energy, 2014)

This study hypothesizes that areas with higher resources are correlative with
higher levels of deployment. Therefore, to examine the variation in resource endowment
across states, this study utilizes the NREL wind energy potential as a fixed independent
variable.
Electrical transmission development. In the electrical industry, transmission
refers to the infrastructure necessary to move electricity from generation sources to load
centers juxtaposed to distribution. Distribution is the movement of electricity into local
areas for consumption, typically from substations that receive the energy transmitted
from generation sources. Transmission lines are typically 69 kilovolts (kV) or greater in
capacity and distribution lines are typically lines that are 33 kV or less. The voltage of the
transmission line refers to the electric energy charge difference of the electrical potential
energy transported between two points and relates to the capacity of the line. The linear
or geographic unit of measurement of transmission is typically in circuit-miles where the
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distance is equivalent to the distance (in number of miles) that the individual circuits on a
line cross. The circuits on a line refer to the number of conducting lines that a
transmission line may have. Specifically, a power pole may have only one circuit or
multiple circuits (usually when multiple, the configuration is two circuits and referred to
as a double-circuited line) on a single transmission structure. Should a line be doublecircuited, the circuit miles are doubled as is the lines’ capacity.
In this study, it is important to note that transmission is defined as the
transportation of electricity from the generator’s step-up transformer substation to a step
down transformer where the electricity is distributed. Generating stations typically
interconnect to a step-up transformer that in turn connects to transmission lines. These
transmission lines lead to substations where voltages are stepped down for distribution.
Figure 6 depicts the key elements of the electric power grid, including these transmission
features.

Figure 6: Key Elements of the Electric Power Grid
Source: US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004

Geographically, the existing transmission is not coincidental with the wind
resources for the United States as a whole, since most of the wind resources exist in areas
that are remote from load and have relatively few high voltage transmission assets. Figure
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7 depicts the wind resource (left panel) versus the transmission assets (right panel) for
transmission greater than 500 kV. Thus, the areas with the greatest wind resources have
very few high capacity transmission lines. Coincidentally, this area has 47% of the
nation’s generation interconnection requests (Silverstein, 2011). Should these
interconnection requests be primarily wind energy, this specifically points to an
additional geographic problem for wind generation, the disparity between resource
locations and load centers on a national basis juxtaposed to in-state demand.

Figure 7: Transmission Assets versus Wind Resources
Source: (Silverstein, 2011)

Typical transmission voltages are 230 kV, 345kV, 500kV, and 750kV. These
higher voltages enable higher transmission capacities in terms of MW. Elevated or
increasing transmission availability is hypothesized as a positive factor in the
development of additional generation resources. To examine the effects of the geography
of the transmission system, this study will use the circuit miles of transmission within
each state. Therefore, the growth in circuit miles of transmission represents the expansion
of transmission availability within a jurisdiction. Therefore, the number of circuit miles
per state provides a reasonable approximation of the capacity expansion of transmission.
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Policy. The policy instruments that incentivize wind energy consist of four broad
types: production incentives, financial incentives, capacity incentives and favorable
permitting regimes. Production incentives are based on the amount of energy produced.
Financial incentives consist of favorable tax treatment that is primarily associated with
the jurisdiction where the facility is located. Capacity incentives are those measures that
require or incentivize a particular amount of renewable energy to be installed. A
favorable siting policy refers to the preferential treatment of wind energy in comparison
to other forms of generation during the licensing process.

Wind energy production incentives. Wind energy is subject to production
subsidies at the federal and state level. These subsidies take the form of tax credits or
cash payments for energy production, typically in cents per kWh. Variation exists across
the states in the type of and amount of production subsidy that each state provides to
wind energy. In 2012, three states considered in this study (see Selection of the
Population, below) provided a state level production tax credit (PTC). The federal PTC is
consistent across states; yet, recent research indicates that the federal production tax
credit interacts with state level incentives to provide elevated wind deployment relative to
when the PTC is not in force (Shrimali, Lynes and Indvik 2015). The data for total PTC
incentives are available for all jurisdictions on a cents/kWh (or $/MWh) basis that allows
for the examination of the effects of these policies that incentivize wind energy across
states.
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Wind energy financial incentives. Wind energy financial incentives in this study
consist of relief from or credits for corporate tax, property taxes, and equipment sales
taxes. All property taxes and sales tax are exemptions and not credits. In the case of the
property taxes, the state typically does not levy the current state property tax on the
benefit of the installation of the facility equipment. In the case of the sales tax exemption,
a similar approach applies where the state does not levy the tax. Finally, the corporate tax
consists of investment tax credits (ITC) or a deduction of the cost of the equipment from
the corporate income.
Wind energy capacity incentives. A popular state level policy is the RPS that
provides a market set-aside through a generation or sales requirement for a percentage of
energy production. This requirement varies across states; nonetheless, the number of
MWs of nameplate capacity or MWh of required generation can be estimated for each
state for each year the policy is in force. In addition to the RPS, some states also support
wind energy demand through mandatory green power purchase options for consumers
and state government green power purchasing (GPP).
Wind energy siting policies. Wind energy is subject to a permitting process where
the government provides a license to construct and operate the facility. Three basic
models have been proposed at the state level: 1) a locally based (Standard), 2) a
simplified state-level model and 3) a minimal model (Bohn & Lant, 2009). In addition to
these state based requirements, where federal lands exist, a federal permit is typically
required. Federal permitting is in addition to the local or state requirements ad would
represent an added burden to developers. Some states, such as Texas and states east of the
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Rocky Mountains, have very little federal lands. States within the Rocky Mountain west
and along the west coast have varying amounts of federal lands. This study proposes to
determine if developers avoid a cumbersome and expensive federal processes through an
examination of the area of federal lands within a state.
Transmission access policies. The governance of the access to transmission
should influence levels of wind development. Two structures exist across the United
States: the RTO/ISO administered transmission grids and utility operated grids. Utility
operated grids are argued as preferentially granting utility generators access to
transmission in lieu of independent power providers who typically develop wind assets
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2014). Therefore, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) supported the creation of the RTO/ISO governance,
where the transmission assets are operated by an independent entity that is designed to
provide non-discriminatory access to generators. These entities were authorized and
encouraged through FERC orders 888, 889, and 2000, which were enacted in the late
1990s (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2014). The first independent grid
operations commenced operations in 1998. These entities have expanded over time and
these governance structures are hypothesized to afford elevated access to wind
generators. This study investigates the effects of these transmission governance structures
through the development of data for the territory within each state that is subject to
RTO/ISO governance.
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Selection of generation assets. The cost of deploying various generation assets
should be examined to determine the influence of price to the selection of future
generation technologies. Renewable energy researchers have compared various
technologies for generating electricity through two differing methods. Researchers have
examined (1) the percentages of the various forms of electrical generation and (2) the fuel
prices for thermal generation (Gong, 2011; Kneifel, 2008; Maguire, 2010; Shrimali &
Kneifel, 2011). Turning first to fuel prices, this operationalization only captures one
aspect of the cost of competing forms of generation, the variable costs of fuels, which is
problematic. Other costs must be incorporated in addition to fuels, such as the capital
costs of the facilities, operational costs, maintenance costs, and financing. These costs
comparisons have been explored through calculations of the levelized costs of electricity
or LCOE. LCOEs have been the subject of fierce debate and several issues are incumbent
with the use of these measures, as well. Second, percentages of generation are
problematic with respect to the variation in generation that occurs, particularly where
variable assets, such as wind are considered.
This study proposes to avoid the aforementioned debates and to focus on the
actual power purchase price (PPA) of wind energy to test whether wind deployment
levels across states are sensitive to the price of wind energy. Should wind deployment
levels not be sensitive to price, this would indicate that policy instruments may provide
support such that comparisons across technologies on a percentage or fuel price basis
may not be feasible from market distortions. Lack of price sensitivity would suggest that
policies to support wind are effective.
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Flexibility of the generation mix. Demand for electricity or load usually varies
throughout the day. Usually load grows in the morning, peaks in afternoon, decreases in
late evening, and reaches a low point in the early morning (Figure 12). The minimal
demand that is present throughout the 24-hour period is met with “baseload” assets –
assets where the variable costs are low. Variable costs are those costs for electrical
facilities are that change with variations in output. Variable costs consist mainly of fuel
for the facility (although some operations and maintenance costs may change with
variations in output). Changing the output from a particular facility or “ramping” is in
reaction to changes in load, or occur from in changes to supply. Intermediate demand is
load above baseload requirements and is served by assets with slightly higher variable
costs. Finally, peak demand is met with the most responsive technologies. Typically,
these technologies have the highest variable costs.

Figure 8: Typical Load Curve
Source: (Kaplan, 2008)

This study proposes to examine the influence of the flexibility of each state’s
generation fleet to affect wind energy deployment. The assets in each state are grouped
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according to a topology of baseload, intermediate and peaking assets. The number of
MWs of nameplate capacity of each type provides an indication of how flexible the
generation fleet would be in response to changes in supply or demand. This novel
examination should shed additional light on the competitive versus complimentary nature
of various assets and on how the existing generation technologies influence wind
deployment.
Depreciation and retirement of facilities. No previous research was identified
that considers the depreciation of the capital stock of generation assets. With all else
equal, there must be increased demand or substitution of retiring generation assets for the
deployment of additional generation assets to occur. Considering depreciation increases
net demand by removing supply from the market, retirements should be considered. The
EIA tracks the retirement of electrical generation facilities on EIA form 860. The data
indicates that since 1999, over 66,000 MWs of generation assets have been retired across
the US. With many plants reaching the end of their economic lives during the next
decade, retirements should increasingly provide increased market space and hence,
demand for new generation facilities to replace these retirements. Capital stock
depreciation will be examined by determining the number of MWs of generation that are
“retired” within a particular jurisdiction. Retirement of facilities may not be related to the
economic life of the facility, but instead to factors such as emission policies that increase
costs or through lower cost competing technologies. These factors are considered in
detail in Chapter Three.
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Electricity demand, import/export, and electricity price. Demand for
electricity must also be examined as a factor that influences deployment. Obviously, with
all else equal, increased demand would require additional supply that may be provided by
wind energy generation. This study examines the influence of demand by utilizing a
measurement of the total demand per state in MWh. However, demand can also be filled
through imports into a state via transmission. Conversely, exports of power may also fill
demand outside of a particular jurisdiction. To examine the imports and exports of
electricity, this study will utilize a measure of the MWh of electricity that a state imports
or exports. Similarly, electricity prices may also increase or decrease the deployment of
wind power since higher prices may allow for higher priced generation within a
jurisdiction or lower prices may require lower cost generation. The electricity price in this
study refers to the average sales price within a state for residential, commercial, and
industrial electricity sales. Prices for electricity do differ across jurisdictions and may
influence the deployment of wind energy in either a positive or a negative manner. This
study will examine the price in cents/kWh across states to consider the influence of price
on wind energy deployment.

Summary of Variables Influencing Wind Power Deployment
This section summarizes the variables this study will examine in exploring the
determinants of wind energy deployment. Soft infrastructures will be examined through
variables related to policies for wind energy economic support, wind siting and
transmission access. Hard infrastructures are examined including transmission,
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generation fleet flexibility, and depreciation of generation assets. Economic contextual
variables include the price of wind energy, imports, and exports of electricity, electricity
demand, and average sales price. Finally, the wind resource potential accounts for the
availability of wind in each jurisdiction. These factors are examined in a cross-sectional
panel dataset for the years 2001 through 2012. Two factors, wind energy potential and the
proxy for wind siting policies, are fixed for the period of 2001-2012. The specific factors
examined by this study are presented on Table 2.
Variable
MWs of Wind Energy
Deployed
Renewable Energy
Production Incentives

Table 2: Summary of Variables
Type
Operationalization/Units
Dependent Variable
Total MWs within a state
Independent Variable

Renewable Energy
Capacity Incentives
Wind Energy Financial
Incentives

Independent Variable

Wind Siting Policies

Independent Variable

Transmission
Governance Policies
Transmission Stocks
Flexibility of Generation
Assets
Generation Retirement

Independent Variable
Independent Variable
Independent Variable

Wind Energy Potential

Independent Variable

Price of Wind
Generation
Demand

Independent Variable
Independent Variable

Imports/Exports

Independent Variable

Electricity Price

Independent Variable

Independent Variable

Independent Variable
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Value of federal and state production
subsidies within a jurisdiction on a
dollars per MW basis
Total GWHrs required per year of
renewable energy generation.
Financial incentives provided to
developers for property and sales taxes
(binary variables).
Total area of federal lands within a state
(acres)
Area (square miles) of each state with an
RTO/ISO governance structure
Total Circuit Miles
MWs of baseload, intermediate and
peaking generation.
MWs of generation removed from service
within a state
Total MWs of potential generation within
a state
Price of wind energy from PPAs as $ per
MWh on a regionalized basis
Total TW/h of electricity generated
MWh of imports or exports of generation
from or to a state.
Average cents per kwh of commercial,
residential, and industrial electricity
prices within a state.

Scope of the Study
The study will be limited in scope to large-scale facility deployment and examine
the period from 2001-2012 when significant wind energy deploy has occurred in the
United States. Large-scale facilities are defined as wind energy generation with projects >
1 MW. Small-scale wind generation for home or personal use will not be considered.
The period from 2001 to 2012 was selected since deployed wind energy facilities
did not extend across a significant number of jurisdictions until after 1999. Actual wind
capacity expanded from 6,737 MWs to 140,089 MWs during this period. This study
therefore captures 95% of the total deployment of wind energy in MWs of nameplate
capacity up to year 2012. This sample is therefore indicative of the vast majority of the
wind energy deployed in the United States until the year 2012. Finally, 2012 is the last
year that data are available for a number of the indicators proposed.
The sample for this study is developed from the United States at the state level.
Several advantages exist for using this unit of analysis. First, the policies related to wind
energy siting, and incentives are usually uniform within the state. For example, within
each state the tax incentives and RPS requirements are uniform within each jurisdiction
and therefore these variables can be compared across the units. Data exists at the state
level for wind energy potential, resources and deployment, depreciation, exports/imports,
electricity pricing and electricity demand. Nevertheless, the generation assets and grid
operations are problematic, since these typically do not fall within state boundaries. In the
case of system operations, there are often disparities between the areas served and state
lines. Generation assets may be dispatched across state lines to serve areas within another
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jurisdiction through import and exports of electricity. Data on transmission stocks is not
typically maintained at the state level, but instead at the entity level or at the regional
level. These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

Selection of population for analysis. A number of analysts have utilized
regression techniques to examine either wind energy or renewable energy development.
The population selection by these analysts has varied but essentially, there are two
differing approaches. Those analysts examining the effects of an RPS on overall
renewable generation have been more inclusive, typically examining 48 to 50 states
(Carley, 2009; Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2011; Gong, 2011; Kneifel, 2008; Yin &
Power, 2010). The analysts that have examined wind energy determinants have usually
focused on defining the populations through the wind power potential of a state. The
number of states defined by wind potential as part of the population has ranged from a
low of 25 (Maguire, 2010) to a high of 39 (Menz & Vachon, 2006). Table 3 summarizes
the population selections from previous studies.
Table 3: Population Selection for Previous Quantitative Renewable Energy Studies
Analyst(s)
Number
Criteria for Selection
of States
Adelaja, et al, 2010
50
Not described
Bohn and Lant, 2011
37
Wind Potential Available, Wind Energy Developed
>10 MW
S. Carley, 2009
48
Hawaii and Alaska eliminated from lack of wind
energy data
Delmas and Montes48
Hawaii and Alaska eliminated from lack of resource
Sancho, 2011
data
Gong, 2011
48
Not described
Maguire, 2010
25
Limited to states with wind potential
Menz and Vachon,
39
Excluded states without data or low wind quality
2006
(<500 MW)
Kneifel, 2008
49
Inclusive policy study of all renewables
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Shrimali and Kneifel,
2011
Yin and Powers, 2010

50

Not Described

50

Inclusive policy study of all renewables

The previous population selections point to a significant flaw in the analyses that
have been inclusive of all states. While the states may have policies to promote
renewables, they may not have the resources to do so. Indeed, wind power has been the
most economic and cost competitive renewable resource until recent price drops in solar
photovoltaic. Results of analyses conducted utilizing 48-50 states may be skewed since
development of renewable energy in these states is cost prohibitive, or simply infeasible
from a lack of resource availability.
This study selects the population for analysis based on two criteria: (1) the
existence of resources and (2) the actual development of resources during the period of
study. In other words, in the first instance, a state must possess sufficient resources to
develop wind power, or it cannot be defined as a member of the population of states
where wind development can take place despite any policy instruments or other
incentives. In the second instance, some states have developed a high percentage of their
wind resources, despite having a low resource base. For example, the estimated wind
energy potential for West Virginia and Pennsylvania is 1883 and 3307 MWs,
respectively. Regardless, the development of the resources in these states is high as a
percentage of the potential with Pennsylvania developing over 40% of the resource base
and West Virginia over 30%. Therefore, it is important to examine states that may have
low levels of resources as well as those with very high levels to understand how these
high penetration levels are achieved. The population must include states where
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development is taking place, despite having a relatively low resource base and those
states, which have high resources, irrespective of whether relatively high development
has been achieved.
Examining the data, Massachusetts has a resource base estimated as 1028
potential MWs; however, the state has developed approximately 10% of the resource.
Either no states with resources less than 1000 MWs have developed their resource base to
this extent, or it is the result of an extremely low resource base. For example, Delaware
has a wind energy potential of 9 MWs and the development is 5 MWs. Obviously, this
state represents an outlier since development of the entire resource base could consist of
the deployment of a very limited number of turbines. In the case of state with over 1000
MWs of resource potential, particularly a smaller state, development of a significant
portion of the resource base would require a much larger effort. This study therefore
proposes that the population consists of all state with >1000 MWs of potential wind
energy development. Although somewhat arbitrary, this level of potential resources
considers states that have developed small resource bases and where a relatively
significant number of turbines would be necessary to do so.
Finally, considering the remaining 37 states with greater than 1000 MWs of
potential, the state of Alaska and Hawaii are not considered in this study. These states are
not connected to the grid in the mainland and therefore do not import or export electricity
with other states. In addition to being isolated systems, pricing wind energy and
electricity is also problematic in relation to the other states. Therefore, the economic and
geographic characteristics of these locations significantly distort the price for electrical
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power in these areas. In addition, logistical considerations for installing various
generation technologies may add to these price distortions. Therefore, these states were
omitted from the analysis. The resulting population therefore consists of 35 US states
with wind energy resource potentials greater than 1000 MWs. These states are presented
on Table 4 and wind power development by state for all years to 2012 are shown on
Figure 9.
Table 4: States Selected for Analyses
Arizona

Maine

New Hampshire

Texas

Arkansas

Maryland

New Mexico

Utah

California

Massachusetts

New York

Vermont

Colorado

Michigan

North Dakota

Virginia

Idaho

Minnesota

Ohio

Washington

Illinois

Missouri

Oklahoma

West Virginia

Indiana

Montana

Oregon

Wisconsin

Iowa

Nebraska

Pennsylvania

Wyoming

Kansas

Nevada

South Dakota

Figure 9: Locations of Wind Power Project in the United States
Source: Wiser and Bolinger, 2012
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Added Value of this Study
Scholars have only recently begun to examine the determinants of wind energy
deployment. The systematic examination of wind energy deployment is also limited in
previous studies. Instead, the majority of research explores selected factors that
hypothesized to determine deployment of wind energy within a state. This study
examines the determinants of wind energy deployment systematically by specifically
focusing on the economic complements necessary for deployment.
By examining supportive hard and soft infrastructures systematically, one benefit
of this study is specification of the physical aspects of the system that have not been
considered or have been under-examined by previous studies. The literature review for
this study did not identify any previous studies that have considered either the retirement
of generation facilities, or the flexibility of the existing assets. Investigating the flexibility
of generation assets will add value by identifying an asset mix that is supportive of the
integration of wind energy assets. The investigation of retirement will determine whether
accelerated depreciation of existing assets may add to wind energy deployment. This
study will specifically examine the factors that have not been considered in the previous
studies.
Transmission is underspecified in the literature with only one researcher
examining a fixed dataset as compared to panel data that describes the changes in the
transmission system during the recent period of wind energy expansion. This study
develops a novel panel dataset for transmission to explore this relationship. The
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correlation of physical assets to the outcomes of wind energy may shed light on whether
complementary policies supporting electricity transmission could be more effective than
policies that only support wind ventures economically or through advantageous licensing
processes.
In addition, with many analysts forecasting grid parity of wind-generated energy
with traditional fossil resources, the importance of characterizing the constellation of
factors that favors increased renewable energy deployment is of growing salience since
removal of wind energy subsidies at the federal level has recently occurred in the United
States. Fostering the wind energy sector through indirect means, such as increasing the
availability of transmission or accelerating the retirement of other assets, may therefore
be of increasing importance.
The findings of this study could be of particular interest in emerging markets,
which are just beginning to deploy renewable energy. By determining the factors that
support the wind industry, emerging markets can take advantage of the “lessons learned”
in the United States. Therefore, markets with limited resources may find that instead of
direct subsidies for renewable energy, the construction of favorable transmission
networks combined with the depreciation/retirement and incentivizing of particular
complementary generation assets is more favorable to wind energy development.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to extend the research that has been conducted in
wind energy development in two ways: (1) the inclusion of under and unexamined
factors, and (2) the improvement of data for analyses. The research of wind energy
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determinants is in its early stages, resultingfrom a lack of data and the relatively short
time the industry has been active (Hitaj, 2012). Significant opportunities exist to refine
the data and structure the analysis. Earlier studies have been limited in the
conceptualization of the system that is lacking in specificity and could be improved
(Carley, 2009; Maguire 2010).
Research Hypotheses
Nine hypotheses are tested. These are:
1. Wind energy deployment is increased in states with elevated wind energy
potential.
2. Policies for siting wind that require an additional level of analysis
decrease levels of wind energy deployment.
3. Policies that require increased wind energy generation capacity increase
wind energy deployment.
4. Policies that incentivize wind energy production increase wind energy
deployment.
5. Policies that provide financial incentives to wind energy increase wind
energy deployment.
6. Grid governance that provides non-discriminatory access increases wind
energy deployment.
7. Increased generation asset retirements increase wind energy deployment.
8. Generation that is more flexible is complementary to wind energy
deployment.
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9. Elevated levels of transmission stocks increase wind energy deployment.
Importance of the Study
This study is significant since it will add to the literature of wind energy
determinants with implications for policy design and policy effectiveness. With respect to
wind and renewable energy policy research, the majority of studies have examined policy
effectiveness and have not concentrated on the economic complements that are necessary
to support the industry. This study is the first to examine the complements and the
policies in a comparative fashion. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the
differentiation of this study from the previous literature.

Policy effectiveness. Several researchers have examined the effectiveness of
renewable energy policies to increase deployment (Carley, 2009; Delmas & MontesSancho, 2011; Gong, 2011; Shrimali & Kneifel, 2011; Yin & Powers, 2010). The basic
question asked by these studies is whether renewable energy economic support policies
are effective or efficient at increasing the total MWs or percent of energy generated from
renewable sources. Studies of policy effectiveness have focused on the effects of various
instruments to increase deployment of renewable energy or of wind energy. Studies that
examine policy efficiency have also focused on determining whether electricity prices
increase from deployment of renewables and the loss or gain to consumer surplus (Hitaj,
2012; Gong, 2011). This study does not focus on policy efficiency or policy effectiveness
but instead explores the influence hard infrastructures and policies on the selection of
future generation assets.
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This study also differs from studies that have developed a normalized measure of
policy effectiveness across states (International Energy Agency, 2008). Instead of
determining policy effectiveness and normalized remuneration levels as in the IEA study,
this study will instead use independent variables developed from a systems perspective.
This study therefore does not seek to determine the normalize remuneration from various
policy instruments, but instead to compare the relative influence of infrastructures and
policies.
Determinants of wind energy deployment. This study also differs from
existing studies of the determinants of wind energy. The current literature focuses
in a more ad‐hoc and less systematic fashion to examine the proposed determinants
while this study proposes a systematic framework for examining the infrastructure
that must exist to support wind energy deployment. Therefore, while other studies
have examined political and social factors related to the development of wind
energy, this study instead focuses on the soft and hard infrastructures that directly
govern and provide services necessary for wind energy development.
This study will add to the previous policy literature by examining factors omitted
in the current wind/renewable energy determinants literature. By examining the
infrastructure that supports wind energy in the context of supportive policy, this study
will provide insights into the strength of effects of hard infrastructures to soft
infrastructures. Improved policy design may result from considering the strength of hard
infrastructures to policy treatments. Therefore, this study may lead to the identification of
potential areas where policies may be improved by expanding the focus of policy from
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targeted economic support to supporting necessary economic complements. Specifically
for wind energy, this study may show that while targeted economic subsidies contribute
to development of wind energy, the supporting facilities associated with wind energy
may be of equal or greater importance. Through an understanding of relationship of wind
energy deployment to economic complements, improved policy instruments may be
designed.

Proposed Methods
The primary method of investigating the questions outlined above is through
quantitative techniques to establish the relative effects of the independent variables to the
dependent variable. Therefore, the main argument of this proposal—that existing
infrastructure has influence relative to subsidy levels and policy interventions—will be
tested by statistical methods. In addition, discussion of these factors will consider the
specific circumstances across states to provide a background and interpretation for the
statistical analysis.
Recognizing the complexity of this system, the quantitative methods will be
bolstered through qualitative analysis and discussion. The qualitative analysis will be
utilized to illustrate where deviation or agreement exists with the results of the
quantitative investigation. In other words, review of the results from the quantitative
analysis will determine if various constellations of factors lead to increased or decreased
deployment of wind energy at the state level.
Plan for the Dissertation
44

Chapter Two of this study reviews the existing literature on the determinants and
the factors that affect wind energy development. Chapter Three explains the methodology
for the collection of the data, specifies the operationalization of the variables, and
concludes by providing an overview of the methods of analysis for the data. Chapter Four
will present the research findings. Chapter Five will summarize the findings and provide
suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO
Formation of the Electrical Sector and Literature Review
This chapter starts by giving an overview of the history of generation and
transmission in the US. The theoretical basis for considering economic complements
concurrently with policies and other contextual factors is provided. Subsequently, the
relevant literature for renewable energy and wind power determinants is reviewed.
The overview of the history of the electricity generation and transmission sector is
instructive since path dependency and technological lock-in have arguably influenced the
patterns of investment and development. The examination of the theory of economic
complements and technology diffusion strongly supports the argument in this paper that
supportive infrastructures must be concurrently examined alongside policies. Finally, the
review of relevant literature identifies the gaps in our knowledge that have led to this
study.

Formation of the Electrical Energy Sector – An Overview
The history of the electrical energy sector spans three distinct periods that have
led to the industry of today. These three periods are described as the formative era, the
regulated monopoly era, and the current deregulatory phase (Hein, 2003). The formative
era extended from1880 to 1930 and consisted of the early competition and consolidation
in the industry (Hughes, 1983). In this period, inventors and entrepreneurs led
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developments in the sector to produced desirable networks. Technological transfers
swiftly followed. Competition, consolidation, and a growing epistemic community lead
to the regulated monopoly era. This era was characterized by expansion of a monopolistic
industry under the rubric of state level regulation. The current deregulatory phase has
been characterized by the unbundling of the sector through federal and state deregulation
to push for the formation of competitive markets for generation, provide independent
operation of transmission assets, and to segment these activities from distribution and
retail sales. This review is not intended to provide a comprehensive history, but instead to
provide an introduction for how path dependencies and lock-in evolved for the generation
and transmission portions of the electrical sector.
The transition to an unregulated market has been the result of federal and state
policy interventions. These interventions have provided the means to unbundle and
segment the sector and to form the nascent markets of today. Of particular interest to this
study is the deregulatory period since unbundling is not complete across the US and
differentiated regimes exist for regulation and governance of generation and
transmission. This study will first examine the deregulatory period to understand how
selection of generation and transmission are inter-related in a new unbundled structure,
fully recognizing that this structure has not been implemented across all states. Following
the exploration of deregulation, this study will then consider how the earlier periods have
led to the industry we see today.
The effort to deregulate markets was led at the Federal level by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The FERC was formed in 1977 as part of the
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response to the energy crisis of that time. At the same time as FERC was formed
congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). This act allowed
FERC qualified non-utility generators to supply bulk electricity and placed the
interconnection of these facilities under FERC jurisdiction. FERC was granted the
authority to regulate interstate transmission of electricity. Furthermore, the PURPA act
required that state regulators “take active roles” in developing the means for non-utility
generators to sell power to regulated utilities (Hirsch, 1999). These changes were the
initial formative steps that allowed the development of electricity markets and the
unbundling of the sector.
States were also encouraged by the PURPA acts to replace conventional regulated
approaches for electricity prices with markets. Concurrently, support increased for
eliminating regulation since non-regulated generators were providing power at lower
costs than regulated utilities. An epistemic community arose that provided novel ideas to
state regulators and alternative approaches to the regulatory utility model were
considered (Hirsch, 1999). Among these approaches were bidding schemes, pay-forperformance, demand-side management, least-cost planning, and integrated resource
planning. The implementation of these programs was uneven with a number of state
selecting to deregulate different portions of the sector, resulting in a hybrid system of
regulated and de-regulated generation and retail activities across the states.
Orders issued by FERC (Order No. 888 and 889) also pushed the restructuring of
the transmission sector to allow for open access to generators through the creation of
ISOs. Again, state regulators and utilities played a key role in these new structures. State
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regulators often required approval for the utilities to enter into the RTO/ISOs. In 1999,
FERC pushed the de-regulation further with FERC Order 2000 that called for the
establishment of RTOs and transmission planning on a regional scale (Hein, 2003). These
FERC orders essentially allowed for the deregulation of generation, established
electricity markets, and restructured transmission to encourage open access while placing
transmission assets under independent control. However, it is important to note that while
these changes were allowed, not all states have deregulated the sector fully and state
PUCs still often play a significant role in the approval of generation and transmission.
These regulatory changes allowed states to transform their electrical sectors. The
electricity sector that largely consisted of state-regulated vertically integrated monopolies
could establish competitive markets by separating the generation, transmission, and
distribution activities. The process of opening the sector to competitive markets
significantly changes the patterns and mechanisms for investments in generation and
transmission. Decisions regarding power plant investments, including the timing and
technology, were previously made under regulation by monopolistic utilities and public
authorities have now shifted and depend on the decentralized decisions of investors.
Likewise, transmission may no longer be controlled by the utilities within many
states. The authority for transmission access and operations in these areas has been
conveyed to independent system operators. Thus, the electricity sector is undergoing a
process where the planning by monopolistic and vertically integrated producers is being
replaced by a decentralized system that is partially based on prices (Leveque, 2006). This
deregulatory transition is allowing the unbundling of the sector and is segmenting the
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interests of the various providers of the elements essential to electricity provision.
Economically, generation, transmission, and distribution are complementary goods.
Confounding this relationship are the consumers, who do not consume these elements
separately, but instead are sensitive to the total price of the service. Further complicating
this relationship is transmission and generation that are partially substitutable. For
example, a choice is made to locate new generation assets closer to load rather than to
transmit the energy via new transmission.
In the monopoly model, joint optimization of the investment pattern was in the
interest of the firm, but in open competition, management is not present to coordinate
generation, transmission, and distribution. The current unbundling is allowing the
separation of transmission from generation to ensure that competitive generators have
non-discriminatory access to transmission. Yet, deregulation has been argued to lead to
strategic behavior from transmission and generation providers (Leveque, 2006). For
example, in order to provide for future transmission the transmission operator must be
informed regarding the plans for generation and vice versa; however, in a deregulated
environment this coordination is lacking. This lack of coordination can lead to deadlock
and under-investment in both segments of the industry. Since both transmission and
generation are considered lumpy investments, obviously both segments would benefit
when there is a high degree of coordination and cooperation.
Historic Development Patterns
Also relevant to the development of wind power is the historical development
pattern during the formation of the industry and prior to the monopolistic regime. Hughes
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(1983) argues that the formative period consisted of four stages. These stages were: 1)
invention and development, 2) technology transfer, 3) system growth and 4) substantial
momentum. Each of these stages is considered below.
In the first stage, the activities of inventors-entrepreneurs were key to the
development of the sector. These inventor-entrepreneurs developed not only the idea for
the technology, but also pushed the inventions until the systems were ready for use
(Hughes, 1983). The nascent power sector development commenced in a decentralized
fashion where the central power station was limited through transmission constraints
associated with the use of direct current (DC) and the practicalities of reciprocating steam
engines that provided the motive power for generation. Reciprocating steam engines were
limited on the ability to achieve greater economies of scale and low voltage DC power
constrained transmission to within one mile of the generator. Despite these limitations,
the systems were seen as useful and during the second stage, technology transfers
commenced with numerous change agents becoming involved in the growth of the sector
(Hughes, 1983). These characteristics led to a large number of companies that would
provide generation within a single city.
In the third stage, Hughes argues that limitations or bottlenecks to the growth or
expansion of the system are overcome. For example, engineers developed steam turbines
that exceeded the limitations of the reciprocating steam engines. Steam turbines exhibit
much greater economies of scale than steam reciprocating engines and decreased costs
significantly for electricity production. The transmission limitations of DC current were
overcome by alternating current (AC) that could be transformed to higher voltages. This
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transformation avoided the large current losses over distances that were associated with
the low voltage DC transmission systems.
To take advantage of the economies of scale associated with these new forms of
generation and transmission, market expansion was necessary and early market
participants sought to consolidate and expand markets (National Museum of American
History, n.d.). During the fourth stage, expansion of markets was accompanied by a rising
number of industry participants including business concerns, government agencies,
professional societies, and others who shape the system and are in turn shaped by the
technical aspects of that system (Hughes, 1983). Therefore, the technology and industry
participants in the formative years of the industry strongly pushed towards larger,
centralized generation facilities combined with longer AC transmission networks. The
economies of scale associated with generators and AC transmission partially drove the
pattern of development in the monopolistic era. These patterns illustrate the
complementary nature of transmission and generation.
Development during monopolistic period accelerated based on the large central
generation station and AC transmission model. Regional interconnections were
established and transmission voltages rose as the size of central station power units
increased to achieve economies of scale. These pursuits resulted in a dramatic decrease in
the costs of electricity provision with prices falling from 55 cents per kWh to 9 cents per
kWh ($1,992) from 1927 to 1967 (Hein, 2003).
These price decreases came to an abrupt halt in the 1970s because of the energy
crisis and increasingly expensive generation expansion plans (Hirsch, 1999).
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Technological progress and economies of scale appeared to no longer decrease prices in
the traditional fashion and monopoly utilities were considered inefficient. Introducing
competition was hypothesized to decrease prices and to provide benefits for the
consumer. The deregulatory wave and the energy crisis arguably led policymakers to
implement the policies that led to the deregulatory era we see today.
One lasting legacy of the monopolistic era was the large central system model.
This model arguably institutionalized utilities to invest in large base load plants and large
transmission lines. The geography of the transmission lines installed during this period
was based on the large central station model and the resources that were utilized to fuel
generation at the time (primarily coal). The characteristics of central station power, fuels,
and transmission led to geographic “lock-in” or geographic path dependency for the
transmission network. The lock-in and the lumpiness of investments are considered in
detail in the transmission, depreciation, and generation sections in Chapter Three.
Theoretical Overview: Economic Complements, Inputs, and Policies
The provision of electricity requires generation, transmission, load balancing, and
distribution to customers. Because of the nature of electricity and lack of storage
capabilities, these goods must be coordinated in a fashion that requires consumption of
the all the necessary services at the same time. Policymakers seeking to incentivize or
dissuade certain means of production in this environment have two basic choices of
instruments to do so. The first is to rule out or dissuade certain activities through
regulation; the second is to provide incentives to a focal activity such as wind energy
production.
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Literature on the diffusion of technology has argued that economic complements
to the focal treatment may provide barriers to the adoption and diffusion of new
technologies (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Schilling, 1998; Schilling, 1999). The management
literature exploring technological diffusion has focused on the underlying conditions
where technologies diffuse across adopters. In early studies, there was agreement on an
S-curve pattern of diffusion (Griliches, 1957; Mansfield, 1961; Rogers, 1962). This
familiar pattern is ascribed to learning benefits, heterogeneous benefits across consumers,
and real-option valuation resulting from the decision to invest in the adoption, as well as
the effects of network externalities (Attewell, 1992; Church & Gandal, 1993; David,
1969; Davies, 1979; Farrrell & Saloner, 1994; Kapur, 1995; Stoneman, 1983; Stoneman,
2002). Fabrizio and Hawn have also suggested and additional distinct case of indirect
network externalities where the benefits of adoption depend on the availability of
complementary good or service at the time of the adoption decision, which these authors
deem as complementary inputs (2013). These authors argue that complementary inputs
are similar to complementary products; however, complementary inputs must be
consumed at the same time as the focal good. In other words, these inputs must be
utilized simultaneously at the time of adoption to generate utility.
This approach differs from the typical complementary goods where after the
purchase of the focal good, other complementary products and services are consumed for
periods after the initial adoption. Fabrizio and Hawn hypothesize that in the case of
complementary inputs that the magnitude of technological diffusion in the case of a
stimulating policy shock is substantially larger when there are higher levels of the
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complementary input. The nature of the electrical system, with the requirement of the
simultaneous consumption of goods including generation and transmission is an exemplar
of complementary inputs.
Wind Energy Determinants: An Overview of the Literature
The literature specific to determination of the factors that influence wind energy
deployment is relatively limited. The abbreviated nature of the literature is an artifact of
the relatively short time that the technology has been deployed in its modern form (Hitaj,
2012). The vast majority of wind turbines have been installed from about 2000 to present
and policies, including state level initiatives to support wind energy, were mainly enacted
after the year 2000 (Wiser, Namovicz, et al., 2007). Therefore, data availability has been
limited and research on the determinants for wind power deployment is a relatively new
and narrow field. Note that while a considerable volume of literature exists on various
aspects of wind energy economics, politics and technology, this review focuses on the
literature that is specific to deployment outcomes. In addition, this review focuses on the
determinants that the researchers argue as significant to wind energy deployment or that
are considered as part of this study. Regardless, no literature identified the relationship of
complementary inputs to outcomes or compared the relationship of infrastructure and
policies to outcomes in wind energy deployment.

Previous systematic examinations of the determinants of wind energy. Unlike
previous research, this study examines the existing policies and infrastructures to
determine the influence on selection of future generation assets, proposing causal
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relationships and linkages (Figure 1). Previous research on renewable energy and wind
energy deployment has not typically specified models of the causal relationships of
deployment variables with two exceptions: Carley (2009) and Maguire (2010). Carley
examines the causal effect of state RPS policies on RE deployment (Carley, 2009). She
proposes that the drivers of renewable deployment include political institutions, state
electricity trends, natural resource endowments, state socioeconomics, the state RPS and
other energy policies. These factors she arranges in a directed acyclic graph that she
states is a “causal diagram that identifies the directional relationship between the
treatment effect and the outcome of interest” (Carley, 2009 p. 3073). There are several
factors she proposes for treatment effects and outcomes related to RPS policies and
renewable energy development (Figure 10). Specifically, the state electricity trends that
Carley examines are electricity use per capita, gross state product (GSP) per capita, and
population growth rate. Yet while policy and electricity demand are considered (GSP is
often a proxy for demand), the analysis lacks three critical factors essential to wind
energy development. These factors are generation, depreciation, existing generation, and
transmission stocks.
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Figure 10: Directed Acyclic Graph
Source: (Carley, 2009)

Maguire specifically examines wind energy deployment (juxtaposed to Carly’s
examination of renewable energy deployment) and proposes a framework that is based on
the standard economic supply and demand model. In the supply side of this model, she
considers the project inputs of capital and labor, wind capacity, the influence of
regulations and financial incentives. On the demand side of the model, she proposes that
the quantity of wind generation is a function of the price of wind-generated electricity,
the total quantity of electricity produced, the price of substitutes and consumers
preferences for renewable electricity. Her research does not specifically consider
depreciation or transmission but instead focuses on price and policy interventions. She
specifically focuses on examining market factors in the analysis. Although a supply and
demand framework is proposed, this framework is appropriate for the selection of assets
to balance the grid during operations, rather than a framework to explore the selection of
future generation assets.
Therefore, studies that have proposed a systematic framework have therefore
examined the drivers of demand for additional electrical generation assets in a relatively
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selective fashion. In many cases the distal drivers, such as the political institutions that
decide policy have been examined rather than the direct drivers such as the
infrastructures and policies themselves. Previous researchers have not proposed a model
where stocks of generation coupled with complimentary infrastructure is the focus but
have instead focused on policies, political bodies, or relative prices as related to
outcomes. Therefore, augmentation of these studies is required, since deeper driving
factors, such as the stocks of transmission and generation, may instead contribute to the
growth or lack thereof in wind energy development, complimenting, or retarding the
effects of policy interventions.
Qualitative studies of renewable and wind energy determinants. The early
literature exploring the drivers of wind development consists of case studies and other
qualitative explorations. Many of these studies focus on the effects of a RPS on the
development of wind power and other renewable energy technologies. For example, one
of the early studies investigated RPS effects on wind energy deployment in Texas
(Langniss & Wiser, 2003). Langniss and Wiser argued that the Texas RPS design was
largely responsible for the state becoming one of the leading wind power markets in the
United States. A subsequent early qualitative study was the evaluation by Wiser, Porter,
and Grace (2004) of design and impacts of RPS policies in 13 states. The evaluation of
the 13 states consisted of a comparative examination to determine the effectiveness of
instrument design. These early qualitative studies were focused on investigating the
policy “effectiveness” and suggested that wind deployment outcomes were determined by
policy designs.
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Taking a different tact, Gouchoe, Everette, and Haynes (2002) studied the effects
of financial incentives on renewable energy deployment. This very early study was
conducted on small-scale, renewable energy technologies that are intended for onsite use
in residential or small commercial applications. Obviously, the findings of this study may
not be applicable to large-scale wind energy development; nonetheless, the study is
significant since policy measures outside of the effects of the RPS were specifically
examined. These authors argued that informational, financial, and institutional barriers
exist for the deployment of these systems. By making these arguments, the authors
introduced greater complexity, suggesting additional factors beyond policies were
contributing or detracting from wind power deployment.
Another notable qualitative study of the determinants of wind energy deployment
provided an overview of the policies and market factors that drove development in 12
states (Bird et al., 2005). Bird et al. diverged from the analysis of RPS and supportive
policies to include other economic and technological factors. These authors cited multiple
reasons for development including the volatility and increasing price of natural gas, high
prices for electricity that resulted from supply-demand imbalances and improved wind
generation technologies that lowered the price of wind-generated electricity. In addition
to these non-policy considerations, these authors also cited policies as driving
development. These policies included the federal PTC and state-level supportive policies
plus the RPS, tax, and financial incentives.
In addition to these state level analyses, Wiser et al. also provided a review of a
proposed federal RPS and how a federal RPS policy might relate to the state level RPS
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(Wiser, et al., 2007). Continuing the trend of examining RPS policies, Chen et al.
synthesized the results and methods RPS cost impact studies across 28 states to determine
the costs and benefits of these policies (Chen et al., 2009). While Chen et al. did utilize
quantitative methods in their examination the focus of the study was not on determinants
of wind energy but instead on the economic impacts of RPS policies. Multiple studies
have been conducted to examine the economic effects of various wind related policies but
few have examined directly the determinants for the deployment of wind energy. As
such, the remainder of this review will focus on relevant studies where quantitative
methods have been utilized to explore determinants of renewable energy and wind energy
deployment.
Quantitative studies of renewable and wind energy determinants. A number
of empirical investigations of renewable energy determinants have focused on the amount
of non-hydro renewable energy deployment (not exclusively wind-generated energy)
attributable to policy interventions. As such, these studies warrant examination since the
majority of non-hydro renewable energy deployed has consisted of wind energy (Table
5).
Table 5: Comparison of Nameplate Renewable Energy Deployment
Wind Energy versus Non-Wind
2002 2003 2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total Wind
MWs
Wind
Growth Yr
on Yr %
Total MWs
RE
Non Wind
Growth Yr
on Yr %

4687

6350

6723

9147

11575

16907

25410

26%

6%

26%

21%

32%

33%

27%

12058

12538

13162

13056

4%

5%

-1%

5%

12023 11803 11994
-2%

2%

1%
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2010 2011

34863 40267 46918
13%

14%

22%

13689 13544 14303
-1%

5%

17%

% of total
RE MWs
from Wind
28%
35% 36%
43%
48%
Adapted from Energy Information Agency, 2014

56%

66%

72%

75%

77%

Considering non-hydro renewable energy as a dependent variable versus wind, it
is important to note that wind energy deployed MWs year on year average growth has
been 22% while average non-hydro renewable nameplate MWs growth has been 3% for
the period from 2002 to 2011. In fact, during this period wind has increased it’s share of
non-hydro renewable energy from 28% to 77% of all non-renewable electricity
nameplate MWs. The development of nameplate MWs of hydro remained for the most
part flat; therefore, the logical conclusion is that the effect of most renewable incentives
has been to deploy additional MWs of wind, at least at the national level (see also Figure
13, below). In this study, we therefore assume that the effect of most renewable energy
supportive policies have mainly been supportive of wind energy nameplate deployment.
The first quantitative examination specific to wind power determinants utilized a
sample of 35 states to examine the effects of various policies to wind energy deployment
(Menz & Vachon, 2006). In this study, four differing dependent variables were examined
that included the installed capacity at the end of 2003, absolute growth in capacity since
2000, absolute growth since 1998, and the number of large wind energy projects (>25
MWs). The policies these researchers examined included the effects of public benefit
funds, fuel generation disclosures, mandatory green power options (MGPO), and retail
choice. This study found a positive relationship between wind development and the
presence of an RPS, MGPO, but interestingly a negative relationship between wind
energy development and retail choice policies. The difference between green power
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options and retail choice is that green power options are where utilities are required
provide a green power option to customers, while retail choice allows customers to
choose their form of electricity supply in a restructured electricity market. Thus, while
the findings for the effectiveness of an RPS are concordant with other research, the
findings regarding retail choice and green power options appear somewhat contradictory.
Regardless, this was the first study to utilize multivariate techniques to examine the
effectiveness of state level policies to promote wind power. The study focused on five
policies and no complementary inputs were examined.
Similarly, Kneifel (2008) examined all fifty states to compare policies to
outcomes for non-hydro renewable deployment. His study showed a positive correlation
with deployment and the existence of an RPS policy when operationalizing the RPS as a
capacity requirement based on a linear extrapolation of the required MWs from
enactment to the final requirement year. In addition, he argued that clean energy funds
(funds that directly subsidize utility scale renewable capacity construction) also showed a
positive effect. Finally, he claimed that MGPO is a driver for development.
Kneifel also examined comparative costs for other generation, the effects of other
forms of electricity generation and political factors. His study found that a weighted
average of the cost of wind, solar biomass, and geothermal was negatively correlated
with deployment and that the weighted costs of the retail prices for electricity in
bordering states was negatively correlated with deployment. The percentage of other
generation forms was not significant, with the exception of the percentage of nuclear
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generation. No correlation was found with the fuel costs but states with a higher league of
conservation voters score was positively correlated with deployment.
In another early quantitative study, Carley (2009) utilizes a dummy variable (1-3)
that counts the number of state policies within a jurisdiction to examine the effects of
loans, rebates, and grants and similarly constructs a tax incentive dummy variable that
consists of property, corporate, personal and sales tax credits. Her study examines the
effects of these policies to the total state’s percentage of renewable energy generation as a
portion of total generation from 1998 to 2006. Her index method is admittedly crude and
does not account for the characteristics of the tax or subsidy (Shrimali, Lynes, & Indvik,
2015). She found that grants, loans, and rebates positively influences development, while
the tax incentives are a negative influence for development. She also operationalized an
RPS as a binary variable and found that RPS policies do not significantly predict the
percentage generation from non-hydro renewable energy sources (Carley, 2009).
However, she finds that the RPS does increase the total amount of renewable energy
generation. Note that Carley’s study examined the percentage of renewable energy and
not the deployment in nameplate capacity.
Carley also examined competitive industries, political environment, wind energy
potential, electricity use, and price. Considering the political environment, she did find
that the League of Conservation Voter’s score and number of natural resource employees
in each state was positively correlated with the percent of renewable generation.
Surprisingly, she found increased wind potential decreased wind energy generation and
that higher electricity prices and electricity use resulted in lower wind generation.
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Doris et al., examined the effects of various state level policies on renewable
energy development placing the policies into two categories – market preparation (barrier
reduction) and technology accessibility (Doris, et al. 2009). The former included
licensing, certification, land access and the RPS, while the latter consisted of tax
incentives, grants, loans, etc. The analysis also looked at portfolios of policies or
combinations of policies that were based on identified best management practice and
policy interactions from previous research. The findings indicate that a correlation exists
between barrier reduction policies and development. Specifically, these researchers claim
that higher total renewable energy generation is significantly related to the
implementation of an RPS, production incentives, generation disclosures, interconnection
policies, and land access. The research also showed that the higher the number of
supportive policies, the greater the level of renewable energy deployment. Importantly,
these findings were presented as correlative and should be interpreted with caution since
several other factors were cited by these researchers as being potentially important and
intervening. The important and intervening factors these researchers cited included:
resource availability, technology cost, economic context, and social
acceptance/opposition in addition to ownership structures of projects and availability of
financing (Doris, et al. 2009). This study opened up several additional determinants for
consideration and called for the investigation of these additional factors. Regardless, the
investigation still fell short of systematically examining the complementary inputs that
influence selection of generation assets and the diffusion of wind energy generation.
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In a relatively unique and focused examination, Bohn and Lant (2009) examined
the role of state-level permitting processes on wind energy deployment in nameplate
MWs. This research argued that a simplified permitting process significantly enhances
the deployment of wind energy. These researchers proposed a three level model for
permitting and argued that these state level processes have strong effects. Yet, the data
lacks variation across states, with only one state having a minimal model and two states
having a simplified state-level permitting regimes. Thus, as they admit, their model is
suspect as a result. Regardless, their results do suggest that the permitting process to
obtain a license maybe an important part of the determinants at the state level.
As part of this same study, the researchers examined the effects of an RPS, wind
energy potential, accessibility of transmission, electricity market restructuring, and wind
energy prices. Bohn and Lant found that an RPS was a positive influence when coded as
the number of years since implementation and that higher wind energy potential was a
positive factor for deployment. They investigated the accessibility of transmission by
using population as a surrogate and found a positive effect as well. However, their work
indicated that market restructuring and higher wind energy prices were negatively
associated with increased deployment levels.
Adelaja et al. (2010) examined wind deployment in MWs as the dependent
variable and argued that RPS adoption and the stringency of its characteristics are key
drivers in wind development. In addition, these authors argue that elevated levels of wind
resources do influence the deployment of wind energy but the influence of wind
resources are relatively low in comparison to the policy, political, and economic factors
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they examined. One political factor they examined was the democratic control of the state
Senate, which was argued as positive for deployment. Considering the economic factors
they cite, the Gross State Product (GSP) and state tax per capita were argued as positive
factors related to wind energy development. On the other hand, public debt, and higher
population densities were argued as negative for wind development. Interestingly, these
authors found no effect from competing energy prices (Adelaja et al., 2010).
Maguire (2010) specifically examined prices and policies in comparison to wind
energy deployment expressed as annual state wind capacity divided by state wind
potential using a supply and demand framework. Maguire argued that RPS policies and
green power purchase programs positively influence a state’s wind capacity. However,
the operationalization of the RPS standard in Maguire’s work is unclear. She also found a
negative association with the League of Conservation Voters score and that the role of
energy prices is not significant with the exception of the price of natural gas (Maguire,
2010). While the lack of influence by market factors is supported by Adelaja et al.,
Maguire’s analysis is suspect for the influence of prices. By using a supply and demand
framework she deploys a method more suitable to the determination of the dispatch order
for generation assets to fulfill instantaneous demand instead of a method to determine the
selection of future generation assets. Importantly, the factors for instantaneous market
demands are not the same as factors for long-range selection of assets to fulfill
anticipated future demand. Hence, this study is not suitable for determining the factors
that are specific to the selection of power plants (see further discussion in Chapter Three).
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Yin and Powers examination of the RPS was arguably the most comprehensive to
date on that specifically focuses on that policy instrument (Yin & Powers, 2010). The
investigation examined the effectiveness of an RPS to the deployment of non-hydro
renewable energy capacity. The researchers expanded upon previous investigations by
factoring in the heterogeneity of policies across state jurisdictions. The heterogeneity
within the RPS policies that these researchers addressed was the ramping up of the RPS
requirement and the final percentage requirement. For example, a state may require a
30% standard for renewable energy production but the state allows a ramping period of
so many years for utilities to achieve this requirement. Because of the variability of
ramping rates, the net effectiveness of the policies varies across time and by each state. In
addition, the RPS coverage may vary, where certain types of utilities are exempt from
RPS requirements. For example, in some states municipalities and power cooperatives
may not be subject to the same RPS requirements as investor owned utilities. Finally, Yin
and Powers also accounted for the incremental share of the generation that resulted after
the RPS implementation. This means that all renewable energy production prior to the
RPS implementation was subtracted from the total to determine the amount that resulted
after the implementation of the RPS. This sophisticated and more comprehensive
approach resulted in the authors arguing that an RPS was effective at increasing the nonhydro renewable energy generation within states.
In addition to examining the RPS, Yin and Powers also argued that MGPO
policies are a positive and significant factor for the deployment of renewable energy.
They also found that the import of electricity was a positive factor for a state to deploy
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renewable energy. Finally, these authors found that the trading of renewable energy
credits (RECs) might serve to weaken the effect of an RPS policy.
Another study that examined the effects of RPS standards to generation was
conducted by Gong (2011). Gong’s study utilized the RPS indicator as derived by Yin
and Powers to consider a sample of 48 states. Gong found that RPS policies are on
average effective in increasing the share of renewable energy production, but do not
actually increase the electricity price. In addition, Gong argued that MGPO policies and
RECs were effective for increasing the deployment of renewable energy. Finally, he
argued that the net metering, an RPS with a penalty, the natural gas prices, and the use of
public benefit funds was negatively associated with the deployment of renewable energy.
Political variables considered included the political parties in government at the executive
and legislative levels within the state. Gong found these variables to be positive and
significant. The analysis also indicated that state imports of electricity were a positive
factor in the deployment of renewable energy.
Shrimali and Kneifel (2011) focused on the potential for renewable energy policy
to promote the penetration of renewable energy and found that RPS policies were
positive for the penetration of all types of renewables, however, the impacts varied
according to the type of renewable technology. Specifically for wind energy, these
authors did not find the RPS an effective instrument; yet, they found required green
power options and clean energy funds positively correlated with increasing penetration of
all types of renewables. Their examination also included economic variables, including
natural gas prices, per capita GDP and found no significance for these factors. Finally,
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these researchers also found that no significance in the LCV score or in the share of coalgenerated electricity within states.
Hitaj (2012) conducted the perhaps most comprehensive and comparable study to
this research to date. Hitaj examined the effects of wind energy capacity additions
considering the effects of electricity transmission line coverage, grid regulation, state, and
federal subsidies. The analysis, conducted at the county level, showed that counties that
installed wind power have significantly higher wind classes, higher levels of policy
incentives, higher per capita incomes, land values, and electricity prices. She finds that
production, corporate, and sales tax incentives are significant determinants of wind power
investment while the property tax incentives appear to have no influence or even a
negative effect on wind power development. In addition, she also finds that the RPS
standard is not a significant factor in wind energy deployment. She does argue that
deployment is elevated in areas with RTO/ISO governance of grid access. While several
of the outcomes from this study are the similar to the hypothesized relationships in this
study, the operationalization of some of these measures needs improvement. For
example, the transmission density relies on a 1993 dataset input as a fixed value
throughout the time of the study. A review of the transmission investment and data
indicates that this formulation is inaccurate (See transmission capacity in Chapter Three).
Shrimali et al. (2015) conducted a recent examination of the interaction of state
level policies and the federal PTC. This study examined panel data for the years 19902011 for installed wind capacity in MWs to determine the effects from interactions of the
federal PTC with state level incentives and policies while considering economic,
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political, and competitive technologies. The study found that the federal level PTC acts as
a catalyst for state level incentives. Therefore, in years where the PTC is available to
developers, the effectiveness of a state clean energy fund, RPS, state green power
purchase program or MGPO is enhanced. In addition, these researchers find that the GDP
per capita in a state and the LCV score are also positive factors for deployment.

Summary of the Previous Findings and Variable Interaction
The main finding of the studies that examine policy interventions renewable and
wind energy is that policies are effective in increasing deployment, although the
particular instruments that this effect are attributable to are debated. The RPS
effectiveness is debated but is arguably a result of the operationalization of the policy.
MGPO policies have been found by previous research as effective, as has the federal
PTC. Retail choice and clean energy funds have also been considered and argued as
effective; however, the study of these instruments is limited. Tax policies including
corporate, property and sales tax also have been studied in a limited fashion and the
operationalization of the state level policies has been rather crude. The results of studies
of these instruments has been mixed. Regardless, Doris et al. (2009) and Shrimali et al.
(2015) contend that the combinations of policies are important. Hence, this study will
consider the effects of RPS, state and federal PTCs, MGPO, and various tax policies in
comparison with the infrastructure variables.
Economic factors considered by the research include the price of electricity, the
wind energy price, the use or demand for electricity, and the cost of competing resources.
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Renewable or wind energy prices have been found to be negatively correlated with or
show no effect to deployment; therefore, the findings for the effects of electricity prices
has been mixed. Comparison of competing resources has consistently shown a negative
association with natural gas. Percentage generation findings have been mixed.
Politically, the findings regarding the LCV score has been consistent across
studies, as have the other variables that indicate the presence of pro-environmental
groups, employees, etc. within a state. With these findings, it is important to consider if
these are not an artifact of the correlation with the groups and political players with the
existence of pro-renewable policy. Overall, many factors examined in previous research
appear as tangential factors or represent more distal drivers for wind energy deployment.
For example, the presence of a state democratic senate, while potentially helpful in
passing policies is likely not to have much influence on the actual licensing of facilities,
financing, or the deployment of complementary inputs. As a second example, the GSP of
the state is relevant, but only when viewed through a lens where states with higher GSP
provide increased infrastructure support or policy support for large projects. Therefore, it
is important to utilize measures for the direct drivers that promote the industry, instead of
the indirect drivers that may or may not result in the direct support to the industry. Thus,
while many of the proceeding studies provide some insight regarding the potential
determinants, operationalizing the variables directly combined with a systematic
approach would represent an improvement. The approaches of the previous research and
those proposed for this study are presented in Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER THREE
Research Design, Data Collection, and Methods of Analysis
This chapter presents the overall research design including the sources and
collection of the data, operationalization of the variables, and the methods used to
analyze the data. As part of the examination of the data, this chapter will discuss the
rationale behind the proposed direction of the influence of the independent and dependent
variable and reference the specific results of previous studies that consider similar
independent variables. The methods for the analysis are presented and the chapter
concludes with a summary each independent variable and the hypothesized effects.

Research Design
This study exploits a natural experiment that exists across the 50 US states. In this
case, variance exists in the conditions of interest across these jurisdictions; nevertheless,
similarities limit some of the confounding variables. For example, in each jurisdiction,
differentiation exists in the contextual, soft, and hard infrastructure variables. On the
other hand, the US states exist within a common governance framework and with
relatively similar governance systems at the state level. As discussed in Chapter One, the
population for this study is selected from the US States resulting from the limitations of
the wind energy resource and logistical constraints.
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The data collected for this study is quantitative in nature and based on the the
dependent variable. The dependent variable is a numerical variable consisting of the
number of MWs deployed within a particular state.This study attempts to utilize variables
of with similar units (MWs). Data that consists of similar types and units is collected
where possible (see Table 6, below). Data that is in similar units scales directly with the
dependent variable, unlike dummy variables or percentages. The data examined consists
of 14 numerical variables and 2 categorical variables. The independent variables vary
across time, with the exception of the acres of federal lands and the wind energy
potentials that are fixed throughout the period of the study. The collection and
operationalization of the data are presented below.
Data Sources
The majority of the data for this research was available from the United States
Energy Information Agency (EIA) and United States Department of Energy (DOE). The
DOE provided the data for dependent variable: total deployed nameplate MWs per state.
DOE also was the source for potential wind generation MWs per state. EIA maintains
data on the retirement of facilities and energy demand on an annual basis by state. The
import and export by state is derived using EIA data for the net generation and retail sales
of electricity. To aggregate the types of generators to baseload, intermediate and peaking,
the EIA data was used for nameplate generation capacity for individual plants.
Data from the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and EIA was examined for transmission but
data is not available from these sources at the state level. To obtain state level data,
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historic transmission maps were obtained from Platts (a commercial data provider. Platts
created all the maps obtained for this study to provide a consistent method for data
collection. Policy data was obtained from the Database of State Incentives for
Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE, 2015). Wind energy generation requirements for
RPS policies were obtained by information provided by Berkeley Labs (Barbose, 2011).
Data to determine the measures associated with siting avoidance of federal lands by
developers were obtained from the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Transmission governance data were derived from maps obtained from FERC. Wind
energy PPA prices were obtained from a database maintained by Berkeley Labs (Wiser &
Bolinger, 2012). A summary of the data sources for these variables is presented in Table
6, and each of these is explored in more detail below.
Table 6: Data Sources
Data
Nameplate MWs
Wind Production
Incentives
Wind Energy
Capacity
Incentives
Wind Energy
Financial
Incentives
Wind Energy
Siting Policy
(Federal lands
area)
Transmission
Governance
Policies
Transmission
Capacity
Flexibility of
Generation Assets

Data Source

Data Units

Dependent Variable
US Department
MWs (nameplate)
of Energy
Independent Variables

Spatial
Coverage

Temporal
Coverage

US 50 States

1999-2013

DSIRE; IRS

Dollars per MWh

US 50 States

2001-2012

BarboseBerkeley Labs

GWhrs required

US 50 States

2001-2012

DSIRE

Binary

US 50 States

2001-2012

Gorte, Vincent,
Hanson, &
Rosenblum

Acres

US 50 States

Static Data
Set

FERC

Square Miles per
state

US 35 States

2004, 2006,
2009, 2011

Platts

Circuit Miles per
State

US 35 States

2001-2012

EIA

MWs

US 50 States

2001-2012
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Generation
Retirement
Wind Energy
Potential

EIA 2014

MWs

US Department
of Energy

MWs

Price of Wind
Generation

Wiser and
Bolinger, 2012

Dollars per MWh

EIA 2014

Electricity
Demand
Electricity Import
and Export
Electricity Price

US 50 States

2001-2012

Wind Energy
Potential
Regional –
Assigned to
Sample States

Static Data
Set

GWhrs

US 50 States

2001-2012

EIA 2014

MWs of net import

US 50 States

2001-2012

EIA 2014

Dollars per MWh

US 50 States

2001-2012

1999-2012

The data for several indicators are readily available; regardless, a number of these
indicators have not been utilized in prior studies or as operationalized in this study.
These indicators include the generation retirement, the generation flexibility, the wind
energy siting proxy variable, and the pricing of wind energy. Also unique to this study is
the development of dynamic datasets for transmission governance policies and
transmission stocks. Several indicators have been utilized in prior analysis of wind
energy determinants including the dependent variable (MWs of wind energy deployed),
wind energy potential, wind energy financial support policies, electricity demand,
electricity prices, import, and exports.
The dynamic datasets for transmission governance and capacity are novel and
were developed for this study. The data for wind energy production incentives, price of
wind energy, flexibility of generation assets, electricity demand, and wind energy
capacity incentives are modified for incorporation into this study. For all variables, a
description of the operationalization, modification, and comparison to previous studies is
provided below.
Dependent Variable – Wind Energy Deployment
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In this study, the dependent variable is operationalized as the nameplate
deployment in for wind energy in MWs per state. This measure is intended to indicate
where capital is being invested in states for wind power on a national basis, since with all
else equal, the total MWs of nameplate deployment is indicative of the magnitude of the
investment. Thus, the nameplate capacity should indicate where favorable conditions
exist for investment considering the demand, prices, policies, and physical infrastructure
that exists.
In comparison to the measure proposed for this study, previous quantitative
studies have examined total renewable energy deployment, and measures of the
deployment levels (MWs and percent of generation) of specific renewable technologies.
In most studies that examine wind specifically, researchers have mainly focused on wind
energy deployment levels in nameplate MWs as the dependent variable. Of the studies
that were identified that are specific to the determinants of wind energy, three of these
wind specific studies have utilized total cumulative MWs of generation as the dependent
variable (Bohn & Lant, 2009; Hitaj, 2012; Menz & Vachon, 2006). Maguire utilized the
annual state wind capacity divided by the state wind potential (Maguire, 2010). Aldelaja
et al. utilized two different operationalizations for the dependent variable: total nameplate
capacity and total generation. The reasoning for not utilizing percentage generation is
discussed in Chapter One (See Measuring the Development of Resources). The data for
nameplate deployment capacity for wind energy were obtained from the US Department
of Energy (US Department of Energy, 2014). The data for total cumulative nameplate
MWs of wind deployment are depicted on Table C-1 in Appendix C.
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Independent Variables
In this section, this study considers the independent variables. These variables are
hypothesized as the direct drivers that influence the selection and deployment of wind
energy generation across states. For each of these variables, consideration is given to how
the variable may influence the deployment within a jurisdiction. The findings from other
studies are presented that considered variable in this study. In addition, the
operationalization of each variable in this study is detailed. Finally, the data developed
for this study will be presented.

Soft infrastructures. Multiple policy instruments exist across states and support
is afforded to the sector from the federal level. The policy instruments that states utilize
are categorized into four broad types, production incentives, financial incentives, capacity
incentives, and favorable siting policies. Production incentives are tied to the energy
production from a facility and include federal and state production tax incentives and
feed-in tariffs. Financial incentives are provided to decrease costs to wind developers that
are not tied to production. These financial incentives include corporate tax incentives,
property tax incentives, and sales tax incentives. Capacity incentives are those
instruments that encourage the deployment of additional MWs of wind energy. Examples
of these instruments include generation disclosures, GPP, MGPO, and RPS. Finally,
minimal permitting regimes and favorable transmission governance are rules that may
expedite wind development. A summary of the typology of the instruments is presented
on Table 7, below.
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Table 7: Typology of Policy Instruments
Production
Incentives

Capacity Incentives

Financial Incentives

Governance

Production Tax
Incentive

Renewable
Portfolio Standard
(RPS)

Corporate Tax
Incentives

Minimal
Permitting
Requirements

Feed-in Tariffs

Mandatory Green
Power Option
(MGPO)

Property Tax Incentives

Favorable
Transmission
Governance

Green Power
Purchasing (GPP)

Sales Tax Incentives

Production incentives are intended to incentivize the level of production and
therefore encourage developers to select sites with higher levels of productivity within
the jurisdiction where the incentive applies. Policies that support capacity deployment
either require a set-aside of a portion of the market to consist of renewable generation
(RPS), to require purchases of renewable power by the state (GPP), and/or allowing
consumers to choose their form of generation (MGPO). These policies are intended to
provide a “push” to consumers or suppliers of electricity by increasing demand for
renewable energy with an overall effect of increasing wind energy capacity. Wind
energy financial incentives provide relief from taxation within a specific jurisdiction.
These policies therefore provide a “pull” and are intended to attract investors to a certain
jurisdiction. Permitting standards may allow for decreased licensing burdens for
developers, thus, decreasing costs and the time to obtain licenses and represent a policy
that attracts or pulls investors towards particular jurisdictions. Governance of
transmission networks may provide for non-discriminatory access for wind.
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Wind energy production incentives. The state and federal PTC policies provide
incentives for wind energy production in cents per kWh of generation. No states within
the selected sample provide a feed-in tariff for large-scale wind energy and therefore, this
instrument is not considered further. During the period of this study, the federal PTC has
been provided periodically. Recent research indicates that the federal PTC is interactive
with the state level policies and provides a “catalyst’ that boosts the influence of the state
level incentives (Shrimali, Lynes, & Indvik, 2015). Therefore, it is important to consider
the federal PTC in conjunction with other state policies.
The federal PTC is a credit against taxes that is tradable and is awarded on a per
kWh basis for electricity generated from qualifying renewable energy resources. The tax
credit was set at 1.5 cents per kWh in 1993 dollars, indexed for inflation and is generated
during the first 10 years of energy production from a particular project that qualifies for
the credit (DSIRE, 2015). The value of the credit has increased over time (Table 8) (IRS,
2005; IRS, 2006; IRS, 2007; IRS, 2008, IRS, 2009; IRS, 2010; IRS, 2011; IRS, 2012;
Selig, 2001; Selig, 2003).
Table 8: Value of Federal PTC
Year

Cents per kwh

2001

1.7

2002

0.0

2003

1.8

2004

0.0

2005

1.9

2006

1.9

2007

2.0

2008

2.1
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2009

2.1

2010

2.2

2011

2.2

2012

2.2

The 2013 value of the credit is 2.3 cents (or $23/MWh). Therefore, the credit
value for a wind project owner with a 35% tax burden would therefore equate to $35.38
per MWh of pre-tax revenue. ($23MWh/(1-35%)=$35.38 (Bolinger & Wiser, 2009).
Considering a 100 MW wind farm with a 30% capacity factor (8765 hours/yr) the PTC
would represent nearly $10 million dollars per year in subsidies, a significant economic
incentive. As a result of the magnitude of these subsidies, the PTC policy has been
argued to provide significant influence on the deployment of wind energy facilities in the
United States.
To show the influence of the federal PTC, it is informative to compare the
deployment of wind energy facilities to the periods where the PTC has been in force vs
when the policy lapsed. Originally enacted in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the PTC
was set to expire in July 1999 but the incentive was extended through 2001. It expired in
2001 but was then extended again in March of 2002 only to expire again at the end of
2003. The policy was not reauthorized until October of 2004. The pattern of deployment
of wind energy facilities is consistent with the expiration of the PTC (Figure 11).
Scholars have often cited this pattern of deployment to argue that policy uncertainty
decreases the deployment of renewable energy, particularly wind (Bolinger & Wiser,
2009). Considering the pattern of deployment and the time that the PTC is in force, the
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evidence certainly argues that the wind industry is responsive to this federal tax incentive.
Thus, tax incentives are an important factor in increasing deployment and in providing
returns to investors.

Figure 11: United States Wind Energy Deployment and the PTC
Source: Marsh, Inc. 2012

Turning to the state level, PTC incentives range from a low of 0.35 cents per
kWhr to a high of 1.25 cents per kWhr that are applicable to commercial large-scale wind
energy systems. These incentives are in addition to the federal tax incentive. Seven states
within the sample provided an incentive as of 2012. Five of the states, Arizona, Iowa,
Maryland, Nebraska, and New Mexico have a cap or limit to the total amount of
incentive provided. For example, in Iowa, this limit is 2.5 MW of nameplate capacity per
owner of a system. In Maryland, Arizona, and Nebraska there is a total monetary limit of
$2.5, $2.0 million, and $50 thousand dollars, respectively, for these programs. New
Mexico limits this incentive to 400 MWh of generation (equivalent of 120 MW of
nameplate per year at 30% capacity). Two states are unlimited in provision of the
incentive: Oklahoma and Utah. Oklahoma provided 0.75 cents per kWh during 2003 that
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was reduced to 0.5 cents from 2004 to 2007 and further reduced to 0.25 cents through the
rest of the study period. Utah provides 0.35 cents per kWh produced to all facilities
(DSIRE, 2015).
The number of states within the population that provided production tax
incentives by 2012 is therefore relatively low. Four of the incentives, Iowa, Maryland,
Arizona, and Nebraska are so limited that the effectiveness of these instruments would
not support industrial wind development and are not considered further in the quantitative
analysis. The other three states (Oklahoma, Utah, and New Mexico) do provide an
incentive that is sufficient for industrial wind development. In comparison to state
policies, the federal PTC is unlimited in its applicability to the level of production.
Therefore, the amount provided by these three state incentives will be added to the
federal PTC during the times when this instrument was in force. Therefore, in this study,
the total of the production tax credits in $/MWh is used as the independent variable to
represent the production incentive. This approach is logical since the two instruments
target the wind energy production. This approach of adding the State and Federal PTC
accounts for the interaction of the federal PTC with the state PTC. The data for wind
energy production incentives are presented in Appendix C on Table C-2.
Wind energy financial incentives. Financial incentives for wind energy exist in
the form of sales tax, property taxes and corporate tax credits. The levels of,
combinations and durations of the existence of these instruments have varied across the
sample states. Sales tax incentives typically refund or provide tax exemptions for
purchase of equipment and installation. State property tax incentives typically take the
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form of tax exemptions instead of credits and typically do not increase property taxes
based on the presence of an energy facility on the property. Corporate tax credits are a
broad category of instruments that include deductions, exemptions and credits that often
overlap the sales and property taxes. Sales tax credits are typically one time, while
property tax relief is usually provided on an annual basis through the life of the project
(Hitaj, 2012).
With all else equal, property tax relief and sales tax incentives should encourage
developers to locate within areas where these incentives are provided. Regardless, in the
case of property tax incentives, research indicates that the effect of these incentives may
not be significant (Hitaj, 2012). In addition, sales taxes may or may not provide
incentives within a state, since equipment may be purchased a state with incentives, the
transported out of state. Hence, each of these instruments must be considered separately
across the sample states to understand the applicability and variance for each instrument
and jurisdiction.
The application of sales tax relief policies has increased during the period of this
study. Initially, these policies were deployed in five states, but by 2012, 12 states had
such policies. The relief provided by these policies is tied directly to the sales tax rates
within the individual jurisdictions and ranges from 2.9% in Colorado to 6.875% within
Minnesota. The costs that would be subject to sales tax relief is usually the costs of
turbines and towers for the facility but the exact extent of the sales tax relief does vary
across states. Regardless, turbines and towers comprise approximately 2/3rds of the cost
of a project (Tegen et al., 2011).
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Berkeley Labs has gathered price data on wind turbine transactions totaling
27,000 MWs from 1997 through 2012. Sources have varied and there are challenges in
the collection and granularity of the data (are ancillary services provided, etc.) but this
data is as the most accurate and comprehensive source for wind turbine costs that is
accessible for this study. The costs and the trends over time for US turbines and global
averages from a particular manufacturer are shown on Figure 12.

Figure 12: Turbine Prices and Trends 1997-2012
Source: (Wiser and Bolinger, 2012)

Examining the data there is wide variation in the costs of turbines, even within a
particular year. For example, in 2010, costs for turbines for projects in the 5-100 MW
range varied from $1,222/kW to $2,045/kW. Variations in turbine costs for projects >100
MW are less extreme; however, in 2008 costs ranged from $1,343 to $1,884/kW. These
costs variations are even more extreme with projects <5 MW. These variations
demonstrate that attempting to operationalize this variable in $/MW is unlikely to provide
consistent results for the effects of sales tax, since turbine costs can vary not only over
time, but across jurisdictions and project developers. Therefore, this study will utilize a
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dummy variable to account for the presence or absence of sales tax relief. Data for sales
tax are found on Table C-3 in Appendix C.
In addition to the sales tax, property tax relief is also a popular state level
instrument. This instrument also varies between states, since the states typically afford
some percentage relief from state taxes based on the cost of the project. Relief afforded
by the states ranges from zero up to 100%. Thus, these incentives can be substantial,
since average capacity weighted project capital costs have ranged from $1,279 to $2,236
per kW over the period of this study (Table 9). For example, a state that affords a 100%
property tax exemption to a developer of a 100 MW project would not collect taxes on
property improvements that range from $127 million to $223 million, depending on the
year of the project installation.
Table 9: Capacity Weighted Average Project Costs
Year

Costs per kW

2001

$1,312

2002

$1,532

2003

$1,390

2004

$1,279

2005

$1,500

2006

$1,672

2007

$1,836

2008

$2,047

2009

$2,236

2010

$2,229

2011

$2,135

2012

$1,943
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Operationalization of property tax relief is also problematic, since variance not
only exists for the costs of projects (as shown through turbine prices Figure 12, above)
but also in the application of the tax. Since in many cases the taxes are imposed at the
county level, the variance can be significant, even within a particular state jurisdictional
area. Regardless, the tax relief afforded may be significant and therefore, the effects of
these incentives should be investigated. As a result of the difference in operationalization,
a dummy variable is assigned to examine the variance in the property tax relief across
jurisdictions. Property tax data are found on Table C-4 in Appendix C.
Finally, corporate tax credits were examined to consider the potential effects of
this variable across the population. Variance across the population was low, with only
three states having a corporate tax credit (DSIRE, 2015). One state, Arizona also imposed
a cap of 50k limit per system with a total cap of $1.0 million in the entire state per year.
This incentive is therefore not significant. The other two states that provide corporate tax
credits were North Dakota and Texas. North Dakota provides a 15% tax credit (3% for
five years) for the cost of inquiring and installing systems on the property owned or
leased by the taxpayer. In Texas, companies engaged solely in the business of renewable
energy installations, sale, or manufacturing are exempt from or allowed to deduct system
costs from the Texas franchise (corporate) tax. The deductions in Texas may be
substantial. Regardless, the variance in these taxes across the sample is not significant
and therefore, the corporate tax is not examined in the quantitative analysis.
Wind energy capacity incentives. Turning to generation requirements, a number
of states have implemented renewable energy portfolio standards (RPS), (GPP)
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requirements, and MGPO. The RPS policies typically require load-serving entities to
procure or distribute a certain amount of power from renewable energy resources
(DSIRE, 2015). The GPP requirements usually take the form of state governments
requiring the purchase of certain amounts of renewable energy each year to supply state
governments with electricity. Finally, MGPO policies are policies that require the load
serving entities to provide an option to consumers where renewable energy may be
selected for supplying that consumer. Each of these instruments is discussed further
below.
The typical RPS requires a set number of MWh, nameplate MWs, or a percentage
of electrical generation to be provided by designated renewable energy resources. RPS
generation requirement levels vary across states as does the ability of states to fulfill these
mandates with power imported from other jurisdictions. These mandates also vary in the
enforcement vehicles for the requirement. States range from having voluntary
requirements to standards that provide penalties and fines to industries that fail to meet
the RPS goals (DSIRE, 2011). Not only does variance exist in the enforcement, but also
in the accepted forms of renewable generation and the set-asides for particular renewable
energy technologies (solar, wind, etc.). States may also impose differing levels based on
the form of entity that serves the load, such as investor owned utilities, co-operatives and
municiple electricity suppliers. Finally, these RPS standards have also been implemented
at various times in various states.
Researchers at Berkeley Labs have maintained a database of RPS compliance data
and RPS generated demand (Berkeley Labs, 2015). The RPS generated demands are also
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projected according to the future requirements of the policy. The demand projections are
estimated by applying the percentage targets of the RPS to the projected retail electricity
sales for those entities that must maintain RPS compliance. These projections also
account for credit multipliers and exclude any resource requirements likely to be met
with large hydro power or demand side measures. Furthermore, these same projections
obtained from Berkeley Labs in 2012 included the carve outs and set-asides for solar
resources in the RPS standards (Barbose, 2011). The GWh data supplied was utilized in
lieu of nameplate MWs since the solar set-asides are quantified in GWh and can be
subtracted from the total RPs requirements. Therefore, the data in this study represents
RPS requirements that have been mainly filled by wind energy.The data obtained from
Berkeley Labs accounts for the majority of variation in RPS policies across various
states.
The number of GPP policies that are exist on a state level are limited. Within the
study sample, the states of Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, and Wisconsin have
programs to purchase renewable power (DSIRE, 2015). The states with GPP
requirements and the levels are outlined in Table 10.
Table 10: State Green Power Purchasing
State

Enactment Year Compliance Year

Level

Maine

2003

2007

100% (70% hydro) (35,000 MWhrs)

Maryland

2001

2014

20%

Massachusetts

2007

2012

15%

Wisconsin

2006

2011

20% (184,800 MWhrs)

Source: (DSIRE, 2015)
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Examining the states with GPP programs in conjunction with the RPS
requirements, it is important to note that each of these states has an RPS requirement. In
addition, these RPS requirements typically dwarf the GPP requirements. For example, in
the case of Maine, the RPS level required for non-hydro energy as estimated by Berkeley
Labs was 3,511 GWh, while the non-hydro component of the puchasing program was
35,000 MWh, or less than 1% of the requirement of the RPS standard for the same
period. The state governments listed above only consume a relatively small portion of the
entire state’s electrical demand and require a subset of the state demand to be filled from
renewable resources. H, the incremental increase in demand in these states is relatively
insignificant. The finding that green power programs are effective may therefore be an
artifact of the limited variance across the dataset and correlation with RPS policies in
place. From the limited variance and similarly limited incremental demand created by
these policies, they will not be considered quantitatively in this analysis.
MGPO requirements by states has been argued in research for determinants of
wind energy as a contributing factor to deployment (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2011;
Gong, 2011; Kneifel, 2008; Maguire, 2010; Shrimali & Kneifel, 2011; Shrimali, Lynes &
Indvik, 2015; Yin & Powers, 2010). All researchers, with the exception of Maguire, have
coded the MGPO as a dummy variable to indicate the prescence or absence of this
program at the state level. Maguire takes a slightly different approach and constructs
independent variables based on the year, the sum and the years from indices. Therefore,
Maguire accounts for the number of programs within a state (presumably at the utility or
other level) and the time these programs were in place. Regardless, through these
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methods of examination, where MGPO is examined as an independent variable regressed
to examine renewable or wind deployment, these researchers have claimed that this
policy instrument is effective.
Researchers have not quantified the capacity requirements of these programs to
determine the effect of these policies on aggregate demand. In addition, MGPO is also
complemented by other forms of voluntary renewable energy purchases that may occur
outside of the mandated jurisdiction, providing additional demand. To satisfy MGPO
requirements and any additional voluntary purchases, renewable energy credits (RECs)
are often purchased. RECs are certificates that are generated along with the renewable
energy to document that electricity was generated from a renewable resource. These
credits are can be sold and traded in the open market. These credits are a means to satisfy
either the voluntary demand for renewable energy (voluntary market) or even more
importantly, the mandatory requirements of RPS policies (compliance market). Thus,
MGPO, voluntary markets, and compliance markets are intertwined.
Logically, to investigate MGPO and voluntary markets, the demand generated by
these markets must be added to the demand created by RPS mandatory requirements to
account for the magnitude of the effect these policies have. However, the accounting is
not that straightforward, since in many cases RECs can be purchased on a non-locational
basis. In fact, RECs are often sold with electricity or allowed to be unbundled with these
sales and either may or may not be sold outside of the jurisdiction in which they are
generated.
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A single specific examination of MGPO policies and voluntary markets by
researchers was identified in the literature. This study claimed the US voluntary green
power market (which includes MGPO purchases) did not increase additional MWs of
deployment of wind (Gillenwater, Lu, & Fischlein, 2014). Sincethe MGPO policies are
correlative but do not necessarily provide for additional demand, this study will account
solely for the mandatory demand requirements (RPS compliance) when examining the
policy demand data quantitatively.
Turning to RPS policy requirements, the RPS may either be enforced with
mandatory requirements or be voluntary. Comparing RPS mandatory and voluntary
requirements is instructive. Voluntary RPS requirements are relatively insignificant in
comparison to the total demand from mandatory RPS policies. Comparing these
requirements to the demand generated from sales in the voluntary market, the RPS
demand is significantly greater; however, the voluntary MGPO market provides a
significant amount of additional demand (Figure 13). In fact, the voluntary market is
approximately 1/3 the size of the RPS requirements. It is important to note that the effects
of this additional demand is not disaggregated across states and the effect is heavily
debated. Figure 13 illustrates the RPS aggregate US requirements and voluntary sales.
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Figure 13: Total RPS, Voluntary Sales 2001-2015 (estimated)
Source: (Barbose, 2011; EIA, 2015; Heeter, et al., 2014)

Since disaggregated data is unavailable, the capacity demand from policies will be
represented by the RPS requirements as developed by Berkeley Labs (Barbose, 2011).
This data as modified for this study excludes carve-outs for solar energy and does not
include hydro generation; therefore, the data should largely represent requirements for
wind-generated energy. The data is the requirements for total generation in GWh that is
compared to the dependent variable of total deployment. Total GWh reflects the
nameplate capacity at an estimated capacity factor and therefore, the use of estimated
MWs or GWh is equivalent in the analysis. As previously stated, GWh was selected for
this analysis since the data for solar set-asides is in GWh and not namplate MWs.
Regarding the additional demand from voluntary markets, it may be large. If the demand
from RPS requirements shows a significant effect, then presumably any additional
demand that results from policy would logically affect deployment in a similar fashion.
The data for renewable energy generation requirements from the RPS standards is
presented in Appendix C on Table C-5.
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Wind energy siting policies. Wind energy siting policies influence the
deployment of wind energy generation by either allowing a developer a clear path to
permit within an expedited timeframe, or to provide a potential barrier to development.
Although limited studies have been undertaken on the effects of permitting, it is clear
through previous qualitative and quantitative analysis that the permitting regime for a
state is important. Hence, this study proposes a measure to examine to what extent
developers avoid additional permitting processes.
Kahn provides an early assessment of the impact of permitting to wind energy
development through an examination in three Pacific Coast states (Kahn, 2000). In this
qualitative assessment, he argues that permitting for renewable resources is harder than
permitting competing fossil energy resources. Specifically, he cites several challenges,
including a lack of essential infrastructure in areas where the resource exists (including
transmission), a challenging regulatory environment, a politicization and a lack of
regulatory certainty in the regulatory realm, and a number of opposing factions to
development. He attributes the bankruptcy of Kenetech—the leading wind developer of
the 1990s—at least partially to the challenges from permitting wind power plants that
lead to cost overruns. In an examination of the early years of the wind industry in
California. Asmus (2001) reaches the same conclusion. Considering that permitting costs
can reach levels where developers face financial challenges; permitting regimes matter.
Thus, when considering the permitting of power plants, developers should prefer
those states that afford the lowest cost. The lowest costs for permitting should exist where
the permitting regime is simplified and the time necessary for the process is shorter. A
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simplified permitting process should decrease the opportunities for opposition groups to
delay the decision (Kahn, 2000). The only study identified in this review that considered
the complexities of wind siting policies in the United States was a quantitative
examination by Bohn and Lant (2010). Bohn and Lant propose that three models exist, a
standard seven-step model, a simplified state-level model, and a minimal permitting
requirement (Figure 14). The standard model of state-level permitting requirements exists
in 94% of the states (47 of 50) the simplified model in 4% (2 of 50) and the minimal
model exists in only 1 state – Texas. The number of steps in the process is an important
variable, since with each additional step; there is the potential for opposition and for
project failure or delay.

Figure 14: Models of Wind Energy Permitting at the State Level
Source: Bohn and Lant, 2010

The regression analysis performed by Bohn and Lant show that the simplified
permitting and siting procedures are correlative with increased deployment of wind
energy. Caution should be used when considering these results, since the number of states
with either simplified or minimal processes is low. Regardless, the logic behind this
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conclusion is persuasive, since the simplified procedures for permitting decrease the
opportunities for opposition to projects. Therefore, this study develops a different
operationalization of a measure for inclusion in this analysis. This measure is based on
the existence of federal lands within a state.
The reason for this divergence with the work of Bohn and Lant is simple.
Essentially, the amount of variation in Bohn and Lant across sample states is not
sufficient to provide robust regression results. In addition to a lack of cross-sectional
variation, the state regimes also do not vary over time, thus not affording a measure that
can provide a reliable result, as cautioned by Bohn and Lant. I therefore deviate from
their approach to examine whether developers will avoid lands that have complex
permitting processes.
To explore this potential correlation, I examine federal lands since these areas
require a complex permitting process on top of the state processes. Importantly, the
amount of lands varies across the sample states, thus providing a reasonable proxy
measure. In other words, instead of measuring the level of development versus the
process at the state level, the percentage of federal lands will be examined versus the
deployment to determine if an inverse relationship exists. Although variance in this
measure over time is minimal, cross-sectional variance is high.
For many states in the western United States, the federal government is a
significant landholder and manages lands through the Department of the Interior. When
federal lands are utilized by private entities, the federal government must decide whether
to authorize these actions. The decision by the federal government requires a permit
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process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Thus, developers who
work within states that contain federal lands or any other federal facilities that require a
federal decision also trigger a separate permitting process in addition to any state or local
process.
Although a project sited on private lands may avoid triggering federal review, the
odds of avoiding federal reviews decrease with the increasing percentage of federal lands
within a state. Should a developer select a site in a state where a large percentage of
federal lands exists, then a NEPA review is much more likely, and the federal
government would then be adding another layer to the permitting process as described
above. Thus, although the federal process is the same across all states, the odds of
triggering a federal review does vary across states and therefore does provide a more
reasonable proxy to determine if developers avoid the more complex permitting
processes.
The federal government owns approximately 635-640 million acres, or
approximately 28% of all land in the United States. This land ownership is concentrated
in the Western US (Table 11, Figure 15). The percent of federal ownership within the
sample ranges from 81.10% in Nevada to 0.30% in Iowa. Within these states, Department
of Interior (DOI) Agencies, including the Forest Service (USFS), National Park Service
(NPS), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and Fish and Wildlife Service administer
much of these lands. Together, these four agencies manage approximately 95% of all
federal lands. In addition to the DOI agencies, the Department of Defense (DOD) also
administers over 19 million acres.
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Table 11: Federal Land by State, 2010
Total Federal Lands
Acreage

Total Acreage in
the State

% of State

Arizona

30,741,287

72,688,000

42.30%

Arkansas

3,161,978

33,599,360

9.40%

California

47,797,533

100,206,720

47.70%

Colorado

24,086,075

66,485,760

36.20%

Idaho

32,635,835

52,933,120

61.70%

Illinois

406,734

35,795,200

1.10%

Indiana

340,696

23,158,400

1.50%

Iowa

122,602

35,860,480

0.30%

Kansas

301,157

52,510,720

0.60%

Maine

209,735

19,847,680

1.10%

Maryland

195,986

6,319,360

3.10%

Massachusetts

81,692

5,034,880

1.60%

Michigan

3,637,965

36,492,160

10.00%

Minnesota

3,469,211

51,205,760

6.80%

State

Missouri

1,675,400

44,248,320

3.80%

Montana

26,921,861

93,271,040

28.90%

Nebraska

549,346

49,031,680

1.10%

56,961,778

70,264,320

81.10%

777,807

5,768,960

13.50%

27,001,583

77,766,400

34.70%

Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Mexico
New York

211,422

30,680,960

0.70%

1,735,755

44,452,480

3.90%

Ohio

298,500

26,222,080

1.10%

Oklahoma

703,336

44,087,680

1.60%

North Dakota

Oregon

32,665,430

61,598,720

53.00%

Pennsylvania

616,895

28,804,480

2.10%

South Dakota

2,646,241

48,881,920

5.40%

Tennessee

1,273,974

26,727,680

4.80%

Texas

2,977,950

168,217,600

1.80%

Utah

35,033,603

52,696,960

66.50%

Vermont

453,871

5,936,640

7.60%

Virginia

2,358,071

25,496,320

9.20%

Washington

12,173,813

42,693,760

28.50%

West Virginia

1,130,951

15,410,560

7.30%
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Wisconsin

1,865,374

35,011,200

Wyoming

30,043,513
62,343,040
Adopted from Gorte, Vincent, Hanson, & Rosenblum, 2012

5.30%
48.20%

Figure 15: Federal Land in the US Lower 48 States
Adopted from Gorte, Vincent, Hanson, & Rosenblum, 2012

Each of these agencies has a different mission and administers land access
differently. The BLM manages approximately 39% of federal land (248 million acres)
and has a mission to provide access for multiple uses, including energy development. The
USFS administers approximately 30% of federal lands (193 million acres) and has a
multiple use mandate for various uses, including timber harvests, recreation, and wildlife
habitat. For both of these agencies, wildlife habitat preservation has become an increasing
priority in recent years (Gorte, Vincent, Hanson, & Rosenblum, 2012).
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The USFWS manages approximately 14% (89 million acres) of federal land;
however, the mission of this agency is very different from the USFS and BLM. The
mission of this agency is primarily to conserve animals and plants. This mission conflicts
with the development of resources, including energy; thus, development on these lands is
highly unlikely. Like the USFWS, the NPS also has a very differing mandate from the
USFS and BLM. The agency manages approximately 12.5% of all federal lands (80
million acres) for the conservation of land and for public use. NPS lands are managed
strictly to prohibit activities that remove resources or that harvest resources (Gorte,
Vincent, Hanson, & Rosenblum, 2012).
To reflect the odds of a federal review, the siting indicator for this study reflects
the area of federal lands within a state. Obviously, this simplistic model does have some
drawbacks. For example, the areas that are federal lands either may or may not contain
wind resources. Another consideration is that some federal lands have greater degrees of
resource protection than others. For example, a National Park would not allow a wind
project within its borders, but the Bureau of Land Management lands are designated for
multiple use development. Regardless, with geographic and multiple differentiated
federal jurisdictional areas within a state, the most straightforward and simplistic
measurement of the odds of triggering a process is based on the percent of federal lands
within a state. The federal lands data are presented in Appendix C, on Table C-6.
Governance of the transmission system. Historically, utilities primarily existed as
vertically integrated companies with monopoly rights administered under the public
utilities commissions (PUC). The PUCs existed to protect the ratepayer’s interests and to
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manage utility monopoly profits until the 1980s. During the 1980s, competition was
introduced into the electric generation market, effectively allowing for the development
of independent power producers who developed electrical power plants and sold the
electricity produced to utilities. Historically, the ability to manage transmission was
argued to benefit the utilities that owned generation assets by discriminating against
independent power producers. The utilization of transmission assets on a discriminatory
basis may also provide higher transmission tariffs. Therefore, FERC directed the
formation of RTO/ISOs to fulfill their requirement for provision of non-discriminatory
access for transmission (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2014).
The ISO/RTO governance structure avoid these practices by providing
transmission rate transparency and non-discriminatory access through an independent
operator. In many cases, the larger geographic area of RTO/ISO entities allows
developers to avoid multiple rate charges that would result by routing through multiple
transmission systems with differing ownership.
Examining the RTO/ISO governance structures more closely, an ISO is an
independent entity that operates wholesale electricity markets and provides reliability
planning for a geographic areas bulk electrical system. An RTO is a regional transmission
authority that has responsibility for the transmission and generation market in a region.
These two types of entities are similar enough that in essence, they can be considered the
same for the purpose of this study. ISO/RTO governance provides for an entity that is
independent of any market participant, is geographically defined, and has operational
authority for all transmission under its control and the authority to provide for short-term
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electrical reliability. Salient to this study, the governance functions ISO/RTOs serve
include the administration of tariffs for the use of the system, the management of
congestion and in particular, the administration of access to available transmission.
RTO/ISO operated grids are typically larger than the grids owned by individual
utilities. The larger grids allow for greater efficiency and reduced costs from coordination
of generation, transmission, grid reliability, reduction in reserve requirements, and
increased market liquidity (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 1999; Kirby &
Milligan, 2008). These aspects are all inherent in larger versus smaller grids. The
transition from utility to RTO-ISO structures is still ongoing and several areas of the
country exist under the RTO/ISO structure for transmission management, while others
are still governed by utilities. The creation and expansion of these entities has mainly
occurred since 2000.
The historic data on the territories served by RTO/ISO governance is spotty. RTO
and ISO participation has expanded over the years in compliance with FERC Orders.
Contact with several of the ISOs and the ISO-RTO Council did not identify historic
records of the territories served. In lieu of territory records, maps were obtained from
FERC annual State of the Market reports that indicated the RTO-ISO coverage for
particular years (FERC 2004; 2006; 2009; 2011). Unfortunately, the FERC State of the
Market Reports do not consistently report the area of the RTO/ISOs. Therefore, the maps
with the service territories as depicted on Figures 16 through 19 provide the best historic
record of RTO/ISO territories that was identified through this literature review.
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Figure 16: RTO/ISO Territories 2004
Source: FERC, 2004

Figure 17: RTO/ISO Territories 2006
Source: FERC, 2006
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Figure 18: RTO/ISO Territories 2009
Source: FERC, 2009

Figure 19: RTO/ISO Territories 2011
Source: FERC, 2011

The effect of the RTO/ISO governance has been under-examined in the literature.
Only one study has been identified that examined the effects of these structures to the
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deployment of wind energy. This study examined the effect of RTO/ISO governance to
wind deployment at the county level, however, it did not account for the physical aspects
of the system, including depreciation and generation flexibility (Hitaj, 2012). Hitaj’s
study is also unclear as to whether the data for RTO/ISOs were static or varied over time.
Regardless, the effect of these entities is a factor in wind energy deployment. The
existence of RTO/ISO governance was found by Hitaj to have increased capacity
additions at the county level by 20%.
In this study, the RTO/ISO governance was examined across time and within the
state sample by estimating the area of each state, that was part of an RTO/ISO in the
particular year. The magnitude of the area within a state should be analogous to the
counties that were considered in the previous study. The maps in Figures above were
imported into the ARC GIS program, adjusted to obtain an accurate projections and
digitized to estimate the RTO/ISO territories for each state for the particular map year for
each state in the population (Environmental Systems Research Institute, 2014).
Examining the data, few states within the population showed a significant
differentiation (greater than 10% increase or decrease) in the area of RTO/ISO territory
within the state over the time periods examined. Virginia and Missouri showed an
expansion of RTO/ISO territory between 2004 and 2006. Nebraska was included into
and an RTO between 2006 and 2009. Arkansas showed a slight expansion of the
RTO/ISO territory from 2009 to 2011, while territory in South Dakota approximately
doubled. In the data, drops in territories did occur in some reporting periods; however,
when the territory was reinstated in the subsequent map, this was considered a mapping
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artifact and not a withdrawal of territory and subsequent reinstatement of area.
Considering the substantial contractual obligations that would be necessary between the
transmission owners and the ISO/RTO, quick withdrawal and reinstatement is highly
unlikely. Similarly, where decreases were less than 10% of area the state, the decreases
were also ignored.
Finally, the ISO/RTO data from the years 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 was
extrapolated to cover all periods within this study. The 2004 territory within each
jurisdiction was assumed for 2001 and was maintained as such until 2004. Expansion
between periods following 2004 was interpreted as linearly between years where data
was not available to the next period with data available. Finally, areas for 2011 were
assumed to be consistent for 2012. The ISO/RTO data are found in Appendix C, on Table
C-7.

Hard infrastructures. In this section, we examine the influence of the physical
supportive infrastructure that are economic inputs necessary to wind energy development.
First, we consider the availability or stock levels for transmission within states. Second,
we examine the flexibility of the generation mix to support the integration of additional
wind energy. Finally, we turn to the depreciation and retirement of the physical assets
that are within the system.

Transmission. Wind energy deployment is affected by access to electricity
transmission. Access affects deployment in two ways. The first is whether capacity is
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available within a particular jurisdiction. The second is whether the governance of the
transmission system affects the ability of a particular proposed generator to interconnect
to the grid and subsequently deliver power as previously discussed.
Transmission System Characteristics. Electricity transmission grids have
economic and technological characteristics that present significant challenges to
infrastructure improvements. Transmission lines are similar to other infrastructure and
may become congested. Congestion occurs when multiple agents attempt to use the
service concurrently, thus leading to the degradation of service for all users. In the case of
transmission, excessive current loads may actually result in line failures. In addition, as
with most infrastructures, the expansion of transmission capacity is not incremental but
instead occurs in discrete units. As previously discussed, the nature of adding discrete
units requires large or lumpy investments for improvements. The congestion and
lumpiness of infrastructure investments leads to several effects that should be considered
further.
First, there is a distinction made between the efficient use and the efficient size of
the transmission network. For the use to be efficient, the capacity should be allocated to
the agents who value it most highly. When electrical transmission line losses occur, these
losses require the injection of more power than is extracted. Losses can therefore thwart
replacement of higher cost local power with lower cost power that is transmitted over a
distance. Therefore, efficient use is influenced by the geography of market participants.
Local electrical power and more distance sources can be priced in cents/kWh,
allowing an equivalence to be established between the marginal costs of both generation
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and transmission. Equilibrium transmission costs are therefore equal to the differences in
marginal production costs between two local markets. Pricing that is derived through
these differences in marginal costs are deemed as nodal prices. Nodal pricing therefore
varies from where you are in the network and over time. Nodal pricing is an important
concept when considering the acquisition of capital that is necessary to achieve an
efficient size of the network.
To be an efficient size, the network must achieve an optimal level of investment.
The goal is to achieve the equilibrium size where the capacity must be great enough to
raise the marginal costs above the benefits of additional expansion. Typically, this level
of investment displaces local generation with less expensive and more remote generation.
The efficient use and efficient investment distinction is necessary since short-term
marginal costs are lower than long-term marginal costs because of lumpiness and
economies of scale. Essentially, this results in a price for transmission that is equal to the
short-term marginal costs. Therefore, the price does not cover the investment
expenditures necessary to construct the optimal size grid. Nodal pricing structures
therefore do not foster new transmission and may not even cover the fixed costs of the
transmission. Hence, the argument is that markets do not and will not facilitate the
expansion of the transmission network (Joskow, 2006). In fact, most analysts have argued
that the investment in transmission will not occur through the markets, but instead
through regulated entities (Joskow, 2006; Pérez-Arriaga & Olmos, 2006).
However, transmission is a network an increase in transmission availability
provides additional means for developers to convey electricity to markets and to afford
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opportunities to wind energy developers. Increases in availability can result from
construction of new lines or upgrades to existing lines or upgrades to facilities ancillary
to transmission. Notably, any of these improvements can affect other interconnected lines
within the network to provide improvements to other areas in the system.
For example, if a high capacity line is connected to a lower capacity line, a
bottleneck may be removed and expanded service may result. If a lower capacity line is
upgraded allowing electrical flow from higher capacity lines, this improvement may
provide additional capacity in areas outside of the upgrade. Hence, new transmission
lines may affect areas outside of the immediate footprint of the new line. This is an
important aspect of the system since the transmission system acts as an integrated
network, thus requiring complicated engineering studies to determine the effects of new
assets. These complicated effects are outside the scope of study for this report and
therefore this study develops a measure of the expansion of the transmission network
within each state to measure the effects on the dependent variable.
Regardless, since wind resources are specific to a particular location, it is
important to examine the effects of the location of transmission facilities with the
location of wind resources. As such, this study proposes to examine the density of the
transmission networks within the sample states. The size of the network provides a proxy
measure of the amount of transmission within a state that reflects the distance from a
particular wind resource to transmission access. Importantly, this measure needs to be
part of a panel dataset and not a fixed variable, since transmission networks have
expanded during the period of this study.
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Investment patterns show that the expansion of transmission facilities.
Transmission investments by investor owned utilities were relatively flat from 1993 to
2000 (Edison Electric Institute, 2005). However, since 2001 the pace of transmission
investment has accelerated rapidly (Edison Electric Institute, 2014; Kaplan 2009).
Analysis by the Brattle Group depicts the trend from 1995 to 2011 (Pfeifenberger, 2012)
(Figure 20). Coincidentally, in 2006 investments increased substantially at the same time
that wind deployment increased rapidly across several states. Certainly, this suggests that
grid expansion has not only occurred but that the network has expanded during a period
of rapid wind energy growth.

Figure 20: Patterns of Transmission Investment - US Investor Owned Utilities
Source: Pfeifenberger, 2012

Transmission data. Data for transmission capacity and circuit miles is not
collected in a consistent fashion at the state level. Several sources do exist for obtaining
aggregated regional data but this research only identified state level transmission data
from commercial sources. Commercial data providers market their data to developers and
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utilities to provide up to date information for the grid. Therefore, historical digital data is
typically not maintained or available for research purposes (Frank, 2014). Regardless,
commercial data providers periodically produce maps of the transmission system. These
historic maps contain distances and capacities of transmission lines with the data
recorded in a reasonably consistent fashion across states. For this research, transmission
circuit miles were obtained from these historic maps.
As previously stated, transmission has been under-examined in the current
quantitative literature. The only other study quantifying transmission utilized a 1993
transmission dataset to correlate with policy variables and wind energy outcomes (Hitaj,
2012). Hitaj acknowledges that the 1993 dataset is out of date, but also states that there
has been little expansion of the grid since the 1990s. The lack of expansion is not
evidenced in investment patterns shown above (Figure 20) or in the regional capacity
data from the NERC and EIA (Table 12). The data shows that transmission expansion has
occurred during the period of this study across the US with approximately 16,145 total
circuit miles of AC transmission added. In other words, in the 11 years from 2001 to
2012, enough circuit miles have been added to the US transmission network to cross the
nation at least 5 times and total circuit miles of the network have expanded by least 10%.
Table 12: US Circuit Miles of Electricity Transmission
AC Circuit Miles of Transmission
Year (Source) 200-299 kV 300-399 kV 400-599 kV 600+ kV
2001 (NERC)
76200
50245
24977
2426
2002 (NERC)
76437
51025
25000
2426
2003 (NERC)
77352
51096
25263
2468
2004 (NERC)
77681
51923
25435
2469
2005 (NERC)
77862
52133
25611
2469
2006 (NERC)
78744
52505
25479
2271
2007 (NERC)
80308
52673
25922
2361
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AC Total
153848
154888
156179
157508
158075
158999
161264

2008 (NERC)
2009 (NERC)
2010 (NERC)
2010 (EIA)
2011 (EIA)*
2012 (EIA)*

2001 (NERC)
2002 (NERC)
2003 (NERC)
2004 (NERC)
2005 (NERC)
2006 (NERC)
2007 (NERC)
2008 (NERC)
2009 (NERC)
2010 (NERC)
2010 (EIA)
2011 (EIA)
2012 (EIA)

80128
53256
25718
2361
80491
55245
26180
2361
83938
54324
25797
2361
82319
58415
25648
2416
84023
59025
26204
2418
85416
56036
26125
2416
DC Circuit Miles of Transmission
200-299 kV 300-399 kV 400-599 kV 600+ kV
465
436
192
1333
465
436
192
1333
465
436
192
1333
232
436
192
1333
232
436
192
1333
232
436
192
1333
232
436
192
1333
465
436
192
1399
681
0
1596
0
681
0
1835
0
920
0
3075
0
983
0
3009
0
983
0
3075
0

161463
164277
166420
168798
171670
169993
DC Total
2426
2426
2426
2193
2193
2193
2193
2492
2277
2516
3995
3992
4058

Source: NERC, 2013; EIA, 2010; EIA, 2011; EIA, 2012
Note: Multi-circuit miles removed from EIA data – the miles appear to be double-counted.

Regardless of the shortcomings of previous studies in operationalizing the data,
the results from previous studies are indicative of the complementary nature of
transmission with wind energy development. In a study by Bohn and Lant (2009),
population was utilized as a surrogate for transmission access. Although admittedly a
weak proxy variable, the study did conclude that transmission was correlated positively
with wind energy capacity. In the study by Hitaj, the use of a static 1993 dataset indicated
that doubling the average transmission capacity would lead to increases in wind power
deployment of 10.8 % within a county. Thus, the previous research indicates that
transmission is an important factor and the improvements proposed in this study to
operationalize transmission should provide a more accurate assessment of impact of this
factor.
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The method used to obtain circuit miles of transmission measured the length by
voltage on the historic maps for transmission lines for each year for the states within the
study population. Maps were not located for all years during the study period. Maps were
obtained for the years 2002, 2007, 2010, 2012, and 2013 (Platts 2002; 2007; 2010; 2012;
2013). These maps document the transmission system for the previous year; therefore, the
data was recorded for the year prior to the date of the map. Hence, data was obtained for
the years 2001, 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2012.
Despite the existence of data gaps, the map data is superior to data obtained from
the NERC and EIA. Specifically, the data are at the state level and second, the maps
show lines with voltages less than 200 kV. All transmission datasets and the maps
examined suffered from inconsistencies with industry practices. For example, NERC data
occasionally shows decreases in transmission circuit miles within a region with almost
20% of the year-to-year changes being declines. The current practices in the industry
would suggest that this is highly unlikely to occur, since the utility would more than
likely re-conductor or upgrade the facility than abandon it (Hirst, 2004). The Platt’s’ data
derived from maps does suffer from these same inconsistencies, but importantly these
inconsistencies only existed for the 2012 and 2013 maps. In addition, by hand digitizing
each of the maps, the actual inconsistencies can be identified across states, thus allowing
quality control for the data that provides a measure of confidence in the data collected.
Each map image was imported into ARC-GIS and a geo database constructed for
each year. A shapefile with the state boundaries was projected to match map image. The
circuit miles for each state were obtained through the digital measurement of each line at
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its respective voltage. The 2002 map was initially digitized as a reference map and each
subsequent map was compared to the result of the previous map to determine where lines
continued to exist or may have been dropped and to avoid double counting. As the data
was digitized, the voltage and number of circuits with a state recorded at the respective
voltage within each state.
The circuit miles measured are consistent across states for the data derived from
the 2002, 2007, and 2010 maps. As previously stated, 2012 and 2013 showed anomalous
values that included the lack of lines of certain voltage from previous years and reduction
in lines in certain states during these periods. The data from these periods was therefore
not utilized in this study.
The resulting circuit mileage data for 2001, 2006, and 2009 was used to estimate
the circuit miles of transmission each year during the period of this study. Similar to the
transmission governance variable, transmission mileage was not assumed to drop within a
jurisdiction from an earlier to a later period. Mileage measurement between periods
where data was collected was also estimated through linear extrapolation. Data for years
past 2009 was extrapolated for each state at the previously determined linear growth rate
for each state this extrapolation was assumed based on the investment pattern (Figure 20).
Despite the crude approximations, the data derived for this study is superior to previous
efforts and points to significant problems with the collection of US transmission system
data.
Importantly, the measure of circuit miles was developed only for AC circuits and
not DC circuits. DC circuits were not included, since DC lines require a very large
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investment in substation equipment to provide voltage conversion for interconnection.
Therefore, although a line may add to the density of the infrastructure in a state, the cost
of the infrastructure to connect to these existing DC lines would be prohibitive and
therefore, DC lines do not provide the same interconnection opportunities as AC lines.
Hence, DC transmission lines were not included in the density measure. Data are
presented for the circuit miles per state in Appendix C, Table C-8.
Generation flexibility. The mix of generation assets influences the ability of the
grid to incorporate variable output generation. The technologies and MWs of
conventional generation within a system allows grid operators the flexibility to adjust the
generation output to accommodate the variable output associated with wind. The
flexibility of the generation technology is for the most part concordant with increasing
variable costs. Variable costs across fossil fuel types are determined by the cost of the
fuels and the particular facility’s efficiency for conversion of fuel into electricity. With all
else equal, the typical order of dispatch for generating facilities is from lower to higher
variable costs. Regardless, there are exceptions to this order of dispatch. One exception is
nuclear plants, which for technical and economic reasons are operated as baseload. A
second exception is hydroelectric plants, which also have low variable costs, but must
also balance the reservoir levels and other environmental and economic factors (Energy
Information Agency, 2012). The dispatch sequence is referred to as the dispatch curve
(Figure 21).
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Figure 21: Hypothetical Dispatch Curve
Source: (Energy Information Agency, 2012)

Historically, the facility efficiency and fuel costs have led to coal-fired plants
being operated as baseload facilities, while natural gas and petroleum facilities have
functioned to fill the intermediate and peak demand (Energy Information Agency, 2012).
Although coal-fired generators are typically less efficient than natural gas, this efficiency
disadvantage is offset by a much lower fuel cost. With natural gas generation, it is
important to disaggregate two gas generation technologies, combined cycle plants and
“peaking” plants. Examining the dispatch curve above, combined cycle gas is dispatched
prior to other natural gas and petroleum plants.
The “peaking” natural gas generation technology consists of combustion turbines
and reciprocating engines. The combustion turbines are similar to a jet airplane engine
and provide motive power to spin a shaft and generate electricity. Reciprocating
technology is similar to an internal combustion engine. Combined cycle plants utilize this
combustion turbine technology but also capture the exhaust heat to create steam that
powers a steam turbine. Combined cycle plants are therefore more fuel-efficient than
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combustion turbines and reciprocating engines because of the additional heat capture.
Combined cycle technologies are therefore dispatched prior to combustion turbines
because of lower variable costs. Traditionally, these plants serve the intermediate load
(See Figure 21). Combustion turbines reciprocating natural gas engines, and petroleumfired plants have typically address peak loads and therefore are known in industry
parlance as “peakers.”
Systems that incorporate elevated levels of intermediate and peaking power
provide a greater amount of flexibility because of the ability to increase and decrease
output more rapidly than baseload plants. Generation mixes with higher flexibility are
therefore more accommodating to wind generation and generation mixes with lower
flexibility less accommodating.
In this study, the assets within a state were segregated into baseload, intermediate,
and peaking according to the technology that generates electricity (prime mover). Data
are available for all 19,023 power plants in the US as of 2012 (Energy Information
Agency, 2014). The data for nameplate MWs of capacity by technology is from the EIA’s
Form 860(Energy Information Agency, 2014). Form 860 is required for
“all existing plants and proposed (10 - year plans) plants that: (1) have a total
generator nameplate capacity (sum for generators at a single site) of 1 Megawatt
(MW) or greater and (2) where the generator(s) or the facility in which the
generator(s) resides is connected to the local or regional electric power grid and
has the ability to draw power from the grid or deliver power to the grid.”
Hence the data for MWs by technology type represents the vast majority of
generation within the jurisdictions considered for this study.
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Data for each year were sorted to determine the technology associated with each
power plant (209,253 data points). State totals were derived for the nameplate capacity in
MWs for each technology. The capacity by MW for baseload assets consists of nuclear,
pulverized coal, steam turbine, and hydropower. Intermediate assets consists of combined
cycle natural gas. Peaking assets consists of internal combustion (including natural gas
and petroleum), pump storage, and combustion turbine technologies. For each sample
state, the nameplate capacity of each of these categories in MW was summed for each
year. Each of these categories is tested within the model to determine the relative
influence of the presence of baseload, intermediate, and peaking assets to the deployment
of wind power.
The aggregation of technologies was agnostic as to the fuel type in this study.
This distinction is important, since all studies to date have examined the competition by
fuel type and not by technology. While fuel type is important since it is related to the
costs of generation, it is not the primary factor that determines flexibility.
Examining the evolution of the mix of technologies in the US from the period
from 2001 to 2012, several changes are apparent (Figure 22). The most obvious change is
that the portion of deployed nameplate MWs of generation from combined cycle plants
has risen dramatically. Deployment from combustion turbines also rose rapidly in the
years 2001-2003 before the pace decreased. A slight rise is apparent in the MWs of
internal combustion technology while the number of MWs of nuclear and hydropower
(including pump storage and traditional hydro) has remained flat. Steam turbine
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deployment decreased over the period, albeit slightly. Pulverized coal technology has
varied slightly over the period, but has essentially remained the same.

Figure 22: US Nameplate Generation (MWs) for Fossil Fuel Technologies
Source: EIA, 2014

Limitations exist when considering the operationalization of this particular
variable. For example, loads are often not balanced within states, but instead may be
balanced across regions or within ISO/RTO jurisdictions. In states where ISO/RTOs do
not exist, vertically integrated companies still operate the generation, transmission and
distribution networks and within these states and electricity trading occurs less
frequently. In addition, these vertically integrated companies may also prefer to pull
resources from their own assets that exist out of state. Indeed, trading may occur across
state lines in either case; therefore, the import and export of power must be examined (see
import-export). Regardless of these limitations, the MWs of for each class of technology
provides a rough means for examining the influence of various power generation classes.
The data are presented in Appendix C, Tables C-9 through C-11.

118

Depreciation and retirement of facilities. Retirement or depreciation of facilities
affects the opportunities for new technologies entering the market. The retirement of
facilities affords “market space”, thus increasing the demand for additional power
generation plants. Retirement of facilities would obviously augment any increase in
demand that occurs. This increase can obviously be filled by multiple technologies;
however, no research was found that related the strength of this factor to the deployment
of wind. Since this is obviously an important element in the lifecycle of all facilities, this
study examines the strength of this variable. Recent policies may have forced the
retirement of coal generation or through implementation of pending air emissions
standards. The effects of emissions and forced retirement policies obviously can therefore
have an effect on the market for various generation technologies. In addition to
depreciation, policies that increase retirement may have large effects in the future for
wind across not only the US, but in many countries around the world where aging
generation infrastructure is approaching retirement.
Two types of policies are directly and indirectly driving retirements in the
electricity sector. The first of these policies is forced retirements. These policies are
typically aimed at coal-fired emissions and either forces the retirement or conversion of
these plants to other technologies. One example of this type of policy is Colorado’s
House Bill 10-1365 that was commonly known as the “Clean Air, Clean Jobs Act.”
Although the act was emissions based, requiring the utilities to reduce nitrous oxide
emissions by at least 70% below a 2009 baseline, compliance also required the minimum
retirement of over 900 MW of coal fired generation. This generation is approximately
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50% of Colorado’s total coal-fired generation (Keske, 2011). Various philanthropies and
NGOs have now mobilized to support policies that retire coal, thus it is essential to test
the effectiveness of these policies to understand the impacts to wind deployment
(Bloomberg Philanthropies, 2014; Sierra Club, n.d.).
Emission standards are forecast to require retirement of up to 60 gigawatts (GW)
of coal fired generation by 2020 (US Chamber of Commerce, 2014). These retirements
will result from the increased costs of compliance with the Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards (MATS) that requires additional emissions controls whose costs are argued to
indirectly cause this retirement. These retirements from the upcoming regulations are
anticipated to commence in 2016, when enforcement commences. The enforcement of
these regulations will require significant capital expenditures on many coal-fired facilities
(if they are not retired), thus degrading the economic performance of these plants relative
to other sources of electricity.
Regardless of the timing of the new standards, it is necessary to examine whether
policies are motivating operators to accelerate depreciation and to retire plants in advance
of life of the capital stock, particularly during the period of this study. To examine this
question, the retirements of all US generation facilities was examined since 1980.
Average age of all retired facilities for each year was determined to see if a pattern
existed that would indicate a decreasing average age for plants being retired. This pattern
would be indicative of policies or other factors accelerating the retirement of facilities.
The number of retirements has increased since 2001; however, the age of the
facilities retired has on average increased and not decreased. Hence, the effect of policies
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to accelerate depreciation through either direct enforcement of retirement or through
emissions standards appears to have little effect during the period proposed for this study.
The average age of retirement of electrical facilities has remained relatively constant
during the period from 1988 to 2012 with retirements occurring with plants aged between
30 and 50 years. Importantly, over half of the generating capital stock was deployed
between 1950 and 1980 when many of the fossil plants were much less efficient. In
particular, 72% of operable coal generation and 78% of operable petroleum generation
was built during this period. Thus, over half of all operable generation in existence today
is between 30 and 50 years old – within the average age of a plant being retired. Figure
23 shows the MWs retired by year and the average age of the facilities and Figure 24
shows the nameplate MWs built for each technology by year from 1924-2011.

Figure 23: MWs Retired versus Average Age of Plant Retired in that Year
Source: EIA, 2014
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Figure 24: Total Operable Nameplate MWs by Technology Built by Year
Source: EIA, 2014

Age of the assets is one factor to assess when considering depreciation but
economics appears to play a key role in the decision for recent retirements. For example,
the profitability of generation plants is related in part to the differentiation in the prices
between the commodities that fuel these generation sources. For example, the price
differential between coal and natural gas is instructive. Forecast prices for coal are
anticipated to increase, while natural gas prices are forecast to decrease. This holds true
in the spot market prices for these two commodities, which is more important considering
the dispatch order for existing plants. Therefore, the lower natural gas spot prices
decrease the variable cost for electricity generated from natural gas generation, while the
increasing costs of coal increase the variable cost for coal generation.
Recalling the order of dispatch is based on the variable costs associated with each
from of production, should an older, inefficient coal plant have higher variable costs than
a newer natural gas plant, the gas plant will be dispatched more frequently than the coal
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plant. Hence, revenue to the coal plant decreases and profitability declines. These
dynamics have been argued as the main driver in the retirements that have occurred in the
period from 2001 to 2012 (Tierney, 2012). If these dynamics were driving the retirement
of facilities, then one would expect an inverse relationship between the retirements and
the price of natural gas. Summing up the driving forces for retirement, the age/efficiency
of the plant combined with the price of natural gas appears to be motivating the
acceleration of MWs of retirement for the period from 2001 to 2012. Figure 25 shows
this relationship.

Figure 25: Natural Gas Price versus MWs Retired
Source: EIA, 2014

In addition to the influence of policy, the lumpiness of the investments may affect
the patterns of retirements. In other words, as the electricity system grew, and the
generator size increased, the potential exists for large retirements to occur in a particular
state as a result. This pattern could influence the available market space for wind energy
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(and other forms of generation) since the retirement of large generators would need to be
replaced, should demand remain constant.
To examine the lumpiness of the retirements during the period of this study, the
vintage of plant retirements was examined to determine the size of plants retired in a
particular year. This examination was done for all states, similar to the above analysis by
plotting the number of plants retired in a vintage versus the nameplate MWs of the
individual plants. The result shows that while a large number of small generators retired,
that indeed, a small number of larger generators were retired in each year. The presence
of these large retirements could influence the markets, as well as the additive effect of the
small retirements. The result of this analysis is depicted in Figure 26, below.

Figure 26: Nameplate MWs and Number of Plant Retirements
Source EIA, 2014

This analysis shows that retirements are not being undertaken during the period
for this study because of policy impacts; but instead, result from market forces in
124

combination with the age of the particular asset. The majority of these retirements are
small and consist of generators that are located onsite at facilities, such as processing
plants, universities, etc. These facilities are legacy plants where small-scale local
generation was economically preferable at the time. Regardless, a significant number of
retirements are being undertaken every year above the 100 MW mark, each representing
a market space that can be filled with other forms of power.
The number of MWs of electrical generation retired was determined from existing
EIA data. Form EIA-860 collects generator-level specific information at electric power
plants with 1 MW or greater of combined nameplate capacity. Form EIA-860A and EIA860B also requires the reporting of annual retirements of electric generators. These data
are required of utility and non-utility entities (EIA, 2014). This data are utilized to
develop total retirements in MWs across all states.
Examining the total retirements across all US 50 states, significant variation exists
over time. As depicted in Figure 26 (above), the pace of the retirement of facilities has
increased over the period of this study. In fact, the pace has increased dramatically, by
over 17 times from 2001 to 2012. Although the total retirement is only a small fraction of
total US generation, the absolute value in nameplate MWs of retirement is slightly higher
than the total deployment of all wind for the same period. Thus, while retirements may
not represent a significant portion of the US fleet, they may be a significant factor that
allows market space for wind. In addition, the market space may also increase as
retirements increase due to age and enactment of pending regulatory rules across the US
in the future.
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Significantly, variation is also found across states as well as through time.
Examining the data for the year 2012, there are several states within the sample where
retirements have occurred, including Ohio, Nevada, Indiana and Illinois. Figure 27 shows
the retirements for the US in the year 2012. Thus, the dataset has significant crosssectional and temporally variation to support the analysis. The generation retirement data
is presented in Appendix C on Table C-12.

Figure 27: US Electrical Facility Retirements 2012 (MWs)
Source EIA, 2014

Contextual factors. Contextual factors for this study include the resources and
economic factors hypothesized to influence the deployment of wind energy. Specifically,
these factors include the wind resources present, the price of generation, electricity
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demand, imports and exports, and the retail price of electricity. Each of these factors is
examined below.

Wind energy resources. Wind speed is an important factor in the profitability of
the plant, since wind power is proportional to the cube of the wind speed, thus a doubling
of speed increases the power in the wind by a factor of eight (International Energy
Agency, 2008). As stated by developers, 1 mph of differential in wind speed can make or
break the project (Taylor & Parson, 2008). Nonetheless, this increase has limitations
since wind plants operate within a band of wind speeds. Energy production commence at
lower wind speeds above the “cut-in” speed of the turbine and ramps up to the turbines
rated output power at the rated output speed. At very high wind speeds, the machine
reaches the “cut-out” speed (typically 25 m/s), ceases operation and the turbine assumes a
configuration that allows the machine to survive high wind events. Thus, although the
turbine may generate electricity at less than full capacity 65-90 percent of the time, the
actual capacity factor (percent of actual production versus turbine potential production at
ideal conditions) is typically 25-40 percent (American Wind Energy Association, 2009)
from the effects of variable wind speeds during the year.
Wind resources are classified by the EIA based on wind power densities into
seven different regimes, with class 1 being the lowest power and class 7 the highest.
These regimes are the average power density during the year at a particular height above
ground. For example, a class 4 wind regime has an average wind power density at 50 m
height above the ground of 400-500 W/m2. Class 4 power densities would translate to a
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wind speed ranging from of 7.0 m/s to 7.5 m/s at an air density equivalent to standard sea
level conditions. Developers have preferred sites that are typically greater than Class IV;
however, this is related to the state of the technology and the variability of the resource
(International Energy Agency, 2008; Renewable Energy Focus, 2012).
Wind energy resources within a particular state may affect the investment
patterns for wind deployment in several ways. First, with all else equal, a higher quality
resource is more attractive by virtue of the anticipated additional revenue that would be
provided, should the additional energy not exceed the turbine’s cut out speed. Therefore,
wind developers are incentivized to seek elevated wind speeds. As this study indicates,
deployment of wind energy generation is complex. Development requires land access,
economic incentives distort markets, and developers must have the ability to deliver the
power to market. Therefore, while elevated wind regimes are preferred, developers are
often not able to take advantage of the best resources. Therefore, the influence of higher
resources within a particular jurisdiction may be substantially subdued, since access to
higher levels of resources may not be possible. For example, Nebraska possesses
outstanding wind resources, with large areas of average wind speeds >8 m/s; however,
the number of MWs developed in the state is relatively low in comparison to states with
similar resources, such as Iowa.
Examining the minimum criteria necessary for deployment, wind developers need
a resource that produces electricity in sufficient amounts to achieve the targeted return on
investment, when including subsidies and incentives. Importantly, the net capacity factors
for a site determine production from a turbine and not wind speed. Wind speed can vary
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considerably over time and while average wind speeds may be high, wind energy below
the cut in speed or above the cut out speed of a turbine is not harvested. Therefore,
average speeds may not be precisely indicative of production, but capacity factors are.
Energy production must be balanced against the costs of developing and
constructing the facility. In other words, attractive wind speeds may not attract
investment, since other development costs may be higher at a particular site than at a site
with an adequate capacity factor. Thus, when assessing the development potential of each
state, the focus should not be on the wind resource levels, but instead on the level of
resource that may provide sufficient returns. Incidental data supports this finding and
Figure 28 demonstrates the logic by showing the locations of wind farms near the
intersections of the states of Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming.

Figure 28: Transmission and Wind Farms at the Colorado-Nebraska-Wyoming Border
Source: Hitaj, 2012
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As the figure shows, wind plants are located closer to transmission despite having
elevated wind regimes nearby (Hitaj, 2012). Thus, while the wind speed is important, the
balance between the capacity factor and the access to transmission or other plant costs
may actually be a more important factor in determining the location of wind energy
generation facilities. Therefore, consideration of the resource levels is not as critical a
factor in examining wind power siting, instead the question is whether the level of
resource provides sufficient return to the developer when considering the other costs,
such as transmission. Therefore, there is a balance between the location of transmission
and the location of the resources.
The determinants literature has examined wind resources as an influence on wind
energy deployment. These studies have utilized slightly different datasets for the resource
availability and the results of these studies have been mixed. In these studies, the wind
resource has been examined through the average wind speed, not the capacity factor. For
example, Bohn and Lant (2011) examine wind speed versus the MWs of wind
deployment across states considering various permitting regimes. The research excludes
15 non-windy states (see Table 3) and the data utilized for assessing the impact of the
resource availability is based on wind speed maps, not capacity factors. This research
concludes that the size of the resource system provides a positive influence to the level of
wind energy deployment. Similarly, Hitaj examined the wind resource by using the
NREL wind classes to derive the area available for developers (excluding six states with
low potential from her analysis) but her analysis was at the county and not state level.
She found that the resource - based on wind speed - is a positive factor in the deployment
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of wind energy (2012). Lyon and Yin (2010) also examined the annual state capacity
addition and used the wind resource dataset based on a 1993 assessment of wind
resources. The dataset Lyon and Yin used was based on wind speed to determine the
resource level (Elliot & Schwartz, 1993). Lyon and Yin categorized the wind resource as
high, medium, or low, finding that a high resource was a positive factor in wind energy
development.
On the other hand, Carley found that the size of the resource was a negative
influence on the share of renewable energy produced within a state. In her study, she
utilized preliminary wind resource estimates based on speed developed by the Pacific
Northwest laboratory (Eliot, Wendell, & Gower, 1991). The wind assessment that Carley
used in her study excluded lands with a wind class resource less than 3 on NREL’s scale
of 1-7 and excluded lands that were subject to zoning restrictions.
Considering these previous findings, one would certainly expect to find that
where datasets include all wind classes, including those consider the areas not capable of
sufficient generation that wind speed would be a significant factor. For example, the
findings of Hitaj, Lyon, Yin, along with Bohn and Lant all indicate that higher wind
speed is a factor. However, Carley’s results do not agree with the other research.
Potentially, this is since Carley did not include lands below class 3 – where speeds are
typically below the level where development takes place. Thus, looking across all of the
studies and considering Figure 28 (above), the indication is that a certain level of
resource is necessary. In other words, an elevated speed is preferred to increase returns
but in actuality, finding a sufficient resource that can balance the other costs to provide
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adequate returns is the key element in determining where wind energy development
occurs. Hence, this study will utilize a dataset that estimates the wind energy potential for
a state in MWs of nameplate generation based upon the geographic area with capacity
factors greater than 30% at a hub height of 80 meters (Lopez et al., 2012).
The dataset used for this study determines the wind potential based on the lands
with elevated capacities within a state. The data for each state also excludes certain lands
that are not amenable or available for development, such as national parks, cities, water,
etc. The 30% capacity factor roughly corresponds to the average capacity factors in actual
projects across the US. Average capacity factors were 30.3% from 2001-2005 and 32.1%
from 2006-2012 (Wiser & Bolinger, 2012). Thus, the dataset utilizes a cut off for the
capacity factor for wind development that is realistic and eliminates the areas where
development is not feasible. Furthermore, this dataset represents capacity factors and
directly relates to the production potential. Thus, this dataset is appropriate to utilize
when considering the total wind resource within a state. The data are presented in
Appendix C, on Table C-13.
Generation asset prices. According to economic theory, wind energy generation
deployment should be responsive to price signals in the market. Wind energy facilities
compete in the market of electricity facility providers, where the lowest cost technology
should be selected. As previously discussed, this is true with respect to the variable cost
of installed generation when dispatched to meet immediate load requirements. However,
for selection of future power plants, the choice of a particular technology is not as
straightforward as it is for selecting existing operational assets to meet current demand.
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Future power plants and the types of plants are selected through a complex process that
requires assessment of current and future policies, costs, and ability to integrate the assets
within the existing generation mix and anticipated market conditions. Thus, the selection
of future generation capacity requires additional scrutiny to understand how technologies
are selected.
Within the literature, the costs of electrical generation have been examined
through two methods and have not considered the economic effects associated with an
RPS. The first method has been to correlate the various fuel costs for non-renewable
energy sources to the deployment of wind and the second is to calculate the levelized
costs of electricity (LCOE) to compare across technologies. The first method is deficient,
since fuel costs are only a small part of what is considered when entities add generation
to their portfolios. The second method is also limited, since LCOE values are subject to
intense debate, may only include the costs of the generation and are not inclusive of how
market prices and intermittency may affect these prices in a comprehensive way. Finally,
RPS policies segment the market for generation assets. Therefore, it is necessary to
examine these specific methods considering why examining actual wind energy prices for
this study presents a superior operationalization.
Fuel cost correlations. Researchers have investigated the relationship between
various forms of generation via the use of fuel costs. The hypothesis is that higher fuel
costs for fossil generation leads to greater deployment in wind energy. At first blush, this
hypothesis seems logical but there is a distinct difference between the market to fill
instantaneous demand for electricity, where this hypothesis may hold true and the market
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for future generation assets where this assumption may not hold true. Researchers have
proposed that increases in natural gas price positively affects deployment of
renewables/wind energy (Bird et al., 2005; Gong, 2011; Kneifel, 2008; Shrimali &
Kneifel. 2011). The mechanism is straightforward: higher gas prices equal higher
generation costs for gas technologies leading to a price advantage for wind. Nevertheless,
this hypothesis confuses the market for electricity with the market for new generation
facilities. Although fuel costs are a factor to consider for new facilities, there are a
number of other factors, including capital costs, construction costs and overall generation
portfolio influences that must be and are considered in the selection of future generation
assets. The distinction between markets for electricity and markets for future generation
has been particularly problematic in previous research that simply correlates fuel costs to
determine pricing competitiveness.
In this study, the market for power plants with differing technologies is the focus,
instead of the dispatching of generation assets to fulfill demand for electricity. Typically,
when utilities plan for the addition of generation assets, these entities typically undergo a
complex planning process. This process is known as Integrated Resource Planning (IRP).
IRPs typically take into account a full range of alternatives that include not only new
generation, but also power purchases, energy conservation, efficiency measures, and
others (Western Area Power Administration, 2014). This process takes a longer view
when assessing future generation assets, since the typical contracts for electrical
production are 20 to 30 year contracts that correspond to the estimated life of the capital
stock of the particular technology.
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IRP processes typically involve a forecasting exercise to determine the suitability
of particular resources with respect to future load balancing, policies and a
comprehensive examination of costs (See Levelized Costs, below). Therefore, the fuel
costs that are input into this process are typically forecasted and do not reflect current
market prices. Hence, comparing market prices for fuels to deployment is not the correct
comparison – instead researchers should examine the expected prices and the other
factors considered in the IRP process. Comparison of the difference between forecast and
market prices is instructive in illustrating this point.
The US EIA in the annual energy outlook (AEO) publishes forecasts for fuel
prices every year. These forecasts have changed over time for coal and natural gas
(Figures 29 and 30). Hence, expectations for prices that are input to models utilized for
integrated resource planning have shifted over time as well. EIA’s natural gas price
forecast has predicted modest price increases for the years 2015-2025, except during the
natural gas price spike of 2009-2010 (AEO, years 2001 to 2012). For coal, expectations
have shifted to higher expected future prices relative to the years prior to 2009.
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Figure 29: EIA AEO Reference Case Price Forecast Wellhead Natural Gas by Forecast Year
Source: EIA, 2001-2012

Figure 30: EIA AEO Reference Case Price Forecast Coal Mine Mouth Price by Forecast
Year
Source EIA AEO 2001-2012

These forecast prices would indicate that a favorable environment for selecting
natural gas facilities would have been in place from 2001 to 2008 since the forecast price
increases in natural gas was modest during this period. However, commencing in 2009,
the forecasts indicated significant price inflation in the future markets for natural gas.
This forecast price increase should reduce the demand for future natural gas power plants.
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Considering the coal forecast prices, these show a similar pattern to gas, except
that unlike gas, where in 2010 price inflation for future periods decrease, instead,
anticipated coal prices show significant inflation. The anticipated price increases in the
future should have the impact of placing a significant damper on the coal generation
development.
For both technologies, it is important to note that a significant lag exists since
permitting and planning cycles for power plants are typically at least 3 to 5 years. In
addition, the construction period for each technology varies as well and is worthy of
consideration (Figure 31). Hence, substantial lag would exist between the issuance of a
pricing forecast and the effects flowing through the IRP process, permitting process and
finally into construction.

Figure 31: Average Construction Period Electricity Generation Technologies by Average
Plant Size
Source: Cooper, 2011

Focusing back on gas markets, the spot market (not forecast) prices increased
from 2001 to 2008 (Figure 32). Speculatively, the price spikes in 2005 and 2008 lead the
EIA to revise the 2009 forecasts to higher prices and higher inflation rates, prior to a
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decline in forecast prices with the entry of natural gas fracking technology. Thus, when
considering the findings of previous research, the increase in natural gas prices from 2002
to 2008 (a period of study included in much of the previous wind energy research)
correlates to a period with an increase in wind energy deployment. This correlation could
lead one to believe that increases in gas price provide increases in wind energy
deployment. Regardless, when considering the forecast prices from 2002-2008, this
correlation is not as strong. Actual prices rose from $5.00/mcf during this period, but
forecast prices only showed an anticipated increase of $2.00/mcf by 2025. Natural gas
generation rose significantly during this period, despite the argument that increased prices
lead to substitution with wind. The actual deployment of natural gas power plants
indicates that utilities use forecast prices for selection of power plants and not spot
market prices (see Generation Flexibility, Figure 22, above).

Figure 32: US Natural Gas Wellhead Spot Price (Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
Source: EIA, 2014

Researchers utilize the correlation of price to deployment, arguing that wind
competes with natural gas when the dependent variable has been the deployment of wind
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energy facilities (Kneifel, 2008; Maguire, 2010; Ohler 2009). Unfortunately, researchers
are again confusing the electricity market with the market for power plant technologies.
Simple examination of the deployment of wind energy and natural gas in nameplate
capacity clearly demonstrates that that instead of a substitution occurring, these two
technologies are experiencing simultaneous robust development (Figure 22). Apparently,
previous research has confused the market prices with the forecast prices and reached
conclusions that are unsupported as a result.
Examining the average prices for coal in real dollars over the period, a different
pattern emerges than is seen with natural gas prices (Figure 33). In this case, the real
price of coal does provide a similar price pattern to forecast prices. The real price
increases are accelerated in comparison to the forecasts. With respect to additional coalfired generation, deployment has remained stagnant. This result also supports the
argument that forecast prices, not current prices govern the selection of future power
plants more so than current prices. Reviewing the literature that compares prices to
deployment, no analyst has utilized forecast prices to match the planning and
construction periods for each technology.
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Figure 33: US Coal Average Price (Dollars per Short Ton)
Source: EIA, 2014

Considering that wind energy has no fuel costs, it is not possible to directly
compare the effects of this aspect of price on the selection of various technologies.
Arguably, the forecast prices would provide a better indicator for the effects of the
development of various technologies. Nonetheless, forecast fuel prices tell only a portion
of the story, since capital costs, financing costs and operations and maintenance are not
included. In addition, no consideration is made regarding the integration of competitive
sources of electrical generation. Thus, the use by researchers to correlate spot fuel prices
or forecast fuel prices is not appropriate.
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Levelized cost of energy comparisons. Researchers have also used the levelized
cost of electricity (LCOE) as another means to compare across technologies. LCOE is a
method that has been used to directly between the energy produced from various
technologies based on total costs, electricity production, and life of the facility. The
LCOE is inclusive of the capital, operation and maintenance, fuel, and other costs
associated with the facility, throughout the facilities life. Therefore, a deeper examination
of the appropriateness of the use of LCOE measures for technology cost comparisons is
warranted.
Costs for facilities are typically broken down into overnight, fixed, and variable
costs. Overnight costs are the total capital equipment and construction costs of the
facility, which are typically significant. Fixed costs typically refer to the fixed portion of
the operations and maintenance costs or the costs of physically maintaining the facility.
Variable costs are the fuel costs – the costs that researchers have typically considered.
Finally, all of these costs must be financed which also adds to the total costs of the
facility. LCOE is therefore a measure that is intended to capture the “all-in” costs for
electrical facilities.
The literature to date that has used fuel costs alone has not considered the actual
total costs of the facility itself when comparing costs to the nameplate deployment. Total
costs is an important variable when considering the actual selection of a technology for a
portfolio of generation assets, since typically assets enter into a bid process to provide
electricity whereas the total costs and not just the variable costs dictate the price that is
provided for generation in a competitive bid to a utility. In other words, when developers
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are providing a cost to a utility to propose a new source of electricity, they obviously do
not base those costs on the fuel costs alone.
LCOE accounts for all of these costs by essentially calculating the costs of
various forms of generation at the interconnection point. The LCOE is the price at which
electricity must be generated to break even over the life of a project. LCOE is therefore
an assessment of the system’s economic performance over the life of the project,
excluding the developer’s profit. LCOE is defined as:
∑

1
∑

1

Where:
LCOE = levelized costs of electricity over the life of the project
It = Investment Expenditures in the year t
Mt = Operations and maintenance expenditures in the year t
Ft = Fuel expenditures in the year t
Et = Electricity generation in the year t
r = Discount Rate
n = Life of the system
At first blush, the use of LCOEs would appear to present a straightforward
method to compare costs across various technologies for electricity generation. However,
when estimating LCOE the system boundaries for the calculations are important. For
example, integrating renewables may require additional generation assets to balance the
grid because of variable electricity production. Yet, the literature examining integration
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costs for electricity production from variable resources is inconclusive. Scholars have
provided a range of costs that depend on the percent of variable energy provided to the
grid. Costs range from 1.85 to 4.97 $/MWh for penetration rates of 3.5 to 15% but values
as low as 2.92 $/MWh for 29% penetration have also been estimated (DeMeo et al.,
2005; Kirby & Milligan, 2008). Other scholars have claimed that the median costs are as
high as $15/MWh (Mills, Wiser, & Porter, 2012). Therefore, the variability of these
integration costs is significant and are not typically included in LCOE estimates. In
addition, the specific variables, such as discount rates that are utilized to calculate the
LCOEs are subject to intense debate. Finally, LCOE represent the lowest cost estimate
for a facility, not necessarily the price a developer may supply to a utility when proposing
a project.
LCOEs are a highly contentious measure that would be inappropriate to use in
this study as an indicator of price because of the significant variance in the values
reported. In addition to the difficulties with fuel costs and LCOE measures, there are
market distortions that result from RPS policies that also have an effect on the wholesale
generation market. These effects should be examined since RPS policies actually segment
the market and therefore, relative prices may not be an appropriate metric, regardless of
the method of measurement.
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Economics of RPS policies. RPS policies distort the market in a fashion that does
not allow for the direct comparison of non-RPS technologies to those technologies that
are subject to the RPS. In essence, an RPS provides a market set aside for renewable
technologies where prices are differentiated from the non-renewable share of the market.
Figure 34 depicts the supply and demand associated with an RPS standard set as a
percentage of the total wholesale generation (Berry, 2002). The values in the figure are
hypothetical but the figure depicted does describe the basic market effects of an RPS
standard.

Figure 34: Effect of an RPS on the Wholesale Generation Market
Source: Berry, 2012

As shown on Figure 34, the demand curve slopes down from left to right and
intersects the combined supply curve at point “C”. The combined supply curve is the
summation of the renewables and conventional supply curve depicted by the solid line
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sloping up from left to right. Note that the presumed price of wholesale electricity in this
graph would be the cents per kilowatt (left axis) at point “C” and where the demand curve
intersects the conventional supply curve. In this graph Q* represents the proportion of
generation by conventional sources, while the RPS line represents the proportion
generated by renewables (Berry, 2002). The analysis indicates that an RPS distorts
markets by providing a separate market and more importantly, separate prices for
renewable energy and conventional energy sources. As hypothesized in this study, the
price of wind energy is not comparable to conventional generation because of these
market distortions and the inherent difficulties in making direct comparisons with prices
of conventional fuels.
Findings by Maguire and Adelaja et al. (2010), support this assertion. In her
quantitative study based on a supply and demand framework, Maguire investigated the
relationship of several market factors including wind project costs, coal prices, natural
gas prices, and total net electricity generation. The results for all of these factors were not
significant; however, the market factors were overall jointly significant. According to
Maguire, this would indicate that there is an overall influence from markets after
considering the influence of the regulatory environment. I would contend that other
factors, such as subsidies, RPS standards, and physical infrastructure availability might
be more of a factor in influencing the deployment of wind energy.
Instead of comparing prices between technologies or fuels, instead this study
compares the regional price of wind energy generation to the deployment in nameplate
MWs developed by each state. The obvious question is not whether relative pricing
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effects occur, but whether there is any impact to deployment from actual contracted wind
prices. Examining wind prices and deployment in this manner assesses whether or not the
market is sensitive to actual wind energy prices indicating whether the wind market is
segmented or separated from fossil generation facilities.
Wind energy prices. The state level wind energy prices used in this study are
based upon research conducted by Berkeley Labs for the actual power purchase prices
negotiated (Wiser & Bolinger, 2012). The price database consists of 302 agreements that
represent 42% of all wind power contracts and 70% of wind power capacity that was
built between 1998 and 2012. The prices are expressed on a levelized basis that captures
the price escalation that is typically provided for in the long-term contracts. In addition,
the analysis that Berkeley conducted is capacity weighted, in other words the contract
prices are averaged based on the number of MWs associated with each agreement. The
receipt of federal and state incentives also reduces these prices, so the prices do not
represent costs but instead the actual negotiated prices inclusive of incentives.
Examining the generation weighted average data on a nationwide basis, the costs
of wind energy rose from 2001 through 2009 (Figure 35). Prices were lowest nationwide
during the period of 2002-2003 and almost doubled by 2009. Prices have decline on
average sharply since 2009, approaching the lows experienced in the early part of this
century. As also shown on Figure 28, regional variation occurs in PPA pricing. This
regional variation is important, since regional average prices can be utilized to test crosssectional variation for the effects of pricing to the deployment of wind energy.
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Figure 35: Generation Weighted Average Levelized Wind PPA Prices by PPA Execution
Date and Region
Source: Wiser and Bolinger, 2012

The underlying data that were utilized to determine the average regional prices are
confidential, so individual state prices cannot be determined from this data. Therefore,
the regional average prices are assigned to the state within each region on an annual basis
to provide the prices for this study. Furthermore, where data gaps exist in the annual
prices, the trends are extrapolated and the values are assigned to each of the states within
each respective region. Figure 36 depicts states as assigned to the respective region and
Table 13 provides the average data by region
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Figure 36: Regional Boundaries Assigned for State Level PPA Prices
Source: Wiser and Bolinger, 2012
Table 13: Generation Weighted Average Levelized Wind PPA Prices by PPA Execution
Date and Region
Great
PPA
Nationwide
Lakes
Interior
West
Execution
2012
2012
2012
2012
Northeast
Year
$/MWh
$/MWh
$/MWh
$/MWh
2012 $/MWh
$42.00
$40.15
$60.11
1996-99
$35.69
$90.65
$32.24
$33.33
$47.11
2000-01
$33.25
$29.25
$41.56
$46.31
2002-03
$37.20
$63.09
$34.11
$50.70
2004-05
$50.05
$52.65
$44.23
$61.48
$62.10
2006
$51.12
$60.93
$42.79
$69.43
2007
$63.67
$63.35
$52.27
$87.06
$89.39
2008
$67.30
$74.77
$52.97
$94.26
$67.23
2009
$60.57
$75.44
$43.66
$95.08
$99.17
2010
$41.85
$56.65
$32.20
$74.31
$58.04
2011
$38.11
$47.50
$31.27
$84.00
$53.43
2012
Source: Wiser and Bolinger, 2012

Although these prices are not representative of each state, they do represent actual
prices for wind energy as negotiated between wind developers and LSEs. These regional
prices will be assigned at the state level to represent the prices for each state. Although
this decreases the cross-sectional variation, the temporal variations are significant and
should provide some indication of the effects of wind energy pricing. Data was not
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provided for the states included in the sample that are in the southeastern US. The states
within the respective region that are part of the study population were assigned prices
based on the proximity to the nearest region. For example, Maryland borders the
northeast region and is assigned the northeast regional price. West Virginia borders the
Northeast and Great Lakes regions and was therefore assigned an average price for these
two regions. Where data gaps occurred between years, the average was taken of the
proceeding and following year to determine a PPA price. The price data are provided in
Appendix C on Table C-14.
Unfortunately, regional prices are the best available public data to utilize in
determining the influence of wind energy pricing to wind energy deployment and state
level pricing is not available. However, should wind energy deployment not be sensitive
to price, this would support the hypothesis that wind subsidies and RPS policies distort
the market to a point where comparisons with existing fossil generation and fossil fuel
prices are specious.
Electricity demand. Complementing the effects of retirement are the effects that
can be associated with demand increases or demand reductions for electricity. Where
retirement affords opportunity by allowing market space, growth in demand can also
accelerate the deployment of electrical generation facilities to meet base demand and to
provide reserve requirements. Demand is hypothesized to influence the deployment of
wind energy facilities directly, since increasing demand requires increased supply and
decreased demand can decrease the requirement for additional power. Demand is
therefore a factor that increases or decreases the market space, increasing or decreasing
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opportunities for entrants into the market. Thus, accounting for demand is essential to
understand the effect of depreciation.
Historically, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and electricity demand were strongly
correlated; however, recently this relationship has become decoupled to some degree.
During the period of this study demand has grown by 9.3% (EIA 2014). In contrast, real
GDP increased from $12.71 trillion to $15.43 trillion or approximately 24% during this
same period (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2014). While electricity growth has
continued, the recession of 2008 did decrease demand severely for a short duration and
the growth rate appears to be slowing. The total demand for the population from 20012012 is depicted on Figure 37.

Figure 37: Electricity Demand in the Study Population (Million MWh)
Source: EIA, 2014

In addition to increasing consumption over time, the population showed variance
across the data (Figure 38). Examining the year 2012, two obvious high consumers were
Texas and California. Interestingly, these states demonstrate that consumption is not
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directly in proportion to population. Regardless, sufficient variance exists across the data
over time and across jurisdictions to provide a reasonable measurement of the effects of
the demand to wind energy deployment.

Figure 38: US Electricity Demand by State Year 2012 (Million MWh)
Source: EIA, 2014

Despite the speculation presented in Chapter One that faster demand growth may
lead to faster wind development, the previous research indicates that demand is not a
significant factor in wind energy deployment. Two previous studies were identified that
have examined the total demand as a determinant of the wind energy deployment. Kneifel
(2008) used total generation (total generation is equal to total demand) as a variable in his
study of the influence of policy. His finding was that total generation was insignificant;
however, he states that the results cannot be easily interpreted because of the multiple
ways that existing generation may impact a state’s level of renewable capacity. Maguire
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(2010) also found that net electricity generation (demand) was not a statistically
significant factor in the deployment of wind energy.
Thus, although no significant correlations have been found between demand and
deployment, this factor needs to be examined when testing the effects of depreciation or
other factors that may differentially influence demand, such as policy. In this study, the
data for total demand by state for electricity is the retail sales of electricity within a state.
The data for retail sales is from the EIA data browser (Energy Information Agency,
2014). Retail sales data are gathered by the EIA for each sector including residential,
commercial, industrial, transportation and other. Data are expressed in units of million
kWh. Data for demand utilized in this study is inclusive of all sectors within each state.
The data for the sample states is provided in Appendix C, on Table C-15.
Electricity import and export. Electricity import and export occurs between states
because of the high voltage transmission network. The import and export of electricity
may affect the deployment of wind power in several ways. First, states may be
incentivized to decrease imports and pursue instate renewable resources, hence increasing
deployment. Second, importing and exporting of electricity may also interact with the
flexibility of the generation mix within a state and decrease the ability to balance variable
resources. Flexibility effects do not occur, since long term contracts typically govern
long-distance transmission and the imports can be thought of as a constant supply, with
in-state loads balanced by in-state resources. On the other hand, transmission may also
deliver renewable resources long distances; hence, a state’s deployment may be related to
the resources and the ability to export wind power and not policy. In addition, correlation
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between exports/imports and deployment could be interpreted as a proxy for the
interconnection between states. Therefore, the export/import variable indicates the
importance of transmission between states. To examine and test for correlations in
deployment and imports/exports this study has developed a measure of import and export
for each state.
The measure of import and export of electricity is derived from the net generation
of electricity for all fuels within a state and the retail sales of electricity within a state
(Energy Information Agency, 2014). Should retail sales exceed net generation within a
state, then the state is a net importer of electricity. Should retail sales be less than the
generation in a state, then the state is a net exporter of electricity. The measure is the total
MWhrs of the net in-state generation that is either imported or exported. Therefore
import/export is operationalized as:
Import/Export = Energy Sales – Generation
Negative values of indicate the amount of increase in generation that a state
would need to fulfill the demand from retail sales. Positive values of indicate the amount
of production over the in-state demand that is exported. The data for net generation and
total retail sales is obtained from the EIA’s electricity data browser (Energy Information
Agency, 2014). The import and export data derived for this study are presented in
Appendix C on Table C-16.
Significant variation exists across the states in the import and export of electricity.
For example in 2012, Maryland and Massachusetts import a large percentage of the
instate demand, while Wyoming and North Dakota export large amounts of electricity.
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Over time, these values have not remained constant in many cases. For example, Idaho
has significantly decreased imports. On the other hand, California imports have
fluctuated slightly over time, but for the most part have remained relatively constant. In
the case of exports, the same is seen across states over time, where some exporters, such
as Maine have decreased the level of exports, while others, such as Wyoming have
maintained stable levels of exports.
Previous research has operationalized the measure of electricity import as the
percent of retail sales, not of generation. The proposed measure for this study is not retail
sales but instead the amount of the total generation exported by a state, or conversely the
amount of in-state generation that is necessary to make up for imports. This measure
should accurately reflect the imports or exports of bulk electricity, versus the percentage
of sales. Percentage of sales reflects instead the percent of import or export that is the
portion of the total demand and not of generation. Since this study focuses on is the
generation and not sales, this measure is deemed more appropriate for this research.
Previous research that has examined the import and export of electricity has
included Sine and Lee (2009), Powers and Yin (2010), and Gong (2011). Unfortunately,
none of these previous studies has used deployment of wind energy as the dependent
variable. Sine and Lee examine entrepreneurial activity in the wind power sector and use
registration of wind energy entities with the FERC and the dependent variable. Gong
studies the effectiveness of an RPS, examining the effect on consumer surplus, thus not
considering the deployment levels of renewables as the dependent variable. Powers and
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Yin are attempting to determine the effects of an RPS; however, their research is based
on the outcomes for renewable energy generation.
Powers and Yin find that interactions between the import ratio and the
incremental share of non-hydro renewables is essentially not a significant factor. They
suggest that the success of an RPS is therefore not dependent on the imports of a state.
Regardless, for the purposes of this study, should this finding hold, then the deployment
of resources is probably due to in-state factors, rather than the result of the influence of
out of state exports or imports.
Electricity price. Electricity prices vary between states because of the
differentiated sources for electricity, levels of demand and other factors. The price of
electricity within a state may affect the deployment of wind power through the price
mechanism. On the one hand, wind energy, subsidies may decrease the price of electricity
resulting in lower prices within a jurisdiction. On the other hand, wind energy
requirements may lead to higher prices if wind energy PPA prices are high. Wind energy
may push prices either lower or higher, depending on the prices within a jurisdiction and
the wind power price. To test for correlations in deployment and prices this study uses the
average of retail and commercial prices within each state. Electricity prices were obtained
from the Energy Information Agency (2014). Data are presented in Appendix C on Table
C-17.
Significant variation exists across the states for the price of electricity. For
example, in 2012 prices ranged from a low of 6.89 cents/kWh in Idaho to 15.08
cents/kWh in New York. Over time, these values have not remained constant but have
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increased. For example, the price in Idaho was 4.92 cents/kWh in 2001. On the other
hand, states like Texas and Pennsylvania have seen price increases followed by price
decreases during this same period. Regardless, significant variation exists in pricing
across states.
Previous research has operationalized the retail price of electricity as the average
price of across all sectors (commercial, residential, and industrial) (Carley, 2009; Delmas
& Montes-Sancho, 2011; Hitaj, 2012; Gong, 2011; Lyon & Yin, 2010). One of these
studies focused on determinants of renewable energy deployment and another on wind
energy deployment. The first, by Carley (2009), indicated that the effect of price was
negative and significant. The second by Hitaj (2012), indicated that the influence of price
was positive and significant. The other studies that considered retail price did not find
any significant influence. The mixed findings demonstrate that price effects are not clear.

Summary of Independent Variables
The independent variables described above have the potential to influence the
deployment of wind energy in either a positive or a negative manner. These independent
variables proposed should have the greatest effect on wind energy deployment. These
variables are proposed from examining the system as a market for power plants and not
as a market for electricity. Hence, this study proposes to measure the effects of baseload,
intermediate, and peaking generation resources, provide an improved operationalization
of the transmission assets, governance, and include the effects of facility retirements. The
hypothesized effects of these variables to deployment are summarized in Table 14 below.
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Table 14: Summary of Hypothesized Effects of Independent Variables
Variable
Operationalized as
Units
Hypothesized
Relationship
Renewable Energy Production Tax
$/MWhr
Positive
Production
Incentive (PTC)
Incentives
Renewable Energy Renewable Portfolio
GWhrs
Positive
Capacity
Standard (RPS)
Incentives
Wind Energy
Sales Tax Incentive
Binary
Positive
Financial
Variables
Property Tax Incentive
Incentives
Wind Siting
Federal Land Area
Acres of Land
Negative
Policies
Transmission
RTO-ISO Territory
Square Miles of Positive
Governance
Area
Land
Transmission
Transmission Circuits Miles
Positive
Stocks
Flexibility of
Baseload Generation
Nameplate
Negative for
Generation Assets
MWs
Baseload,
decreasing with
Intermediate
Nameplate
increased
Generation
MWs
flexibility
Peaking Generation
Nameplate
MWs
Generation
Retired Generation
Nameplate
Positive
Retirement
MWs
Wind Energy
Potential Wind
MWs
Positive
Resources
Generation
Price of Wind
Power Purchase
$/MW
No Correlation
Generation
Agreement Price
Electricity Demand Total in-state demand
TWhrs
Positive
Import-Export
Negative for states that MWhrs
Higher Imports –
import, Positive for
Positive
states that export
Higher Exports –
Negative
Electricity Price
Average of retail and
$/MWhr
Higher Price –
commercial sales price
Positive
Lower Price Negative

Analytical Procedures
This study proposes that states possessing divergent incentives, infrastructures,
and economic conditions differentially influence the development of wind-generated
energy. It is unclear how each of these differing factors contributes to wind power
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development. To explore the relative influence, researchers have typically employed
econometric techniques. Econometric analysis is a quantitative method typically used by
researchers to attempt to identify the separate effects of independent variable to the
dependent variable. Specifically, researchers in renewable energy policies related to
renewable energy deployment have used variations of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression analysis techniques (Carley, 2009; , Hitaj, 2012; Kneifel, 2008; Menz &
Vachon, 2006; Shrimali & Kneifel, 2011). Similar techniques are utilized in this study as
described below.

Data structure and quantitative modeling. The data for this study consists of
cross-sectional and time series data with 35 states observed over 12 years. The panel data
is balanced, meaning all individual are observed over all times. The balance results from
the extrapolation of the transmission governance, circuit mileage data and PPA prices.
These extrapolations were undertaken (as described in Chapter Three, above) to support
the investigation of the time series variance during the period of the investigation. The
data are considered a short panel, where there are many individuals and few periods.
Varying, time invariant and individual invariant regressors are found within the
data. Varying regressors include production incentives, capacity incentives, tax policies,
transmission variables, generation assets and retirement, wind energy prices, demand,
import-export, and electricity price. For some states within the dataset, the capacity
incentives are time and individually invariant since some states may not have an RPS
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requirement. Time invariant regressors for all individuals include the wind energy siting
variable and the wind energy potential.
The panel data in this study therefore exhibits overall variation, or variation over
time and individuals. In addition, data varies between individuals (between variation) and
within individuals (within variation) over time. The type of variation found within the
data is important, since estimators used for modeling the data are based on the variation
(between or within) exhibited by the data. However, tests must be performed to
determine the appropriate models, regardless of the data structure.
Specifically, the between variation is defined for each individual as the mean of
the specific observations over time subtracted from the mean of all observations over
time. The within variation is defined for each individual as the value of the observation
minus the mean for the individual. Finally, there is a modified version of within variation
for the data where the overall mean and individual mean for each observation for each
variable at each time is subtracted from the observation. Simply stated, between variation
examines variation in the individuals irrespective of time, within variation is the variation
over time for each individual and the modified within variation examines variation within
and between individuals on a normalized basis.
The OLS regression panel models explore the relationship across time and
individuals in the context of the method to measure the variation. The panel data models
use different estimators based the within and between variation in the data. The selection
of the appropriate model is based on the consistency and efficiency of the estimator.
Consistency is a property based on the law of large numbers where the addition of
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observations tends to provide more precise and accurate estimates. Estimator efficiency is
established by finding the minimum variance. To select the appropriate model,
consistency is first examined, then efficiency. These selections are made through
comparative testing of the results of each model. The testing procedures to determine the
appropriate models are described following the description of the models.
Basic OLS regression models include pooled OLS, fixed and random effects
models. The pooled OLS model uses both the between and within variation to estimate
parameters. The pooled OLS estimator “pools” the data across individuals and times to
estimate the effects of each regressor. Therefore, pooled OLS essentially ignores the
temporal and individual nature of panel data, and may be inconsistent for the modeling of
panel data. To be consistent, pooled OLS the error terms must be uncorrelated with the
regressors.
Fixed effects models examine the individual-specific effects of the regressors.
The fixed effects model uses the within variation for each individual. Time is considered
within each individual. Since individual variation is the basis for the model fixed effects
models are limited when dealing with time-invariant variables. Time-invariant variables
are therefore dropped from the models and the coefficients for these regressors are not
identified. Similar to pooled OLS, tests must be conducted to assess the consistency and
efficiency of the model.
Random effects models examine the individual effects over time and across
individuals. Random effects models therefore allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the
error term across individuals. Coefficients are provided for all regressors, including time160

invariant measures. From the structure of the data, with time-invariant, between and
within variation, a random effects model may be applicable to the data. However, a
random model may not be consistent in comparison to the fixed model and tests must be
conducted to assess the applicability
Tests performed to determine the selection of pooled OLS, random, or fixed
models are based on the comparison of the consistency and efficiency of the estimators.
Consistency and efficiency are related to the estimated error terms within each model.
Therefore, comparing the error terms across models determines the appropriate model. In
the case where the error terms are uncorrelated with the regressors, pooled OLS is an
appropriate approach; however, fixed models apply when the error terms are correlated
with the regressors. Random effects models are appropriate when the error terms are
uncorrelated with the regressors and when the model is the most efficient.
The method for determining the appropriate model is straightforward. Each model
(pooled OLS, fixed and random effects) is applied to the panel data and the results
obtained. The results of the random effects are compared to the pooled OLS results to
determine significance of the random intercepts. Should significance be determined, then
the random effects models is the most appropriate of these two models, since the results
indicate the random effects models is the most consistent. To determine if the errors are
correlated with the regressors, and if a fixed model is appropriate, a Hausman test is
performed. Should the resulting p-value of this test be significant, then a fixed effects
model is appropriate, if not, then the random effects model is appropriate.

161

Fixed effects models examine the effects across individuals and random effects
models vary (Gelman 2005). In other words, in fixed effect models the differentiation is
related to whether observed effects are related to the characteristics of each individual
(the US states in this context) or if the effects are instead related to observations across
individuals. Therefore, if a fixed effects model is more appropriate, then the observations
within each state’s provide more explanation of the dependent variable than the classes of
observations (potential wind energy, policies, etc.) across states.
This study will also utilize cross-correlational analysis of selected independent
variables to the dependent variable to explore the temporal relationships. The time series
data from the dependent and independent variables is used to explore the leads and lags
that in the time series data. Specifically, cross-correlation and covariance of two
univariate variables are examined in tandem to consider the temporal relationship from
the panel data (Venables & Ripley, 2002). This analysis will consider the relationship of
significant regressors determined through the econometric modeling.
The statistical modeling software selected for the analysis is R. R is a software
environment for statistical computing and graphics (R Core Team, 2015). The R software
is implemented using the R-Studio graphical interface that is an open source integrated
development environment for R. The R-Studio edition utilized in this study is RStudio
Desktop (2015).
Qualitative analysis. The qualitative analysis is guided by the quantitative
results. Three states are selected for qualitative examination from the states that exceed
the predicted levels of deployment, those that meet predicted levels and those states that
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lag predicted values. For each of these states, the contextual variables along with the soft
and hard infrastructure variables are compared. The cases that vary from the predicted
values were selected to explore why these states show significant variation from the
modeled results.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Results and Discussion
In this chapter, the results of the quantitative analysis of the data and a
comparative case study are presented. Discussion of the results is provided for
quantitative and qualitative results within each respective section. Following the
presentation of these results, the quantitative and qualitative results are compared and
discussed.

Quantitative Results
Summary statistics were developed for the dependent and independent variables.
The location or central tendency of the data is provided by the median, mean and
interquartile means. The data spread or statistical dispersion is summarized by the
standard deviation. Summary statistics are presented in Table 15.
Variable
Wind Deployment
(Nameplate MWs)
PTC Subsidy
($/MW)
RPS Requirements
(GWh)
Sales Tax
(binary)
Property Tax
(binary)
Federal Land
(Acres)

Min.

Table 15: Summary Statistics
1st Qu.
Median
3rd Qu.

Max.

Mean

Std. Dev.

0

1

130

691.5

12214

633

1334

0

18

20

22

32

17.21

7.87

0

0

0

1179

49138

1773

5395

0

0

0

0

1

0.2476

0.4316

0

0

1

1

1

0.5381

0.4985

81692

406734

1865374 26921861 56961778 11028314 15794781
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RTO-ISO
Territory
0
(Sq. Miles)
Transmission
117
(Circuit Miles)
Baseload
Generation
936
(Nameplate MWs)
Intermediate
Generation
0
(Nameplate MWs)
Peaking
Generation
3
(Nameplate MWs)
Wind Resource
1028
(Potential MWs)
Retired Generation
0
(Nameplate MWs)
Power Purchase
Agreement
29.25
($/MWhr)
Demand
5352
(Million MWhrs)
Import (positive)
or Export
-61137
(negative)
(Million MWhrs)
Retail Electricity
44.6
Price ($/MWhr)

7800

30843

55519

248954

39739

46913

2375

3176

4343

24911

3690

3134

5310

9144

20822

63644

13603

12282

289

1948

4051

42518

3886

6741

649.5

2147

4898.5

14374

3315.5

3434

9200

54920

516822

1901530

298763

421368

3.75

78

363.25

11907

606.26

1524

39.7

52.27

63.35

99.17

54.05

19.16

23255

49576

98419

376065

71671

70795

-3268

6756

18426

80788

9410

24895

64.3

74.95

93.53

163.8

82.56

25.85

Following the estimation of the summary statistics, independent variables were
cross-correlated to check for collinearity in the data. Collinearity of the regressors could
lead to under or over estimation of the significance of closely related regressors.
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were estimated for each of the pairs of independent
variables. This measure returns values ranging from -1 to 1, with -1 being a perfect
negative correlation, zero meaning no correlation, and 1 being a perfect positive
correlation. Values above 0.5 or below -0.5 show stronger associations between the
independent variables and should be considered when interpreting results. This level of

165

correlation may mask the effects of the correlated regressors and the individual effects
may not be distinguished as a result.
The variables for the PTC, sales tax, property tax, federal lands, PPA price,
import-export, and electricity price showed no correlation values >0.5 or <-0.5. No
variables showed a negative correlation below -0.5. The variables for RPS, RTO-ISO,
transmission miles, baseload MWs, intermediate MWs, peaking MWs, potential MWs,
retired MWs, and demand all showed positive correlations within this group of regressors
that were above 0.5. The correlations for variables that were above 0.5 are presented in
Table 16.

RPS
RTOISO
Tmiles
BaseMWs
IntMWs
PeakMWs
PtMWs
RetMWs
Demand

Table 16: Cross-Correlation of Independent Variables
RPS RTOISO Tmiles BaseMWs IntMWs PeakMWs PtMWs RetMWs Demand
1.00
0.47
1.00
0.40
0.80
1.00
0.40
0.70
0.77
1.00
0.55
0.75
0.85
0.77
1.00
0.49
0.53
0.51
0.74
0.49
1.00
0.05
0.65
0.54
0.22
0.39
0.01
1.00
0.61
0.57
0.68
0.63
0.70
0.64
0.25
1.00
0.56
0.75
0.80
0.95
0.83
0.81
0.22
0.71
1.00

Interpretation of these correlations is relatively straightforward and the
relationships are as expected considering the regressors are economic complements or
inputs. For example, the demand variable is correlated with generation, transmission, and
retirements. Logically, the increased demand would require the construction of
complementary inputs to meet the demand. Therefore, with increased demand, each of
the variables for transmission and the various types of generation would also be required
since generation fills demand and transmission is necessary to deliver the services from
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generation. In addition, demand is correlated with the RPS requirements. RPS policies
often require that a percent of generation or sales is provided through renewable energy
generation, so this correlation is not surprising and expected.
More interesting are the correlations that occur between the RPS, RTO-ISO
variables, infrastructure, and contextual variables. For the RPS variable, the correlation of
the intermediate generation is >0.5 indicates that the coefficients determined for this pair
of variables should be interpreted carefully. RTO-ISO areas are correlated with
transmission and generation regressors, which is expected since the nature of these grid
governance structures is to facilitate coordinated transmission planning and to foster
transmission construction. Hence, RTO-ISO governance effects may be masked. To
examine the correlation of the independent variables and to assess the relative strengths
of the policy variables to the infrastructure variables, a step-wise modeling approach was
taken (additional measures tested the stability of the model with the presence of highly
correlated variables – see Model Testing, below).
To determine relative strengths of the independent variables, initially a policy
model was estimated with policy regressors and contextual variables to determine the
effects of the various policies to the dependent variable. Subsequently, an infrastructure
model was estimated with infrastructure and contextual variables only (no policy
variables) to examine the effects of the infrastructures to the dependent variable. Finally,
all regressors were modeled to determine the effects of the independent variables.
Relative strengths of regressors are assessed through this process, since the significance
of less relevant regressors will diminish when compared in the overall model. In addition,
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by examining the regressors in a comparative fashion, the method determines if omitted
variables bias exists.
All models were tested to determine the appropriateness for analysis of the data.
Pooled OLS, fixed, and random effects models were constructed and the results
compared. Lagrange multiplier tests and Hausman tests were utilized to determine the
most efficient and consistent model for the data (Hausman, 1978; Honda, 1985). A fixed
effects model was indicated as the most appropriate model for the policy, infrastructure
and combined models. When modeling is conducted using fixed effects coefficients are
not developed for time-invariant variables, since the fixed effects model utilizes within
variation for each state. Therefore, coefficients are not developed for time invariant
variables for federal lands or wind energy potentials in the model analysis. The results of
all models and model testing for this study are presented in Appendix D. The results for
the policy, infrastructure and combined models are summarized in Table 17.

Table 17: Summary of Model Results
Dependent Variable (total MWs)
Independent Variable
Production Tax Credit
($/MWhr)
Renewable Portfolio
Standard (MWs Required)
Sales Tax Incentives
(0/1)
Property Tax Incentives
(0/1)
RTO-ISO Present
(Sq. Miles)

Policy Model

Infrastructure Model

1.5513715

Combined Model

--

--

3.8028000

0.0564127

***

--

--

0.0366540

**

398.9925802

*

--

--

244.5800000

.

--

--

-344.1300000

*

--

--

-0.0031538

-19.2472371
-0.0148085

**
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Transmission
(Circuit Miles)
Baseload Generation
(MWs)
Intermediate Generation
(MWs)
Peaking Generation
(MWs)
Retired Generation
(MWs)
Power Purchase Price
($/MWhr)
In-State Electrical Demand
(GWhrs)
Imports/Exports of
Electricity (GWhrs)
Retail Electrical Price
($/MWhr)

--

--

0.5220108

***

0.5218000

***

--

--

-0.0944555

.

-0.1009200

.

--

--

-0.0883995

***

-0.1216300

***

--

--

-0.0777722

--

--

0.2803509

-9.4326174

***

0.9947734

0.1168185

***

0.0480252

***

0.0506300

***

0.0154913

.

0.0352537

***

0.0432420

***

16.7656269

***

6.5252421

*

5.5150000

.

-0.0950950
***

0.2580100
0.7262600

R-Squared

0.52539

0.75304

0.76735

Adj. R-Squared

0.47035

0.67415

0.67782

F-Statistic

46.2477

127.389

85.4039

376

376

371

<2.22e-16

<2.22e-16

<2.22e-16

Degrees of Freedom
p-Value

***

Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

The model for the policy and contextual variables estimates positive and
significant coefficients for the RPS, sales tax, demand, import-export, and electricity
price variables. Negative and significant coefficients are estimated for the RTO-ISO and
PPA variables. Since the RPS policy sets aside a portion of the market for wind energy,
this variable is positive and significant as hypothesized. Similarly, demand that drives the
RPS requirement is positive and significant. The import-export variable indicates that
wind deployment is correlated with states that either import or export electricity in the
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policy model. Electricity prices are also relatively straightforward and states with higher
prices appear to promote development. The PPA price would indicate that where wind
energy prices are high, deployment levels are decreased. The negative coefficient
associated with the existence of an RTO-ISO area is unexpected; however, examining the
data, the RTO-ISO expansions occurrs in states that did not deploy wind capacity over
time. The RTO-ISO territory areas have been relatively constant during the period of the
study in states with wind development, while RTO-ISO expansion occurred Virginia and
Arkansas that have developed no wind energy during period of the study.
The model for infrastructure and contextual variables estimates positive and
significant coefficients for the transmission miles, retirement of generation, demand,
import-exports, and lower significance for the electricity price. The interpretation of these
results is similar to the policy and control model, where the demand, import-export, and
price are hypothesized to effect deployment in a similar manner to the policy model. The
transmission and retirement coefficients estimated are as hypothesized, where the states
that build transmission and retire facilities show increased wind energy development.
Negative and significant coefficients are associated with the baseload MWs and
intermediate MWs, which would be expected, since these are competing resources to
wind development. Peaking MWs are not significant and indicates the complementary
nature of more flexible resources to wind energy deployment. The control variable for
PPA prices is also not significant in this model, juxtaposed to the weak significance in the
policy model. This indicates that PPA prices are not as strong a factor in wind energy
deployment as the infrastructure variables and is consistent with the hypothesis that PPA
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prices are not correlated with deployment. Since a strong cross-correlation for PPA prices
is not apparent this leads to more support to the hypothesis that wind energy is price
insensitive. In addition, the decreasing significance indicates omitted variables exist.
The combined model shows positive and significant effects for the RPS, sales tax,
transmission, generation retirements, demand, and import-export. Significance levels for
the RPS and sales tax policies are diminished relative to the policy model but the
transmission, generation retirements, demand, and import-export show elevated
significance. These results indicate that infrastructures are omitted variables in policy
analysis. In addition, the baseload and intermediate generation retain their significance
while the peaking generation remains insignificant. The results are consistent with the
conceptual model that proposes infrastructures are important economic complements for
determining the deployment of wind energy. Therefore, the results suggest that
deployment will occur in areas where demand is high and transmission provides access to
markets. The highly significant and positive coefficient for demand and retirements
indicates that “market space” or opportunities to sell power are significant factors.
The negative property tax variable is surprising since developers should react
positively to decreased tax burdens. However, the property tax variable was not
significant within the policy and control model. Importantly, the property tax and sales
tax were operationalized as binary variables and therefore do not provide differentiation
on the magnitude of the effects of these policies across the states. Further research is
necessary to provide adequate quantitative measurements for the differential effects of
these policies across the population.
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The intermediate and baseload generation variables were both negative, with
baseload generation showing a weak significance and intermediate generation showing a
strong significance. Peaking systems showed no significance and appear not related or in
this case, not competitive with wind energy. These relationships are as hypothesized;
where the less flexible systems are less amenable to incorporation of higher levels of
wind energy deployment and vice versa.
The PTC variable, as operationalized, is not significant within either the policy or
overall model; however, the PTC is a federal instrument that is consistent across states
and only three states provide a state level PTC. Of these states, one has implemented a
decreasing level of PTC support over time (Oklahoma) and another has very few
developed MWs (Utah). Hence, for the majority of states the PTC variable is uniform,
regardless of whether the state has developed or not developed any level of wind energy.
Therefore, variance exists across states for the dependent variable of nameplate MWs but
not in the independent variable of the PTC. Furthermore, PTC expirations occurred early
in the study period, when low levels of wind deployment were taking place. PTC subsidy
increases were also greater during the earlier part of the study period and were lower on
an annualized basis in the year 2008-2012 (Table 8). As a result, no correlation is likely
using the variable as operationalized in this study. Support for the PTC as an important
policy instrument is still evident since a lack of correlation is evident between wind
energy PPA prices and wind energy deployment. This price insensitivity indicates that
the support given to developers from policies are a strong driver of wind energy
deployment.
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Relative strengths of independent variables. To examine the relative strengths
of the independent variables to the deployment of wind, standardized coefficients were
estimated. The resulting model has the same significance for each variable but estimates
the coefficients in terms of the sample standard deviation of the dependent variable, per
the sample standard deviation increase in the regressors. Standardized coefficients may
be an inaccurate assumption in the case of non-normal distributions, therefore, the
interpretation is limited to in this study to the relative ranking of the effects. Regardless,
the relative rankings do indicate the strength of the policy factors to the contextual
factors. The complete results of all standardized models are presented in Appendix D.
The standardized results are summarized in Table 18.
Table 18: Summary of Results – Standardized Coefficients
Dependent Variable (total MWs)
Infrastructure
Independent Variable
Policy Model
Combined Model
Model
Production Tax Credit
12.214
--29.94
($/MWhr)
Renewable Portfolio
Standard (MWs
304.722
***
--197.99
**
Required)
Sales Tax Incentives
398.993
*
--244.58
.
(0/1)
Property Tax
Incentives
-19.247
---344.13
*
(0/1)
RTO-ISO Present
-695.549
**
---148.13
(Sq. Miles)
Transmission
--1638.261
***
1637.61
***
(Circuit Miles)
Baseload Generation
---1161.545
.
-1241.02
.
(MWs)
Intermediate
Generation
---596.662
***
-820.95
***
(MWs)
Peaking Generation
---267.436
-327.00
(MWs)
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Retired Generation
(MWs)
Power Purchase Price
($/MWhr)
In-State Electrical
Demand
(GWhrs)
Imports/Exports of
Electricity
(GWhrs)
Retail Electrical Price
($/MWhr)
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared
F-Statistic
Degrees of Freedom
p-Value

--

--

427.775

-180.954

***

19.084

8280.124

***

3404.037

***

3588.63

***

386.119

.

878.698

***

1077.80

***

433.423

***

168.69

*

142.57

.

0.52539
0.47035
46.2477
376
<2.22e-16

***

393.69

***

13.93

0.75304
0.67415
127.389
376
<2.22e-16

0.76735
0.67782
85.4039
371
<2.22e-16

Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Examining the highly significant standardized coefficients within the policy
model, demand is the overwhelming factor in increasing wind energy deployment. In
relative terms, the RPS and electricity prices provide roughly the same level of effect.
Negative factors include the PPA prices that are highly significant but weakly negative.
Again, the RTO-ISO is less significant but it is strongly negative, which is again
unexpected. Therefore, when considering the relative strength of the policy to the
contextual factors, demand (a contextual factor) provides elevated influence relative to
policies. However, as discussed, the PTC operationalization may not afford the variation
necessary to measure the effects of this policy; therefore, the effects of this policy may
not be reflected in the results.
Standardized coefficients estimated for the infrastructure variables show the
relative strengths of these variables to the contextual factors. The results of this analysis
show that demand is again the overwhelming factor in deployment. Transmission follows
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demand as the next strongest factor for deployment in the infrastructure model, followed
by the import or export of electricity. Retirement also shows a positive effect, although
weaker than the aforementioned factors. Examining generation, baseline generation is
less significant but the strength is higher than that of intermediate generation, which is
highly significant, while peaking generation shows no correlation with deployment. The
ordinal ranking of the generation assets are as hypothesized where increasing generation
flexibility is less competitive withwind energy.
Considering the combined policy, infrastructure and policy model, standardized
coefficients show the strongest factor in determining deployment is demand followed by
transmission, imports and exports, and retirement of facilities. For the policy measures,
the RPS is a positive influence, followed by the sales tax measure but these policy
measures are less influential than the contextual or the infrastructure variables. Retiring
facilities shows slightly greater positive influence than the RPS policies. Finally, the
standardized coefficients for differing generation types are consistent with the
interpretations above and flexible resources are less competitive to wind energy. The
caveat to these analyses is the relative strength of the PTC is not available through this
model nor are the fixed regressors that include the state wind energy resources and the
federal lands that are a proxy for an additional permitting regime. These factors are
discussed further in subsequent sections.
Investigation of leading and lagging regressors. Models were developed for
each of the regressors with elevated significance (significance >0.01) to examine the lead
or lag of these to the dependent variable of deployment. Correlation coefficients for the
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factors were plotted versus the amount of lag to determine whether there is a higher
probability of occurrence for a particular regressor to lead or lag deployment. Lead-lag
plots for all significant variables and the plots of the actual deployment to significant
variables are provided in Appendix E.
The analysis shows deployment of wind energy occurs in advance of RPS
requirements. Developers and utilities act in advance of mandatory RPS requirements
since these policies often include penalties for failure to meet the standard. Transfer of
renewable energy credits to meet RPS requirements may also facilitate the development
of wind in advance of mandatory requirements. States that have low or no RPS
requirements that desire to export wind energy to states with RPS requirements may add
to the deployment in advance of the requirements. Therefore, the import and export of
wind may be enhanced by RPS requirements and fulfillment of demand in other states. In
addition, California deployed a large portion of the wind fleet in that state prior to the
RPS, arguably because of lucrative tax credits (Asmus, 2001). California’s deployment
level was 40% of total US deployment in 2001 and this deployment was in advance of the
RPS requirements that were promulgated in that state in 2003. Arguably, this large
deployment in advance of requirements may lead to a distortion in the cross-correlation.
Examining transmission, the pattern of development is quite different from the
RPS policies. The correlation of transmission to deployment indicates that the probability
is higher of transmission construction leading to the deployment of wind energy. This
relationship is logical, since without transmission, power cannot be moved to markets and
developers cannot construct facilities without this essential infrastructure. Transmission
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leading deployment suggests that proactive construction of transmission would facilitate
the development of wind energy.
Intermediate generation shows a similar pattern to transmission, where this
competing resource is often developed in advance of wind energy deployment. Although
the resource is competitive, speculatively, transmission may have been constructed to
support these facilities. If so, excess transmission may have been utilized by wind
developers. In addition, the early construction of natural gas may also be complementary
since this technology is more flexible than baseload technologies, particularly coal. Thus,
by deploying flexible generation technologies in advance may also foster wind
generation.
Demand shows a two-tailed effect, where demand and deployment of wind, are
more highly correlated both before and after the period when wind is deployed. This is an
artifact of the use of wind to fill demand that is created before deployment as well as
afterwards. Retirement of generation, which is hypothesized to add to demand, shows a
pattern where the probability of plant retirement is most highly correlated at the time of
wind energy deployment. The lead-lag correlation indicates a bi-directional relationship
where retirement of facilities leads to wind energy deployment and conversely, wind
energy deployment leads to retirement.
Finally, the pattern of correlation in the import and export of electricity show
relatively low correlation coefficients. Examining the actual data, a bifurcated effect is
apparent. States that import electricity develop wind energy as do states that export
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electricity. The individual states also have varying leads and lags in the deployment of
wind to the import and export of electricity, leading to the low correlation coefficients.
Model testing. To test the findings of the model, several techniques were utilized.
Initially, the states with the largest deployment in nameplate MWs of wind energy were
each sequentially removed from the model to assess the effects to the results. These
states, Iowa, California, and Texas represent 38% of all US deployment as of 2012 and
therefore should provide elevated influence in the model relative to states with lower
levels of deployment. Should the findings hold across these models, then individual state
effects do not significantly affect the results.
Examining these models, the RPS, transmission, intermediate generation,
retirement of transmission, demand and export-import variables retained significance.
The sales tax and property tax variables lost significance (particularly when omitting
Texas). When Iowa was omitted, the sales tax influence coefficient direction changed
from positive to negative. The decreasing significance and positive to negative change
indicates that the property and tax variables require improved operationalization.
The baseload MWs coefficients became positive and slightly significant without
the presence of the data including Texas. Texas has increased intermediate MWs over the
period of the study while deploying the largest wind fleet in the US, shifting away from a
baseload generation fleet to a more flexible generation fleet with a large wind fleet.
Therefore, Texas has largely shifted away from less flexible baseload assets and this
retirement of baseload assets and the strategy is positive for wind. Nevertheless, it is
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important to note that the findings for the RPS, transmission, intermediate generation,
retirements, demand and import-export remained consistent throughout this test.
A second technique to test the model incorporates time as an independent variable
in the model. If time is a significant predictor, then other factors exogenous to the model
account for the temporal correlation. As expected, time is a significant predictor of the
deployment of wind and the unaccounted variation may be partially explained by the
operationalization of the policy variables, the technological changes in wind turbines over
the period, or related to decreasing institutional barriers allowing greater incorporation of
wind energy assets.
A third check that was performed plotted each of the independent variables
against the dependent variable to explore the potential for non-linear relationships of the
dependent variable to each regressor. Non-linear patterns, such as exponential or
saturation types (S-curve) were not identified in the data. In addition, scatterplots that
contained the dependent and independent relationship for each state were constructed to
examine the potential for patterns to exist at the state level that may not be easily be
recognized in a composite scatterplot of all data. All scatterplot data is presented in
Appendix F.
To investigate the potential for highly correlated regressors to effect model results
in the infrastructure model, a forward step-wise fixed effects model was constructed. This
model verified the stability of the infrastructure model, since regressors identified within
the fixed model retained significance and direction throughout the test. The infrastructure
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model was selected for this test, since this model contained the majority of the highly
correlated regressors.
In addition, a forward step-wise model was constructed using a between estimator
to determine if any regressors were significant predictors of the mean level of wind
energy deployment across states. The import and export of electricity, the RPS variable
and the level of wind resources within a state were significant in the between model. This
result emphasizes the importance of policies, resources, and ability to import or export as
factors that influence the mean of the deployment of wind energy across states.
Finally, the model residuals or the difference between the observed values and
predicted values of the dependent variable was used to assess the appropriateness of the
use of a linear model. Each of the state residuals is shown on Figure 39. In the figure each
color represents a state. Model residuals in MWs difference from the predicted values are
on the left axis and y-axis represents the number of cases within the model (35 states x 12
years or 420 cases). The plot of the residuals shows a random distribution with no
apparent pattern that would indicate the need for a non-linear model.
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Figure 39: Model Residuals

Qualitative case selection. Three qualitative cases were selected by assessing the
model residuals to determine the two states (Iowa and Ohio) that varied the most and the
one state (Nebraska) that deviated the least from the model findings. Of the two states
that varied the most from the predicted values, one state (Iowa) deployed greater amounts
of wind power than predicted, while the other state (Ohio) deployed less wind power than
expected. These two states therefore represent cases that most significantly depart from
the statistical findings; therefore, should be examined in detail. Residuals for the state of
Nebraska do not exceed 205 MWs. Nebraska therefore represents a state that conforms
the most with the model and should therefore be considered in conjunction with the two
cases that depart from the model. This case study comparison considers groups of factors,
first policy variables, then infrastructure, and finally contextual variables. Fixed variables
not amenable to the quantitative analysis are also considered in this section. Prior to the
comparison of the cases, first we will examine the varying outcomes in the states
selected.
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Outcomes. Deployment of wind power in Nebraska and Ohio has reached
relatively the same level of wind energy deployment as of 2012, with each state
deploying 449 and 428 MWs, respectively. The development level in these states is
relatively modest, with Nebraska and Ohio ranked 23rd and 26th, respectively, in wind
deployment. Together, these two states only represent 0.7% of all wind development in
the population. Nebraska added wind gradually over time, while the majority of
deployment occurred in Ohio in the period from 2009 to 2012. Iowa has developed an
order of magnitude more wind than either state, with 5,133 MWs and ranks third in the
United States with over 8.5% of the total deployment (Figure 40).

Figure 40: Deployment of Wind over Time – Case Study States
Source EIA, 2014

Policy variables. Examining the permitting regimes, all states in this case utilize
the local-based or standard permitting model. The amount of federal lands does vary
across the states, and Nebraska has almost twice as much federal land as Ohio and less
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than five times the federal land area than Iowa. However, the total federal area within
each state is very low at less than 1.5% of all land within the states. Hence, the selected
cases are not appropriate for assessing the potential for developers to avoid difficult
permitting processes.
Governance of the grid has varied across the cases, with Iowa and Ohio part of an
RTO/ISO since the beginning of the study period. Nebraska transitioned to RTO/ISO
governance between the years of 2006 and 2009, with the vast majority of the state within
an RTO/ISO territory by 2009 (See Figures 16-19). Deployment in Nebraska did increase
coincidentally with the incorporation of the majority of the state into the RTO/ISO
governance but the comparison across these cases does not clearly indicate the
effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of these governance infrastructures.
Significant state level PTCs are not available in any of these states but the federal
PTC does apply across the states. Iowa did have a PTC credit that was enacted in 2005 at
a level of 1.5 cents/kW for 10 years; however, this credit was limited to 2.5 MWs per
qualifying facility and is too limited to provide a significant incentive. Importantly, the
federal PTC expiration years of 2002 and 2004 did not decrease the deployment in these
states, since each state expanded wind energy during these years (albeit at low levels in
comparison to later periods in the study). Perhaps even more importantly, the deployment
levels during the PTC expiration periods were very low in comparison to the
development levels that occurred in the later years of this study. The continued
deployment during the expiration periods would contribute to the lack of significance of
the PTC variable in this study.
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Examining the sales tax, property tax, MGPO, GPP, and RPS policies for each
state, Iowa and Ohio have always provided property tax relief while Nebraska has not.
Sales tax relief has been provided in Ohio over the study period, while Iowa implemented
this policy in 2006 and Nebraska provided this relief in 2007. Following the year 2006 in
Iowa and 2007 in Nebraska, expansion of the wind fleet accelerated but this expansion
may only be coincidental with the implementation of sales tax relief, since this level of
relief is relatively low and other factors may have contributed to this acceleration. MGPO
are required in Iowa but not in Nebraska or Ohio. Regardless, these MGPO policies may
have added to aggregate demand and increased deployment. GPP programs have not been
implemented in these states.
RPS standards exist in Iowa and Ohio but not Nebraska. The RPS in Iowa is a
modest standard, requiring only 210 MWs, but was implemented in 1983. The RPS in
Ohio is recent and was enacted in 2008 with a requirement of 12.5% of electricity from
renewables by 2026. The ramping up of the renewable energy requirement in Ohio during
the study period is therefore modest. However, the rate of deployment did accelerate in
Ohio after RPS enactment supporting that the RPS is effective (Figure 40).
Considering all cases, the total number of policies enacted to promote either
energy conservation or to stimulate renewable energy development are 61, 51 and 19 for
Iowa, Ohio and Nebraska, respectively (DSIRE, 2015). Thus, total policy support is far
greater in Iowa and Ohio than in Nebraska. Temporally, Iowa was an early adopter of
renewable support policies with the earliest US RPS standard, while Ohio has adopted the
RPS measure later in the period of the study. Therefore, it appears that the number of
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policies and timing of implementation supports the argument that policies do matter; but
with the caveat that the timing of implementation and interactions between instruments
are important.
Infrastructure variables. Turning to the infrastructures and the outcomes,
transmission, generation mixes, and retirements have varied across the cases.
Transmission mileage in Iowa increased modestly by approximately 10%, Ohio
transmission mileage almost doubled over the period of the study, while mileage in
Nebraska increased by almost 9%. The lack of expansion in Iowa is surprising but the
data show that Iowa has increasingly exported wind power and may therefore be
benefitting from improvements in transmission in neighboring states or the construction
of key linkages to improve in-state capacity for export. Generation percentages for
baseload, intermediate, and peaking assets changed across time for all states. All states
have shown a decrease in the amount of baseload generation and an increase in the
percentage of intermediate assets. Baseload generation in Iowa, Nebraska, and Ohio
decreased by 11%, 7%, and 19%, respectively. Intermediate assets increased by 10%,
5%, and 12% for these same states. Peaking assets in Iowa and Nebraska were relatively
high at the beginning of the study period at 22% and 20%, respectively and remained
constant through the period, while Ohio increased peaking assets from 15% to 21%.
Finally, Nebraska retired only 8 MWs during the period of the study, while Iowa and
Ohio retired 428 and 3,665 MWs, respectively. In Iowa and Ohio, the retirement of assets
accelerated over the period, with levels increasing particularly in the period of 2010
through 2012 for both states.
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Contextual variables. For the cases selected, the potential MWs of wind
deployment are highest in Nebraska at 917,999 MWs, relatively elevated in Iowa at
570,714 MWs and low in Ohio in 54,920 MWs. The PPA prices in Nebraska and Iowa
are the same since regional PPA data is used in this study, while wind prices in the Ohio
region are much higher. Demand was greatest in Ohio but actually decreased over the
study period. Absolute demand was lowest in Nebraska, but increased by the highest
percentage over the period. In Iowa, the demand has also increased over the period. Iowa
has increasingly exported electricity during the period, while Nebraska has exported but
at decreasing levels. Ohio has gone from importing to meeting demand and back to
importing over the period. The electricity prices started the period as lowest in Nebraska
and highest in Ohio. At the end of the period, prices were lowest in Iowa and remained
highest in Ohio.
This examination of the outlier cases indicates that one of the fixed variables,
resource potentials, may play a role since Ohio was lacking resources and development
relative to Iowa. Nebraska, while possessing much greater wind resources has limited
access to export transmission, with only one transmission line to Wyoming, one to
Western Kansas, one to South Dakota and a single point of connection to Missouri. All
other large transmission lines from Nebraska lead to Iowa. Hence, Nebraska is limited by
transmission either to areas with very little load or load growth or to Iowa, who exports
wind power (Platts, 2013). Thus, the potential for Nebraska to export wind resources is
limited. The step-wise between analysis results support the assertion that wind is an
important factor, since the analysis indicates that the mean of all state deployment is
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influenced by wind resources. In addition, demand is supported as an influence, since
demand in Ohio has fallen throughout the study period and Ohio development has lagged,
despite increasing transmission and retirements. The assertion of demand as the dominant
factor is further supported since demand in Iowa has increased over the period.
Iowa’s deployment level is one of the highest in the nation, despite lower relative
levels of increases in transmission. This may be the result primarily of export to
neighboring states and efficiencies in transmission improvements. Speculatively, Iowa
may have taken advantage of existing transmission and location to export to a large
market in neighboring Illinois. In addition, Iowa’s proximity and position between
Nebraska and the larger markets to the east may effectively block power transmission
from Nebraska, shutting off development within that state. The combination of the
growth of Iowa as a power exporter and the lack of transmission development lends some
support to this hypothesis. The comparison of these cases and the quantitative analysis
show that the market demand and the ability to supply to markets matters in determining
where wind energy is deployed.
Review of hypotheses. Nine hypotheses were presented in Chapter One, and each
of these is considered below in light of the evidence from the quantitative and qualitative
examinations. The hypotheses are presented with a brief discussion following each.
1. Wind energy deployment is increased in states with elevated wind energy
potential.
Evidence supporting this hypothesis includes the step-wise between modeling that
shows the mean of the deployment increases because of greater wind resources.
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Qualitatively, Iowa shows much greater deployment than Ohio while Nebraska has a
greater resources but has limited load and transmission.
2. Policies for siting wind that require an additional level of analysis
decrease levels of wind energy deployment.
No evidence confirms this hypothesis through either the quantitative or the
qualitative examination.
3. Policies that require increased wind energy generation capacity increase
wind energy deployment.
Quantitative evidence shows that RPS policies increase wind energy deployment.
Qualitatively, Iowa has had a long standing RPS and has elevated deployment. Nebraska,
which has no RPS has demonstrated low growth rates. Ohio’s growth rate accelerated
after RPS implementation. Thus, qualitative and quantitative studies confirm this
hypothesis.
4. Policies that incentivize wind energy production increase wind energy
deployment.
Direct evidence for this hypothesis is limited. The PTC as operationalized in this
study shows little variation across states and PTC expirations were early in the study
during a period of low deployment. None of the states in the qualitative studies has a
state-level PTC.
5. Policies that provide financial incentives to wind energy increase wind
energy deployment.
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No evidence was found to support the property tax relief, although some
quantitative evidence supports the sales tax policies. Some support for sales tax policies
is found in the qualitative study. Therefore, this hypothesis is plausible for sales tax
policies.
6. Grid governance that provides non-discriminatory access increases wind
energy deployment.
No evidence was found to support this hypothesis, either qualitatively or
quantitatively.
7. Increased generation asset retirements increase wind energy deployment.
Quantitative evidence supports this hypothesis. Qualitative evidence was
indeterminate. This hypothesis is plausible.
8. Generation that is more flexible is complementary to wind energy
deployment.
Strong support is afforded to this hypothesis by the quantitative evidence;
however, the case study analysis was not clearly supportive. The hypothesis is plausible.
9. Higher levels of transmission stocks increase wind energy deployment.
This hypothesis was strongly supported by the quantitative evidence. The case
study analysis does provide evidence to support the hypothesis through the comparison of
Iowa and Nebraska. The hypothesis is plausible.
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Discussion
The argument that infrastructure influences wind energy development as
compared to policy interventions is supported; however, it is important to note that the
influence of the PTC and RPS are certainly factors that influence deployment, since price
insensitivity is evident which likely results from large subsidies and the market set-asides
afforded from the RPS standards. Price insensitivity is concordant with economic models
of an RPS that show that renewable energy does not directly compete with fossil energy
via price (See Figure 34 and Berry, 2002). Since wind energy has been the lowest price
renewable resource to fulfill RPS requirements because of technological advantages and
the PTC subsidy, it is no surprise that the wind energy has grabbed the lion’s share of the
RPS requirements (See Table 5, comparison of wind versus non-wind deployment and
Figure 13, RPS requirements and wind deployment).
Support is provided for the hypotheses that transmission improvements and
retirement of generation assets are factors that are positive for wind development,
although wind development may also lead to retirement of facilities. Evidence was also
found to support the hypothesis that policies such as the RPS, which require increased
renewable energy, are also positive factors for increasing nameplate deployment of wind
energy. Also supported is the hypothesis that higher levels of generation flexibility are
less competitive with wind energy and in fact may be complementary and lead to
increased wind energy deployment.
The use of fixed effects modelling does not allow the estimation of coefficients
for siting policies and wind energy resource variables. Forward step-wise between
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modeling did indicate that wind resources are an important factor. The qualitative
analysis do not provide evidence for the effects of siting policies, since the cases selected
did not provide variation for this variable. Quantitative analysis and comparison across
cases was inconclusive regarding the hypothesis that PTC policies increase wind energy
deployment. However, indirect evidence supports the influence of the PTC as an effective
instrument, since wind energy deployment is insensitive to PPA prices. Sales tax policies
that subsidize wind are supported as increasing deployment.
This study makes similar findings to other quantitative analysis within the
literature, but also departs in some aspects. For example, this study finds that a capacity
incentive, in this case the RPS, is a contributing factor to wind energy development. This
finding is similar to Bohn and Lant (2009), Carley (for total MWs) (2009), Gong (2011),
Kneifel (2008), Maguire (2010), Menz and Vachon (2006) along with Yin and Powers
(2010). This study also claims that subsidies, such as sales tax policies are also supportive
to wind energy deployment, although this association is weak. The finding that sales
taxes relief is a positive factor is juxtaposed to findings by Carley (2009), but agrees with
findings by Hitaj (2012). The negative association of property tax relief to deployment is
surprising and agrees with findings from Hitaj. She found negative coefficients for
property tax relief (significant at the 10% level) within a pooled OLS model constructed
at the county level. Indirect evidence in the form of a lack of price sensitivity is
hypothesized to support that the PTC in combination with the RPS is an effective policy
instrument (see discussion above). However, state level analysis of the PTC is
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problematic as previously discussed. The PTC has been argued as effective by Maguire
(2010) and Hitaj (2012).
The negative coefficient for the RTO/ISO governance is somewhat surprising but
as previously discussed; the operationalization at the state level may be problematic to
discern the effects of this variable. Hitaj (2012) claims positive effects to wind
deployment from RTO/ISO governance when examining county level data, which may be
a more appropriate level for the analysis of this variable. County level data would allow
for a more granular analysis of the locations of wind facilities versus the presence or
absence of RTO/ISO territories than total RTO/ISO area per state. On the other hand,
regional level data that considers RTO/ISO territories to areas without a similar
governance structure may provide additional insight.
The findings of this study that transmission plays a large role in the deployment of
wind are not surprising and agree with the previous investigation by Hitaj (2012).
However, this study utilized a time-variant dataset to examine transmission, juxtaposed to
static data that was used by Hitaj. Importantly, since the study by Hitaj was focused on
policies, the consistency of transmission being significant within her study adds to the
weight of the evidence that transmission in an important economic input is an underexamined factor in wind energy deployment.
Unique to this study is the disaggregation of the competing generation assets to
baseload, intermediate and peaking sources. The findings of this study agree with
previous literature that natural gas is competitive with wind (Gong 2011; Kneifel, 2011;
Lyon & Yin, 2010; Shrimali & Maguire, 2010). However, this study goes further and
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suggests that peaking generation (including natural gas) does not compete with wind and
that more flexible resources are likely complementary with wind deployment. This study
also suggests that increased baseload power is more of a factor in decreasing wind energy
deployment (although the finding is less significant). These aspects of wind deployment
have not been investigated previously.
Also unique to this study is the finding that retirement of power plants is an
important factor in providing market space for new entrants or that wind energy forces
retirement of other generation. While logical and not surprising, this aspect of the
electrical power system has not been investigated with respect to wind deployment.
Regardless, this finding is significant, considering that the US generation fleet and others
throughout the world are rapidly approaching the end of the life for much of the existing
capital stocks.
The emergence of demand as an overarching factor in the deployment of wind is
not surprising but previous investigations by Kneifel (2008) and Maguire (2010), did not
reach a similar conclusion. These researchers found demand as statistically insignificant
within their models. This finding may be an artifact of the study periods. Both Maguire
and Kneifel examined periods prior to the 2008 financial crisis. This study spanned that
period and extended through the demand decreases that occurred during the 2008
financial crisis. The demand decreases were associated with decreasing wind deployment
as utilities forecast lower growth in electrical demand and cut back on purchases from
new assets. In other words, the correlations in these earlier studies may not have been as
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strong, since deployment levels were lower and were not subject to correlation with
increasing then decreasing demand.
The finding that imports and exports of power are an important factor agrees with
previous studies. Yin and Powers found that found that an import-export ratio is positive
and significant. Gong found that the percent of renewables a state imports or exports is
also positive and significant. The operationalization in this study examined the difference
between in-state demand and in-state supply in TWh, with negative values for states that
must import and positive values for those states that export, unlike previous studies that
utilized percentages or ratios. Regardless, the agreement across studies leads additional
support that imports and exports are a determining factor for wind energy deployment.
Importantly, this indicates that interstate transmission capabilities are an important factor
for wind energy and interstate linkages should be promoted.
Retail electricity prices were not significant, which agrees with a number of
previous studies (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2011; Gong, 2011; Lyon & Yin, 2010;
Shrimali & Kneifel, 2011; Yin & Powers, 2010). However, this disagrees with the
countervailing findings by Hitaj (2012) of a positive effect with prices, and negative
findings by Carley (2009).
Finally, wind energy PPA prices were found by this study as statistically
insignificant. This finding is counter to Bohn and Lant (2011), who found a weak
negative association with price and deployment. The finding is also counter to findings
by Kneifel that a weighted average of renewable energy prices for the US is negative for
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non-hydropower renewables. The finding is consistent with the economic effects of an
RPS and likely indicates a lack of price sensitivity because of the RPS and PTC subsidy.
In summary, the systemic examination of the main drivers that influence wind
energy deployment supports the main argument of this study that the economic context
and supportive infrastructures are important factors to consider with policies. Based on
the quantitative analysis and comparison across cases, the deployment of wind is in large
part determined by demand for electricity. This demand can be from economic growth, or
the retirement of assets. Some portion of the total demand is set aside by capacity
policies, such as the RPS or spurred on by MGPO policies. The locations that are
successful for the deployment of wind are conditioned on the availability of resources,
transmission and the flexibility of the generation assets within the jurisdiction. States
with greater baseload resources decrease the deployment, while flexible peaking
resources are less competitive with wind energy. States also developed resources to assist
with deficiencies of in-state production or to export power.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations for Further Research
Summary of Findings
This study assessed the determinants of wind energy development in the United
States. The population in this study consists of 35 states that have wind resource
potentials greater than 1000 MWs within the 48 contiguous US states. The study period
extended from 2001 to 2012. The determinants of wind energy assessed consists of
policies, infrastructure, and contextual variables. The specific policies assessed included
the federal and state PTC, state level RPS mandatory deployment requirements, sales tax
relief, property tax relief, the potential for a federal permitting process, and grid
governance by RTO-ISOs. The infrastructure variables assessed include transmission,
baseload, intermediate, and peaking generation along with retirement of generation
assets. The contextual variables include the wind energy potential, import, and export of
electricity, electricity demand, wind energy prices, and electricity prices.
This study assesses these factors through two principle methods, quantitative and
qualitative analysis. The quantitative analysis consisted of three models: (1) a policy and
contextual factors model, (2) an infrastructure and contextual model, and (3) a combined
policy, infrastructure and contextual model. This modeling approach was utilized to
assess the relative strengths of the infrastructure and policy variables. Three qualitative
cases were selected by assessing the model residuals to determine the two states (Iowa
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and Ohio) that varied the most and the one state (Nebraska) that deviated the least from
the model findings. Of the two states that varied the most from the predicted values, one
state (Iowa) deployed greater amounts of wind power than predicted, while the other state
(Ohio) deployed less wind power than expected.
Quantitative modeling found that the overarching factor determining the
deployment of wind energy in this study is in-state demand. Transmission deployment
within each state is also highly significant and is the second largest factor in increasing
wind deployment. Lead-lag analysis indicates a higher probability that transmission
deployment leads wind deployment. Imports and exports are the third largest factor;
therefore, states not only deploy wind energy to decrease imports but also to increase
exports. Retirement of electrical facilities is the next largest contributor to deployment,
with a bi-directional relationship where retirement of facilities leads to wind energy
deployment and conversely, wind energy deployment leads to retirement. Sales tax and
RPS policies also contribute to wind energy but the effects of sales tax are less
significant. Deployment of wind leads RPS requirements, indicating that wind plants are
placed in service to meet anticipated mandatory requirements.
The baseload, intermediate, and peaking generation sources show a pattern of
declining influence to wind deployment. In other words, the presence of less flexible
baseload power decreases wind deployment by a greater amount than intermediate
resources. Finally, peaking resources are not statistically significant in the model
indicating that these resources are not competitive with wind. The deployment of
intermediate generation resources tends to lead the deployment of wind. Deployment of
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intermediate resources in advance of wind energy supports the hypothesis that more
flexible generation assets are favorable to the incorporation of wind energy.
The PTC and PPA prices are not significant in the model. The lack of significance
of the PTC is surprising; however, within this study, there is a lack of variance of the
PTC level across the states while state level deployment varies significantly. The federal
PTC is uniform across states, and the PTC subsidy increases relatively slowly during the
later period of this study when most wind development occurs, leading to a low potential
of correlation between this instrument as operationalized and the deployment of wind
power. The PTC did expire twice during this study in 2002 and 2004; but deployment
levels were low in comparison to the levels from 2005 to 2012 when the PTC was in
force. Furthermore, state level PTC programs are in states that have limited deployment,
except for Oklahoma, which has had a decreasing PTC. A lack of correlation of PPA
prices and deployment indicates that wind power is largely insensitive to price, which is
likely a result of the economic effects of the RPS combined with the PTC. Therefore,
although the quantitative findings did not indicate the PTC was a significant factor, the
lack of price sensitivity would tend to support this instrument as a positive factor for
wind deployment.
A fixed-effects model was determined as the appropriate and consistent model for
the quantitative analysis. This type of model accounts for variation within states to
estimate the effect of the individual regressors to the level of wind energy deployment.
As such, the effects of time-invariant variables including the use of federal lands as a
proxy to examine avoidance of extensive permitting processes and the wind energy
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potentials could not be determined.
The model results were tested through several methods. Initially, the underlying
data was examined via plots of the individual regressors to the dependent variable. These
plots were constructed to consider the potential for non-linear relationships. The plots
were assembled to examine the aggregate data and within state data. Non-linear
relationships were not identified within the data. Additional checks were performed by
serially extracting the data from states with the highest deployment (California, Texas,
and Iowa). For the most part, the findings remained the same through this analysis. Time
was incorporated as a variable and found significant, thus indicating that additional
factors outside of the study regressors account for a portion of the variance over time.
These factors may include but not be limited to technological improvements in wind
generation, breaking down of institutional operational and governance variables that
allow for operation of the grid at higher wind penetration and acceptance by utilities of
wind as a viable resource.
Finally, step-wise fixed effects and between models were constructed. The stepwise fixed effects models showed that the cross-correlation of the infrastructure variables
did not affect model stability. The step-wise between model showed that the RPS, wind
resources and the import and export of power were factors that affect the mean of the
deployment across states.
The qualitative assessment of the cases showed that wind potential is likely be a
significant determinant of wind energy development. Comparing Ohio, which has very
little wind potential with Iowa that has a very high potential, the infrastructure and
199

contextual variables are more favorable in Ohio; however, the wind potential is much
lower. Considering Nebraska and its high wind potential, the transmission is limited and
export appears constrained, thus limiting comparisons with the other two states. No
determination could be made from these cases on the effects of a permitting process,
since each of these state utilizes the same process and the level of federal lands within
each is very low.
Conclusions
This study has shown that supportive infrastructures should be considered when
targeting policy prescriptions for a particular activity such as wind generation.
Considering the domestic and international implications of these findings,
complementary policies are necessary for complementary economic inputs to foster wind
development. In other words, for states that desire to deploy utility scale wind power to
address climate change or to meet climate commitments, these states should promulgate
policies for to support complimentary generation and transmission assets that are
complementary to wind. While prescriptive policy transference may not be effective, the
findings for the complementary infrastructures should apply across states. In addition, the
principle of decreasing the relative price of wind power of providing the set-asides for
demand is also necessary. Therefore, governments that desire to foster a robust wind
industry should promulgate policies to provide a supportive constellation of factors for
deployment.
Thus, four principles should guide policymakers in states that wish to foster wind
energy development (1) utilizing policies such as an RPS and other means to increase
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renewable energy demand, (2) providing incentives or policies that support the
transmission necessary to bring wind from resource areas to markets, (3) promoting
supporting complementary generation that allows for the integration of large scale
variable resources, such as wind, and (4) providing the means to make wind the lowest
cost power source relative to the conventional or fossil generation. These supportive
principles should be implemented in a temporal fashion. By examining the leads and lags,
the data show that states with similar contextual profiles that install transmission and
complementary generation (or electricity storage) increase the deployment of wind
energy. By following these four principles, this study has indicated that wind deployment
will be stimulated. By following these principles, states should be able to accelerate their
energy systems towards sustainability.
For developing states, the institutional knowledge and technologies that allow for
the complex management of intermittent resources should be transferred. Advanced grid
integration technologies are necessary since electricity storage methods are currently
rapidly improving and costs are decreasing. Improvements in battery technology should
allow for even higher levels of intermittent resource penetration; however, considering
the energy density requirements of urban areas, importation of utility scale power appears
necessary for the near future. Regardless, improved storage methods combined with
higher renewable energy capture efficiencies may allow developing nations to “leapfrog” the current grid models and move to a more decentralized electrical energy system.
Recommendations for Further Research
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For wind power and infrastructures, additional research should be conducted to
explore the relationship of existing capacity in transmission systems to the deployment of
wind energy systems. Although this study approximated this relationship through the
number of circuit miles of transmission that were deployed within states, this proxy may
not reflect the initial available levels of capacity across states, since voltages and hence,
capacities vary across lines.
Similarly, additional investigation of the effects of various forms of generation
could benefit from additional research. The three categories of generation, baseload,
intermediate, and peaking are sufficient for an initial examining of the relationship of
various types of generation; however, the baseload category contains multiple power
generation technologies whose effects should be disaggregated further. An examination
of the particular baseload generation technologies may lead to a determination of
particular baseload technologies that are more amenable to wind energy deployment.
Furthermore, an examination of the relationship between battery or other emerging
electricity forms of storage should also be conducted. Many of these technologies have
reactive times lower than fossil forms of energy and may exhibit an elevated
complementary nature to wind or other renewables.
Wind energy policy researchers need to develop superior measurements that
capture the magnitude of the policy effects. In particular, improvements in
operationalizing the sales tax and property tax variables are necessary to obtain measures
that provide equivalent scales for these policies. For example, tax relief varies county by
county and this variable needs to be measured based on dollars per MW (or MWhr) of
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support. Similarly, the PTC and sales tax variables could benefit from similar treatment
that allow for similar scaling of the variables effects to the dependent variable.
Considering the demand policies, the quantification of the purchases of green
power could be markedly improved. In addition, the distinction could be improved for the
purchases required under mandatory purchase policies versus the purchases under
voluntary programs. Preliminary research indicates that use of voluntary purchase
programs is increasing rapidly (Heeter, et al., 2014). The disaggregation of these
purchases may lead to improvements in the estimates for the effects of demand policies,
versus voluntary purchases.
On a broad scale, this study has shown that policymakers need to consider the
relationship of policies, supportive infrastructures, and contextual factors when
formulating policy prescriptions that target a particular sector or activity. The lens of
looking back at patterns of development for targeted activities is important in determining
interrelationships and shows where targeted policies may be improved. The relationship
of targeted policies to the supportive infrastructures should be investigated to understand
relationship of policy promulgation to policy effectiveness. Policy research in this
overarching subject area may lead to more fruitful and effective policies.
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BLM -

Bureau of Land Management

DOE -

United States Department of Energy

DOI -

United State Department of the Interior

DSIRE -

Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy

EIA -

United States Energy Information Agency

ERCOT -

Electric Reliability Council of Texas

FERC -

Federal Regulatory Energy Commission

GAO -

United State Government Accountability Office

IOU -

Investor Owned Utility

ISO -

Independent System Operators

IEA -

International Energy Agency

kV -

Kilovolt

LSE -

Load Serving Entity

LCOE -

Levelized Costs of Electricity

MGPO -

Mandatory Green Power Option

MW -

Megawatt

MWh

Megawatt-hour

NERC -

North American Electric Reliability Council

NREL -

National Renewable Energy Laboratory

PPA -

Power Purchase Agreement

PUC -

Public Utilities Commission

PTC -

Production Tax Credit
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RPS -

Renewable Portfolio Standard

RTO -

Regional Transmission Organization
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Baseload – minimal amount of electricity demand through a 24-hour period
Baseload Generation – electricity generation assets typically dispatched to address the
minimal daily load.
Capacity Factor - the ratio between the ideal full load output over time and actual
generation over time for a particular generator
Circuits - the number of conducting lines on a particular transmission facility
Circuit-miles - the distance the individual circuits on a transmission or distribution line
cross
Combined cycle power plant – a dual-stage generation technology (typically natural gas)
that creates electricity from the driving force of a simple-cycle turbine, subsequently
capturing the exhaust gases form the turbine to generate steam that is used to produce
additional electricity
Corporate Tax Incentives – a broad class of policy instruments that includes tax
exemptions, credits and deductions available for renewable energy developers and
producers
Dispatch – selection of generation assets to meet demand for electricity
Distribution - the movement of electricity into local areas for consumption
Flexibility – the ability of a group of generators to ramp to meet changes in demand.
Green Power Purchasing – a regulatory policy that requires the purchase of renewable
energy by a particular consumer, such as the state.
Hard Infrastructure – the physical structure and facilities necessary for the operation of an
enterprise.
Independent System Operator – a form of transmission and grid operation governance
intended to provide non-discriminatory access to electricity markets and transmission
Intermediate Demand – electricity demand above the baseload demand for the system,
but below peak requirements
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Intermediate Generation – electricity generation assets dispatched to address the demand
above baseload, but below peaking requirements – typically natural gas combined cycle
technologies.
Kilovolt – 1000 volts, where a volt is a unit of electromotive force
Load – demand for electricity
Mandatory Green Power Option – a regulatory policy that requires consumers to be
informed of the various types of generation that are available and allows for purchase of
the consumer selected type
Megawatt (MW) – a unit of power equal to one million watts
Megawatt-hour (MWh) – a measurement of power equivalent to the use of one million
watts continuously for one hour
Nameplate Capacity – the theoretical output capacity of a generating unit operating 100%
of the year
Peak Demand – the highest demand for electricity within a period of time.
Peaking Generation – electrical generation that meets the highest demand periods,
typically natural gas simple-cycle, reciprocating engines, or other rapid start and/or
ramping technologies.
Power Curve – the output of a wind turbine as a function of increasing speed.
Production Tax Credit – a policy instrument that generates tax credits to a qualifying
resource, typically based on the number of kWh of generation.
Property Tax Incentive – a policy that provides tax relief for the land improvements
associated with renewable energy facilities.
Ramping – change in the electricity output of a particular generator over time as
controlled by operators. Ramping typically occurs in fossil fuel plants, not renewable,
which are governed by natural inputs.
Ramping Rate – the rate of change of electricity output from a particular generator,
baseload assets typically have lower ramping rates, while peaking assets have the fastest
ramping rates.
Regional Transmission Organization – an organization for transmission and grid
operation governance intended to provide non-discriminatory access to electricity
markets and transmission similar to an Independent System Operator
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Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard – standards typically enacted on a state level that
prescribe a certain percentage of electricity sold or produced within a state be produced
by renewable resources
Sales Tax Incentives – a form of corporate tax relief where the sales tax within a
jurisdiction is lower or dismissed for renewable energy developers.
Simple Cycle Power Plant – electrical generation technology that typically uses liquid or
gaseous combustible fuels as the driving force of a turbine to create electricity
Soft Infrastructure – the societal organizational structures (rules, laws and processes) that
are associated with the governance of a particular enterprise
Steam Turbine – a device that converts pressurized steam to rotational energy
Transmission – the infrastructure to move electrical energy from generation source to
load centers (See distribution)
Turbine – a device that produces rotary power by converting fluid movement
Variable costs - production costs for electrical generators that change with variations in
output
Watt – a unit of power equivalent to one joule per second
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Table C-1: Nameplate Capacity of Wind Energy Deployed in Sample States (MWs)
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
63
128
138
238
AZ
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
AR
1683
1823
2025
2095
2149
2376
2439
2537
2798
3253
3927
5542
CA
61 223 231 231 291 1067 1068 1244 1299 1800 2301
CO 61
0
0
0
0
75
75
75
76 147 353
618
973
ID
0
0
50
51 107 107 699 915 1547 2045 2743 3568
IL
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
131 1036 1339 1340 1543
IN
IA 324 423 472 634 836 932 1273 2791 3604 3675 4322 5133
KS 114 114 114 114 264 364 364 921 1021 1074 1274 2713
0
0
0
0
0
9
42
47 175 266
397
431
ME
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
70
120
120
MD
1
1
1
1
1
4
5
6
15
18
46
103
MA
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
144 138 164
377
988
MI
MN 320 338 558 600 745 896 1300 1753 1810 2205 2733 2987
0
0
0
0
0
0
62 163 309 457
459
458
MO
0
0
1
1
137 146 153 271 375 386
386
645
MT
3
14
14
14
73
73
72 117 153 213
337
459
NE
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
152
NV
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
25
25
25
26
171
NH
1
1
206 266 406 496 496 497 597 700
750
778
NM
48
48
48 186 370 425 832 1274 1274 1403 1638
NY 48
0
5
66
66
98 178 345 714 1203 1424 1445 1680
ND
0
0
4
7
7
7
7
7
7
10
112
428
OH
0
0
176 176 475 535 689 708 1031 1482 2007 3134
OK
OR 157 218 259 263 338 438 885 1067 1758 2104 2513 3153
35
35 129 129 129 179 294 361 748 748
789 1340
PA
3
3
44
44
44
44
98 187 313 709
784
783
SD
TX 1096 1096 1290 1290 1992 2736 4353 7113 9403 10089 10377 12214
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
20 223 223
325
325
UT
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
46
119
VT
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
VA
180
228
244
241
390
818
1163
1375
1849
2104
2573
2808
WA
0
66
66
66
66
66 146 330 330 431
564
583
WV
53
53
53
53
53
53
53 449 449 469
631
648
WI
WY 141 141 285 285 288 288 288 676 1099 1412 1412 1410
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Table C-2: Total State and Federal PTC Value (cents/kWh)
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ
AR
CA
CO
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NM
NY
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
SD
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 1 2.8 1 2.9 2.9 3 3.1 3.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 2.55 0.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.35 2.35
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
2.05 0.35 2.15 0.35 2.25 2.25 2.35 2.45 2.45
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
1.7 0 1.8 0 1.9 1.9 2 2.1 2.1
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2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
3.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.45
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.55
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2

2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
3.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.45
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.55
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2

2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
3.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.45
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.55
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2

Table C-3: Sales Tax Variable (Binary)
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AZ
AR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

ID

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

IL

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

IN

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

IA

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

KS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

ME

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

MD

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

MA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

MI

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

MN

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

MO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

MT

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

NE

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

NV

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

NH

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

NM

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

NY

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

ND

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

OH

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

OK

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

OR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

PA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

SD

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

TX

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

UT

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

VT

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

VA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WA

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

WV

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WI

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

WY

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
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Table C-4: Property Tax Variable (Binary)
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

AR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

CO

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

ID

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

IL

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

IN

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

IA

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

KS

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

ME

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

MD

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

MA

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

MI

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

MN

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

MO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

MT

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

NE

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

NV

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

NH

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

NM

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

NY

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

ND

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

OH

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

OK

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

OR

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

PA

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

SD

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

TX

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

UT

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

VT

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

VA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WV

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

WI

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

WY

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
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Table C-5: RPS Total Capacity Requirements (GWh)
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 35 69 104 120 164 215 678 713 748 878 1009 1118
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
AR 0
0 18676 20909 22851 26003 28479 31813 32839 43388 42962 49138
CA 0
0
0
0
0
0
690 1316 1278 1081 2794 2763
CO 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
ID
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1086 4397 5557 6758 7634
IL
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
IN
IA 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1765 1771 1796
KS 0
ME 3532 3308 3361 3615 3598 3436 3511 3571 2583 3543 3936 4007
0
0
0
0
1838 2152 2620 2736 3509 4685 5519
MD 0
0
473 721 984 1199 1464 1669 5156 5852 6248 6631
MA 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4076
MI 0
MN 0 2312 2213 2213 2873 4950 4027 4030 3995 7945 7925 10417
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1129 1138
MO 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
472 468 943 946 928
MT 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
NE 0
0 1271 1313 1205 1283 1979 1938 2526 2484 3111 3136
NV 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
431 631 803 1009 1082
NH 0
0
0
0
0
669 754 745 728 756 1196 1173
NM 0
0
0
0
0
1138 2359 3599 4834 2992 4453 5889
NY 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
ND 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
345 676 1314 1935
OH 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
OK 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1706 1677
OR 0
0
0
0
0
0
86
113 465 4313 5027 5552
PA 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
SD 0
TX 0 5049 5049 5049 6824 6824 8994 8994 12907 12907 16820 16820
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
UT 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
VT 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2740 2740 2740
VA 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2232
WA 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
WV 0
WI 131 131 131 131 131 2594 2649 2713 2817 4154 4103 4065
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
WY 0
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Table C-6: Total Acres of Federal Lands
State
AZ

Total Federal Lands Acreage
30,741,287

AR

3,161,978

CA

47,797,533

CO

24,086,075

ID

32,635,835

IL

406,734

IN

340,696

IA

122,602

KS

301,157

ME

209,735

MD

195,986

MA

81,692

MI

3,637,965

MN

3,469,211

MO

1,675,400

MT

26,921,861

NE

549,346

NV

56,961,778

NH

777,807

NM

27,001,583

NY

211,422

ND

1,735,755

OH

298,500

OK

703,336

OR

32,665,430

PA

616,895

SD

2,646,241

TX

1,273,974

UT

2,977,950

VT

35,033,603

VA

453,871

WA

2,358,071

WV

12,173,813

WI

1,130,951

WY

1,865,374

AZ

30,043,513
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Table C-7: RTO-ISO Territories (square miles)
State 2001
AZ

0

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

AR 29989 29989 29989 29989 29989 29989 29989 29989 29989 37656 45324 45324
CA 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764 129764
CO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

ID

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

IL 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519 55519
IN 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826 35826
IA 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857 55857
KS 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759 81759
ME 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843 30843
MD 9707

9707

9707

9707

9707

9707

9707

9707

9707

9707

9707

9707

MA 7800

7800

7800

7800

7800

7800

7800

7800

7800

7800

7800

7800

MI 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539 56539
MN 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627 79627
MO 33615 33615 33615 33615 43307 53000 53000 53000 53000 53000 53000 53000
MT 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870 23870
NE

0

0

0

0

0

0

NV

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

8953

8953

8953

8953

8953

8953

8953

8953

8953

8953

8953

NH 8953

24814 49628 74443 74443 74443 74443

NM 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807 26807
NY 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126 47126
ND 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001 69001
OH 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861 40861
OK 67566 67566 67566 67566 67566 67566 67566 67566 68595 68595 68595 68595
OR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

PA 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743 44743
SD 37602 37602 37602 37602 37602 37602 37602 37602 37602 52992 68382 68382
TX 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954 248954
UT

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

VT

9217

9217

9217

9217

9217

9217

9217

9217

9217

9217

9217

9217

VA 11768 11768 11768 11768
WA

0

0

0

0

0
0

39490 39490 39490 39490 39490 39490 39490
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

WV 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038 24038
WI 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158 54158
WY 1068

1068

1068

1068

1068

1068
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1068

1068

1068

1068

1068

1068

State
AZ
AR
CA
CO
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NM
NY
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
SD
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

2001
4320
4389
6518
3051
2443
3499
3779
3814
2292
256
627
550
4358
3074
4471
3529
2125
2220
205
2697
2288
2359
4545
4856
3004
3044
2118
14189
1893
117
3005
2667
1654
2344
2186

2002
4320
4450
6518
3106
2617
3780
3929
3814
2466
290
642
545
4426
3074
4504
3547
2183
2220
248
2697
2321
2394
4566
4876
3004
3157
2118
14726
1954
143
3005
2716
1738
2413
2280

Table C-8 Circuit Miles of Transmission Per state
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
4320 4320 4320 4320 4320 4320 4320
4511 4572 4633 4697 4697 4697 4697
6518 6518 6518 6518 6981 7444 7908
3161 3217 3272 3328 3427 3526 3626
2757 2931 3106 3315 3440 3564 3689
4005 4286 4567 4904 5236 5567 5899
4050 4200 4351 4531 4848 5166 5483
3814 3814 3814 3814 3879 3945 4010
2606 2780 2955 2667 2791 2915 3039
318
352
387
428
432
437
441
655
670
686
704
830
955 1081
541
535
530
524
539
554
569
4481 4550 4618 4700 5100 5500 5900
3074 3074 3074 3074 3296 3519 3741
4530 4563 4596 4635 4679 4722 4766
3562 3581 3599 3621 3621 3621 3621
2229 2287 2345 2414 2414 2414 2414
2220 2220 2220 2220 2437 2655 2872
282
324
367
418
418
418
418
2697 2697 2697 2697 2722 2746 2771
2347 2380 2413 2453 2453 2453 2453
2422 2457 2492 2534 2730 2927 3123
4582 4603 4624 4649 5542 6435 7328
4891 4911 4930 4954 5349 5745 6140
3004 3004 3004 3004 3191 3377 3564
3248 3362 3475 3611 3779 3948 4116
2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118
15156 15693 16230 16874 18381 19888 21395
2003 2064 2125 2198 2484 2770 3056
163
189
214
245
250
256
261
3005 3005 3005 3005 3276 3547 3818
2756 2805 2855 2914 3233 3552 3871
1806 1890 1974 2075 2310 2545 2780
2469 2538 2607 2690 3096 3503 3909
2356 2450 2544 2657 2757 2857 2957

233

2010
4320
4697
8307
3725
3814
6231
5800
4075
3163
445
1207
584
6300
3963
4810
3621
2414
3089
418
2796
2453
3319
8221
6535
3751
4284
2118
22902
3342
266
4089
4190
3015
4315
3057

2011
4320
4697
8833
3824
3855
6341
5906
4097
3204
447
1249
589
6433
4037
4824
3621
2414
3162
418
2804
2453
3385
8519
6667
3813
4340
2118
23404
3437
268
4179
4296
3093
4451
3090

2012
4320
4697
9296
3923
3980
6673
6223
4162
3328
451
1374
604
6833
4260
4868
3621
2414
3379
418
2829
2453
3581
9412
7062
4000
4509
2118
24911
3723
273
4450
4615
3328
4857
3190

Table C-9: Total Nameplate MWs of Baseload Generation
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 14282 14413 14963 14203 14215 14666 14666 14552 15143 15142 15142 15072
AR 9985 9997 9958 9958 9958 9958 9958 9495 9970 10690 10663 11472
CA 38485 37826 36479 36219 36308 35966 36000 35813 35625 35565 35045 34518
CO 5966 6016 6224 6228 6229 6229 6186 6164 6300 7038 6881 6753
ID 2600 2660 2681 2682 2682 2684 2677 2675 2677 2697 2697 2697
IL 33152 29870 30055 30091 30195 30192 30050 30013 30712 30497 29435 29957
IN 21788 22708 22663 22679 22647 22596 22585 21946 22560 22185 22036 21150
IA 7231 7231 7231 7228 7240 7240 8314 8242 8460 8258 8284 8246
KS 8674 8690 8653 8654 8653 8621 8621 8361 8540 8515 8547 8485
ME 2544 2637 2641 2659 2658 2658 2671 2495 2590 2589 2658 2544
MD 10037 9935 9940 9941 9941 9941 9973 10077 10077 10075 10112 9882
MA 8041 7116 6376 6415 6416 6415 6056 5956 5979 5979 5869 5970
MI 21030 21175 21204 21428 21455 21058 21110 20426 21000 20896 20778 20797
MN 8223 8498 8258 8266 8247 8191 8015 8360 8006 7999 8011 8058
MO 13704 13708 13655 13664 13663 13666 13660 13657 13657 14555 14841 14993
MT 5099 5102 5102 5108 5118 5279 5300 5265 5305 5293 5312 5334
NE 5129 5137 5104 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5850 5921 6174 6174
NV 4753 4779 4781 4760 4745 4559 4680 3286 4939 4947 4849 3224
NH 2855 2868 2868 2893 2891 2891 2845 2831 2848 2837 2837 2839
NM 5343 5388 5387 5404 5334 5334 5334 5265 5334 5326 5327 5302
NY 27121 27391 27452 27893 27455 27304 26950 26170 26128 25245 25294 24920
ND 4781 4781 4840 4878 4878 4878 4878 4878 4883 4883 4883 4881
OH 26838 26793 26653 26847 26571 26531 26336 26041 26086 25597 25674 23620
OK 12577 12714 12750 12750 12755 12565 12442 12321 12439 12270 12394 12299
OR 8894 9103 9068 9089 9127 9146 9167 9143 9202 9162 9178 9258
PA 34636 34558 34496 35034 34727 34747 34423 34561 34563 34530 33762 32935
SD 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2083
TX 62241 63455 63201 63644 62943 61287 60010 54298 53533 56711 56029 55026
UT 5250 5352 5472 5579 5660 5660 5629 5629 5630 5629 5629 5629
VT 13514 13463 13474 13474 13393 13380 13387 13355 13381 13463 13463 13617
VA 936 940 948 948 948 948 948 961 963 963 965 965
WA 23579 23577 23611 23665 23696 23714 23809 23731 23898 24034 23951 23986
WV 15678 15725 15725 15725 15805 15797 15696 15692 15696 15696 16516 15341
WI 10057 10065 9976 9737 9772 9769 9774 10362 10380 10847 11620 11707
WY 6389 6392 6475 6476 6482 6482 6482 6577 6578 6698 7131 7131
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Table C-10: Total Nameplate MWs of Intermediate Generation
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 1786 3325 6319 10901 11635 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11925 11939
AR 236 1550 1735 4163 4667 4909 5588 5588 5588 5588 5588 5588
CA 4930 7251 11740 12505 16114 17750 17914 17777 19553 20762 20733 21489
CO 1252 1439 1987 2776 2789 2789 3121 3246 3246 3246 3201 3401
ID

375

375

375

375

322

322

322

322

322

322

322

641

IL
IN

533
387

3658 3558 3505 3505 3505 3505 3505 3505 3420 3420 3420
1344 1909 3134 3134 3134 3134 3072 3072 3072 3072 3072

IA

83

83

702

KS

0

0

0

1245 1245 1245 1245 1245 1248 1248 1314 1314
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

ME 1375 1375 1377 1377 1377 1377 1377 1651 1651 1651 1389 1389
289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289

MD

MA 1988 2225 6689 6656 6671 6645 6645 6553 6638 6655 6648 6648
MI 2890 4014 5192 5192 5221 5230 5309 5309 5139 5139 5139 5150
MN 530 581 718 718 886 1457 1579 2223 2809 2809 2809 2809
MO 1833 2098 2170 2098 2153 2153 2184 2184 2184 2199 2214 2113
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
MT
NE

0

0

46

118

468

468

468

468

468

468

468

422

NV 1541 1726 2625 3977 3943 5151 5395 6018 6018 5956 6514 6514
0
606 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506
NH
79
256 256 323 973 1083 1783 1783 1783 1783 1741
NM 79
NY 4622 4581 4581 5914 7874 8158 7726 7697 8105 9410 9604 9604
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
ND
OH

0

600

2826 2836 2870 2870 2870 2870 2870 2951 2996 4414

OK 1552 3044 5514 6870 6881 7408 7423 7423 7498 7498 8031 8035
OR 2117 2572 3169 3048 3048 3048 3531 3435 3435 3441 3441 3452
PA 1474 2508 5517 9063 9062 9062 9062 9062 9062 8940 9640 9640
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
324
SD
TX 19462 28849 35598 37053 37263 37683 38308 38153 40103 41193 42518 42158
0
0
0
140 432 707 1275 1298 1298 1298 1298 1298
UT
VT 2553 2415 2841 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 3787 4346 4346
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
VA
WA 956 1604 2284 2558 2589 2484 2484 3453 3453 3453 3479 3511
WV

0

0

0

WI

315

315

368

WY

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1032 2215 2401 2401 3004 3004 3004 3004 3030
0

0

0

235

0

0

0

0

0

0

Table C-11: Total Nameplate MWs of Peaking Generation
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 1873 2515 3817 2147 2147 2142 2131 2407 2407 2407 3136 3336
AR

394

342

342

351

342

510

916

915

916

964

963

962

CA 11203 11241 10981 11340 11486 11654 12119 12181 12825 13125 13364 13757
CO 1851 2649 3157 3244 3244 3242 3356 3662 3937 3951 3900 4100
ID

271

271

271

271

444

444

444

617

622

623

630

639

IL 10859 12633 13887 14049 14350 14374 14359 14201 14231 14220 14138 14191
IN 3956 4278 3715 3881 4277 4304 4311 4301 4302 4311 4298 4310
IA

2088 2205 2248 2547 2593 2602 2659 2653 2653 2586 2570 2607

KS 2261 2386 2871 2978 2988 3071 3215 3683 4024 4014 4002 3908
234 244 430 430 431 431 431 245 248 248 434 437

ME

MD 2307 2328 3134 3153 3153 3153 3180 3181 3185 3176 3178 3203
MA 2821 4060 2611 2626 2632 2609 2575 2591 2737 2726 2705 2710
MI 5266 6775 6821 6748 6681 6689 6617 6578 6797 6793 6774 6742
MN 2383 2597 2702 2728 3137 3057 3251 3529 3809 3785 3765 3777
MO 4066 5670 5793 5927 6259 6290 6295 5904 6311 6286 6250 6385
MT

64

64

107

107

109

164

164

164

164

255

405

447

NE 1262 1265 1429 1889 1846 1850 1777 1775 1777 1779 1779 1824
NV 1048 975 975 1075 1075 1302 1299 1897 1905 1905 1767 1770
NH

147

147

157

155

156

156

144

132

135

135

124

129

NM

673

1009 1026 1039 1033 1026 1023 1167 1180 1176 1156 1202

NY 6941 6694 7228 7304 7312 7301 7669 7562 7597 6914 7301 7195
81
85
87
87
87
86
86
86
86
87
63
ND 64
OH 4571 6496 7271 7280 7272 7274 7488 7491 7492 7444 7447 7497
OK 1761 1830 1392 1400 1400 1274 1347 1693 1825 1815 1815 1742
OR

3

352

262

261

267

267

219

216

222

176

178

183

PA 4641 5383 5406 5386 5387 5382 5397 5386 5410 5414 5709 5737
SD 691 730 730 718 913 1006 1005 1102 1102 1102 1102 1102
TX 8311 6870 6875 7573 7971 7934 8258 8484 8786 9840 9858 9813
UT 220 769 769 772 769 709 616 604 653 696 706 771
VT

135

140

140

140

140

141

136

139

139

139

139

139

VA 5893 6037 6724 7236 7251 7247 8096 8467 8666 8662 8572 8581
WA 1230 1306 1299 1306 1329 1329 1261 1193 1268 1278 1278 1282
WV 891 1235 1224 1483 1483 1483 1224 1224 1224 1224 1226 1226
WI 4070 4153 4261 4322 4722 4727 4749 4725 4727 4732 4776 4765
209 209 209 317 317 266 266 266 266 266 270
WY 92
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Table C-12: Total Nameplate MWs of Generation Retirement
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
4
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
27
5
AZ 4
0
7
0
0
0
0
1
1
71
AR 0 120 0
CA 0 907 2091 630 22 438 54 82 50 210 71 652
2
0
0
2
4
0
0 115 125 135
CO 10 88
3
3
0
19
6
33
4 281 14 39
ID 16 10
0
0
0
2
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
IL
2 403 174 3662 222 36 121 9 121 405 1130 1246
IN
0
3
5
0
46 11
8
51 662 170 914
IA 86
1
8
21
7
34 87
4
3
24
8 212
KS 1
0
2 437 0
6
13
3
16
ME 29 468 472 32
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 230
MD 0
5
0
0
3
0
0
0
21
0
0
22
MA 0
20
4
2
22 79
4
3 112 69 150 31
MI 1
91 53
2
15 82 279 4 269 45 39 61
MN 2
2
87 14
3
5
0
2
2
18 47
7
MO 1
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
MT 0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
26
NE 0
0
1
0
4
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
NV 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
NH 0
0
2
8
40 10
0
0
3
13 23 26
NM 0
0
0
0 190 11
0 128 21 25 200 1636
NY 0
21 98 79 603 194 593 454 95 884 37 383
ND 3
66 102 2 570 12 2083
OH 0 373 174 0 284 0
73
0
0
0
66 11
0
0 183 0 168
OK 0
0
0
0
0
0
60 75
0
0
0
0
OR 0
0
4 774 873
PA 0 569 227 382 217 3 318 1
1
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
SD 75
13 341 1104 557 1532 1505 684 3904 959 1228 74
TX 6
0
13
2
0
3
0
0
0
0
2
23
1
UT
0
0
0
2
3
6
12 95 514
VT 0 138 3
0
0
0
0
0
14
0
0
0
0
0
VA 0
0
0
70 52
0
44
0
7 104 188 208
WA 51
10 117 265 0
14 64 22 41 201 100 51
WV 3
0
0
0
14
0
0
0
0
0
0 1177
WI 0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
3
1
WY 0
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Table C-13: Total Nameplate
MWs of Potential Wind
Generation
State
MWs
AZ

10904.1

AR

9200.3

CA

34110.2

CO

387219.5

ID

18075.6

IL

249882.1

IN

148227.5

IA

570714.2

KS

952370.9

ME

11251.2

MD

1482.9

MA

1028

MI

59042.3

MN

489270.6

MO

274355.1

MT

944004.4

NE

917998.7

NV

7247.1

NH

2135.4

NM

492083.3

NY

25781.3

ND

770195.8

OH

54919.7

OK

516822.1

OR

27100.3

PA

3307.2

SD

882412.4

TX

1901529.7

UT

13103.7

VT

2948.7

VA

1793.3

WA

18478.5

WV

1883.2

WI

103757.1

WY

552072.6
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Table C-14: PPA Price for Wind Generation ($/MWhr)
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
AR $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
CA $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
CO $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
ID $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
IL $90.65 $76.87 $76.87 $63.09 $63.09 $52.65 $60.93 $63.35 $74.77 $75.44 $56.65 $47.50
IN $90.65 $76.87 $76.87 $63.09 $63.09 $52.65 $60.93 $63.35 $74.77 $75.44 $56.65 $47.50
IA $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
KS $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
ME $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
MD $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
MA $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
MI $90.65 $76.87 $76.87 $63.09 $63.09 $52.65 $60.93 $63.35 $74.77 $75.44 $56.65 $47.50
MN $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
MO $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
MT $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
NE $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
NV $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
NH $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
NM $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
NY $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
ND $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
OH $90.65 $76.87 $76.87 $63.09 $63.09 $52.65 $60.93 $63.35 $74.77 $75.44 $56.65 $47.50
OK $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
OR $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
PA $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
SD $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
TX $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
UT $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
VT $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $89.39 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
VA $47.11 $46.31 $46.31 $54.20 $54.20 $62.10 $75.75 $76.37 $67.23 $99.17 $58.04 $53.43
WA $33.33 $41.56 $41.56 $50.70 $50.70 $61.48 $69.43 $87.06 $94.26 $95.08 $74.31 $84.00
WV $75.74 $61.59 $61.59 $58.65 $58.65 $57.38 $68.34 $69.86 $71.00 $87.31 $57.35 $50.47
WI $90.65 $76.87 $76.87 $63.09 $63.09 $52.65 $60.93 $63.35 $74.77 $75.44 $56.65 $47.50
WY $32.24 $29.25 $29.25 $34.11 $34.11 $44.23 $42.79 $52.27 $52.97 $43.66 $32.20 $31.27
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Table C-15: In-State Electricity Demand (million MWhrs)
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 62274 62601 64080 66933 69391 73253 77193 76268 73433 72833 74944 75063
AR 41732 42450 43108 43672 46165 46636 47055 46135 43173 48194 47928 46860
CA 247759 235213 243221 252026 254250 262959 264235 268155 259584 258531 261942 259538
CO 44236 45937 46495 46724 48353 49734 51299 52142 51036 52918 53458 53685
ID 21096 20700 21219 21809 21853 22762 23755 23901 22754 22798 23272 23712
IL 136034 138447 136248 139254 144986 142448 146055 144620 136688 144761 142886 143540
IN 97734 101429 100468 103094 106549 105664 109420 106981 99312 105994 105818 105173
IA 39444 40898 41207 40903 42757 43337 45270 45488 43641 45445 45655 45709
KS 35847 36714 36735 37127 39024 39751 40166 39516 38243 40421 40760 40293
ME 12152 11441 11972 12368 12363 12285 11860 11674 11283 11532 11415 11561
MD 61640 68380 71259 66892 68365 63173 65391 63326 62589 65335 63600 61814
MA 52496 53708 55514 56142 57228 55850 57139 55884 54359 57123 55570 55313
MI 102409 104714 108877 106606 110445 108018 109297 105781 98121 103649 105054 104818
MN 60687 62162 63087 63340 66019 66770 68231 68792 64004 67800 68533 67989
MO 73213 75001 74240 74054 80940 82015 85533 84382 79687 86085 84255 82435
MT 11447 12831 12825 12957 13479 13815 15532 15326 14326 13423 13788 13863
NE 24723 25661 25857 25876 26976 27276 28248 28811 28452 29849 29676 30828
NV 28167 29204 30132 31312 32501 34586 35643 35192 34284 33773 33916 35180
NH 10316 10383 10973 10973 11245 11094 11236 10977 10698 10890 10869 10870
NM 18727 19207 19330 19846 20639 21435 22267 22038 21647 22428 23042 23179
NY 144181 147440 144045 145082 150148 142238 148178 144053 140034 144624 144047 143163
ND 9810 10219 10461 10516 10840 11245 11906 12416 12649 12956 13737 14717
OH 155798 153407 152189 154221 160176 153429 161771 159389 146300 154145 154746 152457
OK 49667 49485 50428 50942 53707 54905 55193 56279 54537 57846 59847 59341
OR 45885 45255 45195 45636 46419 48069 48697 49187 47567 46026 47171 46689
PA 135272 139820 140369 143501 148273 146150 151573 150401 143747 148964 148757 144710
SD 8627 8937 9080 9214 9811 10056 10603 10974 11010 11356 11680 11734
TX 318044 320846 322686 320615 334258 342724 343829 347059 345296 358458 376065 365104
UT 23217 23267 23860 24512 25000 26366 27785 28192 27587 28044 28859 29723
VT 5585 5629 5352 5664 5883 5795 5864 5741 5497 5595 5550 5511
VI 96453 100619 101510 105424 108850 106721 111570 110106 108462 113806 110228 107795
WA 78495 75404 78134 79982 83425 85033 85742 87333 90165 90380 93725 92336
WV 27669 28463 28297 28919 30152 32312 34184 34221 30271 32032 31239 30817
WY 65218 66999 67241 67976 70336 69821 71301 70122 66286 68752 68612 68820
WY 12950 12874 13254 13540 14138 14947 15536 16690 16562 17113 17418 16971
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Table C-16: Exports (positive) and Imports (negative) of electricity (million MWhrs)
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
AZ 27637 31531 30316 37631 32088 31140 36148 43191 38538 38918 33181 35842 34436
AR 5460 5162 7293 8256 1630 5533 7541 8916 14285 12806 13380 18146 13816
CA -49163 -51003 -50432 -57246 -53957 -46160 -53387 -60171 -54808 -54405 -61137 -60019 -56973
CO 2640

-337

122

1145 1264

964

2608 1300

-470 -2197 -2025 -1128 -475

ID -11749 -10913 -10796 -10946 -11028 -9376 -12271 -11930 -9654 -10773 -6703 -8213 -8251
IL 43215 49607 52807 52704 49134 49979 54206 54855 57176 56591 56614 54025 61334
IN 24836 24179 24420 24676 23823 24826 21218 22529 17358 19187 16313 9523 6931
IA

1215 1630

909

2345 1399 2146 4519 7599 8219 12064 10717 10966 10386

KS 8902 10474 9833 9656 6839 5773 9956 7114 8434 7503 4600 4132 8954
ME 7413 11094 7000 6731 6481 4531 4269 5421 5067 5487 4559 2868 2238
MD -12578 -20101 -19015 -14839 -15703 -14216 -15193 -15965 -18814 -21728 -21782 -24004 -26429
MA -14018 -11680 -7129 -8642 -9713 -10252 -10063 -13379 -15392 -14318 -17515 -19115 -20717
MI 9437 13175 2470 11881 11175 4539 10013 9209 3082 7902 4116 3348 2500
MN -12164 -9384 -8036 -10976 -13000 -13532 -13753 -14029 -11512 -14130 -15413 -15795 -16127
MO 6332 6161 12985 13579 9888 9671 5620 6647 8667 6228 10621 9369 9817
MT 12785 12643 13444 13832 14460 14429 13399 14311 12387 16368 16341 13942 13581
NE 5762 5957 4599 6133 4489 4394 4195 3563 5550 6781 6419 3389 7175
NV 5709 2885 3063 6355 7713 -2726 -2973 -102

3421 1373 -1980

-7

1366

NH 4759 5570 10624 12903 13225 10970 12041 11900 9466 11306 9197 8394 8791
NM 14885 11455 13406 13094 14497 15831 13718 14972 18027 13824 15139 13457 12859
NY

-266 -7848 -6402 -7117 -3261

27

-2299 -3731 -6883 -7662 -6567 -7395 -8064

ND 20522 21087 20861 19420 21093 19636 19318 20319 21547 21784 21343 21408 19639
OH -13536 -6338 -5551 -5875 -3200 2005 -6615 -5977 -10210 -10547 -19160 -22711 -12095
OK 5582 9698 10199 9788 14901 15710 17626 20050 20530 14405 14759 18556 14490
OR -833

1844 3771 5745 2906 5272 6381 9531 9124 9101 12524 14244 12841

PA 61305 64503 65981 71158 69818 72662 74515 71950 75749 80788 78558 78710 81740
SD -1226 -1215 -1136 -1704 -3290 -2924 -4466 -3891 -2813 -1306

319

300

-1684

TX 54536 64783 56514 69684 62411 57859 61663 57729 51872 53237 59412 64709 65980
UT 12637 13341 14164 13700 13165 14897 17588 18387 15956 14205 11977 9680 12489
VT

-104

-173

676

-194

-166

1289

-40

1079 1785 1025 1226 1059 1358

VA -22348 -25613 -26201 -26524 -29907 -33651 -33209 -37427 -38380 -40840 -43557 -37056 -32849
WA 4554 27361 21961 22183 18541 23170 21248 23495 14305 13093 21538 24499 20332
WV 54168 66299 66415 60831 63474 61504 59749 56902 40512 48757 47761 42596 44536
WI -6455 -8568 -7119 -7531 -8511 -8181 -7910 -6642 -6327 -4438 -5323 -5077 -3180
WY 31827 30910 30373 31268 31429 30453 30097 29810 29467 31006 30220 32618 35331

241

Table C-17: Electricity Price (cents per kWhr)
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AZ 6.01 5.57 5.53 5.64 6.25 6.93 6.92 7.57 7.54 7.25 7.38 7.57
AR 7.18 7.13 7.24 7.37 7.69 8.12 8.42 8.99 9.42 9.53 9.58 9.67
CA 11.16 12.14 11.76 11.32 11.57 12.71 12.73 12.42 13.14 12.94 12.99 13.44
CO 6.01

6

6.76 6.94 7.63 7.61 7.77 8.56 8.29 9.12 9.35 9.36

ID

4.92 5.57 5.25 4.97 5.11 4.94 5.05 5.68 6.49 6.54 6.43 6.89

IL

6.88 6.89 6.84 6.78 6.91 7.03 8.45 9.22 9.15

IN

5.3

5.34 5.37 5.58 5.88 6.46

6.5

7.09 7.62 7.67

IA

6.12 5.98 6.09 6.38 6.65 6.97

6.8

6.88 7.36 7.63 7.54 7.67

KS 6.18 6.25

6.3

6.33

6.5

6.83 6.79 7.39 7.96

9.1

8.3

8.96 8.39
8

8.29

8.82 9.28

ME 10.56 10.36 9.83 9.69 10.63 11.8 14.59 13.79 13.11 12.83 12.57 11.81
MD 6.57 6.16 6.43 7.15 8.09 9.91 11.47 12.98 13.08 12.67 11.92 11.27
MA 11.56 10.04 10.55 10.76 12.16 15.43 15.15 16.23 15.44 14.24 14.1 13.78
MI 6.96 7.07 6.84 6.94 7.21 8.11 8.51 8.91 9.39 9.86 10.37 10.94
MN 5.94 5.77 5.99 6.23 6.59 6.95 7.41 7.78 8.14 8.39 8.64 8.84
MO 5.97 6.01 5.98 6.03 6.06 6.23 6.49 6.81 7.32 7.71 8.23 8.42
MT 6.51

5.7

6.14 6.41 6.72 6.91 7.13 7.72 7.58 7.84 8.24 8.25

NE 5.35

5.5

5.59 5.67 5.82 6.04 6.25 6.56

7.2

7.49 7.85 8.31

NV 7.77 8.36 8.24 8.48 8.97 9.54 9.88 9.83 10.24 9.61 8.84 8.83
NH 10.94 10.59 10.83 11.38 12.53 13.86 13.98 14.64 15.1 14.83 14.74 14.2
NM 7.15 6.71 6.98 7.09 7.49 7.36 7.42

8.3

8.08 8.36

8.7

8.78

NY 11.51 11.11 12.42 12.52 13.89 15.21 15.19 16.38 15.4 16.34 15.82 15.08
ND

5.5

5.47 5.49 5.72 5.94 6.23 6.44 6.72 6.68 7.14 7.55 7.85

OH 6.61 6.75 6.73 6.89 7.06
OK 6.02

5.5

7.7

7.9

8.39 9.02 9.13 9.01 9.11

6.27 6.44 6.76 7.25 7.23 7.72 6.92 7.52 7.72

7.5

OR 5.45 6.31 6.18

6.2

6.34 6.53 7.02 7.24 7.47 7.56 8.04 8.21

PA 8.01 8.06 8.02

8

8.26 8.67 9.07 9.33 9.61 10.3 10.43 9.9

SD 6.35 6.25 6.35 6.45

6.6

6.7

6.89 7.15

7.4

7.84 8.06 8.49

TX 7.33 6.61 7.44 7.89 9.06 10.29 10.1 10.91 9.85 9.32 8.94 8.52
UT 5.21 5.38

5.4

5.67 5.91 5.96 6.38 6.47 6.75 6.92

7.1

7.8

VT 6.18 6.21 6.26 6.42 6.62 6.84 7.11 7.98 8.93 8.68 8.83 9.06
VA 10.86 10.87 10.98 11.03 10.95 11.37 12.04 12.33 12.76 13.24 13.8 14.22
WA 5.37 5.87 5.86 5.78 5.86 6.16 6.36 6.54 6.58 6.65 6.77 6.94
WV 5.07 5.11 5.13 5.13 5.15 5.04 5.34 5.61 6.66 7.44 7.88 8.13
WI 6.07 6.27 6.64 6.87 7.47 8.11 8.47
WY 4.46 4.68 4.77 4.98 5.16 5.27
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5.3

9

9.37 9.77 10.2 10.27

5.68 6.09

6.2

6.58

7.2

APPENDIX D
Model Results and Model Testing
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244

-433.0

Max.
6390.0

2.0358e-06

4.3124e-04

9.2029e-04

XFedLand

XRTOISO

XPtMWs

2.2160 0.0272876 *

-0.0148085

0.0051342 -2.8843 0.0041490 **

3.7237439

0.0089865
4.5024 8.977e-06 ***

1.7238 0.0855604 .

0.0087374 13.3699 < 2.2e-16 ***

2.6488117 -3.5611 0.0004167 ***

:

Y ~ X

F test for individual effects

Y ~ X

Y ~ X

alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent

chisq = 169.07, df = 9, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

Hausman Test

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

F = 11.769, df1 = 32, df2 = 376, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

normal = 8.854, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Honda)

F-statistic: 48.7835 on 11 and 408 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.55185

0.56808

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 327900000

F-statistic: 46.2477 on 9 and 376 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.47035

0.52539

Adj. R-Squared :

:

5690.0

1.4236 0.1553213

3.9995 7.535e-05 ***

3.4735e+00

4.3644e-03

2.3520e-03

2.3808 0.0177347 *

2.4237 0.0157968 *

4.1995 3.287e-05 ***

3.0218e+00 -1.7381 0.0829396 .

3.6670e-04

401110000

F-statistic: 22.7841 on 11 and 408 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.36966

0.38053
Adj. R-Squared :

:

8.3213 1.322e-15 ***
2.5945 0.0098145 **

4.0842e-03 -2.2955 0.0222103 *

Residual Sum of Squares: 248480000

Total Sum of Squares:
R-Squared

Pr(>|t|)
3.5345 0.0004553 ***

7.0793e-06 -0.0423 0.9663069

1.6140e+02

1.6266e+02

1.3579e-02

5.8632e+00

3.3219e+02 -4.2766 2.366e-05 ***

Std. Error t-value

197.0

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

8.2695e+00

1.0578e-02

9.8774e-03

-5.2524e+00

1.4666e-03

-9.3754e-03

-2.9922e-07

2.2977e+02

4.2203e+02

1.1300e-01

2.0723e+01

Signif. codes:

---

XElecPrice

XImpExp

XDemand

XPPA

XPtMWs

759170000

XFedLand

XPropTx

XSalesTx

XRPS

XPTC

R-Squared

Total Sum of Squares:

Estimate

-75.2

Max.

482.0 0.348

Median 3rd Qu.

(Intercept) -1.4207e+03

Coefficients :

-358.0

Min. 1st Qu.
-3230.0

XRTOISO

345150000

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

16.7656269

0.0154913

0.1168185

-9.4326174

0.6324

Residuals :

theta:

Residual Sum of Squares: 163810000

0.6055 0.5452043

0.2872 0.7741056
4.3096 2.091e-05 ***

-19.2472371 195.6881888 -0.0984 0.9217015

Signif. codes:

---

5.4014224
0.0130901

Pr(>|t|)

232315.3

660.1 0.652

individual

std.dev share

var

Effects:
idiosyncratic 435675.3

Total Sum of Squares:

2.3024e+00

4.2799 2.333e-05 ***
3.5201 0.0004801 ***

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

1.3940e+00

XElecPrice

1.2044e-03
2.1500e-03

XElecPrice

XImpExp

XDemand

XPPA

XRTOISO

XPropTx

Max.
3630.0

Std. Error t-value

271.0

398.9925802 180.0483896

0.0564127

1.5513715

Estimate

-61.4

Median 3rd Qu.

Signif. codes:

XImpExp

4.7701 2.568e-06 ***

0.1776 0.8591522

0.5965 0.5511513

2.5359 0.0115894 *

2.9247 0.0036399 **

3.0446e+00 -1.2031 0.2296349

1.9293e-04

2.4286e-03

3.4128e-06

9.2745e+01

1.0691e+02

XSalesTx

XRPS

XPTC

Coefficients :

-294.0

Min. 1st Qu.
-2740.0

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "random")

Call:

(Swamy-Arora's transformation)

Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model

---

5.1548e-03

7.5680e-03

XDemand

-3.6630e+00

2.3519e+02

XPropTx

XPPA

3.1268e+02

XSalesTx

7.7283 8.560e-14 ***

4.4144 1.299e-05 ***

2.4282e+02 -3.6133 0.0003401 ***

9.7297e-02

1.2590e-02

6.0768e+00

2.6825e+01

Pr(>|t|)

XRPS

Std. Error t-value

250.0

XPTC

Estimate

-89.7

(Intercept) -8.7737e+02

Coefficients :

-2990.0

Median 3rd Qu.

Residuals :

Residuals :

Min. 1st Qu.

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "within")
Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Call:

Call:

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "pooling")

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

SCALED MODEL BELOW

Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model

POLICY MODEL

245

-433.0

-89.7

250.0

365.376

188.632

XImpExp

2.5359 0.0115894 *
0.1776 0.8591522

0.5965 0.5511513

0.2872 0.774106
4.3096 2.09E‐05 ***
2.216 0.027288 *
‐0.0984 0.921702
‐2.8843 0.004149 **
‐3.5611 0.000417 ***
13.3699 <
2.20E‐16 ***
1.7238 0.08556 .
4.5024 8.98E‐06 ***

:

Y ~ X

Y ~ X

Y ~ X

alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent

chisq = 169.07, df = 9, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

Hausman Test

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

F = 11.769, df1 = 32, df2 = 376, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

F test for individual effects

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

normal = 8.854, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Honda)

F-statistic: 48.7835 on 11 and 408 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.55185

0.56808

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 327900000

:

F-statistic: 46.2477 on 9 and 376 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.47035

0.52539

Adj. R-Squared :

197.0

73.3508

46.1599

1.4236 0.1553213

2.5945 0.0098145 **

8.3213 1.322e-15 ***

3.5345 0.0004553 ***

89.7956

108.7833

166.7116

154.6990

2.3808 0.0177347 *

2.4237 0.0157968 *

4.1995 3.287e-05 ***

3.9995 7.535e-05 ***

57.9705 -1.7381 0.0829396 .

191.8348 -2.2955 0.0222103 *

111.9488 -0.0423 0.9663069

161.3986

162.6649

401110000

F-statistic: 22.7841 on 11 and 408 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.36966

0.38053
Adj. R-Squared :

:

Pr(>|t|)
344.3998 -0.7169 0.4738164

Residual Sum of Squares: 248480000

Total Sum of Squares:

Signif. codes:

R-Squared

Max.
5690.0

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

213.7828

XElecPrice
---

263.6593

700.1095

618.7257

-100.7611

-440.3592

-4.7317

229.7700

422.0317

610.3740

163.1521

XImpExp

XDemand

XPtMWs

XFedLand

XPropTx

XSalesTx

XRPS

XPTC

(Intercept) -246.9167

XPPA

759170000

-75.2

Median 3rd Qu.

482.0 0.348

Estimate Std. Error t-value

Coefficients :

-358.0

Min. 1st Qu.
-3230.0

R-Squared

Total Sum of Squares:

0.6324

Residuals :

theta:

XRTOISO

345150000

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

42.525
70.708
180.048
195.688
241.152
50.814
619.31
223.989
96.266

Pr(>|t|)

232315.3

660.1 0.652

individual

std.dev share

var
idiosyncratic 435675.3

Effects:

Residual Sum of Squares: 163810000

Signif. codes:

---

XElecPri 433.423

XImpExp 386.119

XDemand 8280.12

-180.95

XRTOISO -695.55

XPropTx -19.247
XPPA

Max.
3630.0

Total Sum of Squares:
0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

0.6055 0.5452043

3.5201 0.0004801 ***

4.2799 2.333e-05 ***

4.7701 2.568e-06 ***

12.214
304.722

XSalesTx 398.993

XRPS

XPTC

271.0

Signif. codes:

59.521

53.588

85.370

81.391

58.407 -1.2031 0.2296349

114.071

53.969

2.9247 0.0036399 **

7.7283 8.560e-14 ***

4.4144 1.299e-05 ***

-61.4

Median 3rd Qu.

Estimate Std. Error t-value

Coefficients :

-294.0

Min. 1st Qu.
-2740.0

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "random")

Call:

(Swamy-Arora's transformation)

Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model

---

36.038

388.244

20.255

XRTOISO

XDemand

32.194

XPtMWs

92.745

235.188

XPropTx

XFedLand

-70.270

106.907

312.676

XSalesTx

68.005

47.842

525.567

XRPS

XPPA

Pr(>|t|)

203.278 -0.5845 0.5592119

211.192

XPTC

(Intercept) -118.815

XElecPrice

Max.
6390.0

Estimate Std. Error t-value

Coefficients :

-2990.0

Median 3rd Qu.

Residuals :

Residuals :

Min. 1st Qu.

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "within")
Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Call:

Call:

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "pooling")

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model

SCALED POLICY MODEL

246

-326.0

9.0407e-03

XDemand

2.9419

0.003448 **

1.8656

1.0632

Pr(>|t|)

2.6274018

0.0065896

0.0085092

1.9796516

0.0580477

0.23203
0.61561

2.4835

0.01344 *

5.3499 1.532e-07 ***

5.6439 3.278e-08 ***

0.5025

4.8297 1.994e-06 ***

0.0649686 -1.1971

0.0194605 -4.5425 7.499e-06 ***

0.06617 .

9.5909 < 2.2e-16 ***

0.0512617 -1.8426

0.0544279

759170000

:

0.7444
0.7249

Y ~ X

Y ~ X

Hausman Test

Y ~ X

alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent

chisq = 59.708, df = 9, p-value = 1.526e-09

data:

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

F = 14.543, df1 = 33, df2 = 376, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

F test for individual effects

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

normal = 18.703, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Honda)

F-statistic: 119.116 on 10 and 409 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 194040000

Total Sum of Squares:

:

F-statistic: 127.389 on 9 and 376 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.67415

0.75304

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 85240000

345150000

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Total Sum of Squares:

Signif. codes:

6.5252421

0.0352537

0.0480252

0.9947734

0.2803509

-0.0777722

-0.0883995

-0.0944555

0.5220108

0.7149

-256.0

Estimate

-54.2

XTmiles
XIntMWs

XBaseMWs

0.7287

2.2853e+00

4.8084e-03

5.9321e-03

1.9446e+00

4.7741e-02

0.004065 **
0.660448
0.292251

4.0537 6.037e-05 ***

4.6948 3.648e-06 ***

5.1430 4.202e-07 ***

1.0546

7.6632 1.330e-13 ***

2.5229e-04 -0.4396

4.0508e-02 -2.8894

1.8255e-02 -4.6853 3.811e-06 ***

378810000

0.70961
F-statistic: 109.854 on 10 and 409 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

Adj. R-Squared :

:

9.4041 < 2.2e-16 ***
2.8133e-02 -6.1903 1.461e-09 ***

4.0996e-02

Residual Sum of Squares: 102770000

Total Sum of Squares:
R-Squared

Pr(>|t|)
2.3499e+02 -4.9511 1.081e-06 ***

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

9.2639e+00

2.2574e-02

3.0509e-02

2.0507e+00

3.6585e-01

-1.1091e-04

-1.1704e-01

-8.5533e-02

Signif. codes:

---

XElecPrice

XImpExp

XDemand

XPPA

XRetMWs

3.8553e-01
-1.7415e-01

3120.0

Std. Error t-value

175.0

Max.

462.0 0.485

Median 3rd Qu.

(Intercept) -1.1635e+03

Coefficients :

-2150.0

Min. 1st Qu.

Residuals :

theta:

213484.0

476.1 0.515

individual

std.dev share

var
idiosyncratic 226703.0

Effects:

XPtMWs

0.021407 *

---

XElecPrice

XImpExp

XDemand

XPPA

XRetMWs

Max.
2610.0

Estimate Std. Error t-value

199.0

XPeakMWs

2.3096

0.713148

0.062813 .

0.288326

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

1.9400e+00

3.4704e-03 -0.3679

4.8460e-03

2.1938e+00

4.0141e-02 14.4267 < 2.2e-16 ***

1.2164e-04

XPeakMWs

XIntMWs

XBaseMWs

XTmiles

-31.1

Signif. codes:

4.4807e+00

0.001526 **

0.101053

2.4015e-02 -6.5850 1.400e-10 ***

1.6628e-02 -3.1913

2.1226e-02 -1.6435

7.5149 3.625e-13 ***

0.006829 **

Pr(>|t|)

-218.0

Coefficients :

-1590.0

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "random")

Call:

(Swamy-Arora's transformation)

Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model

---

XElecPrice

-1.2767e-03

2.3324e+00

XPPA

XImpExp

5.7910e-01

XRetMWs

XPeakMWs

3.5784e-04

-1.5814e-01

XIntMWs

XPtMWs

-5.3064e-02

XBaseMWs

3.0186e-02

2.2685e-01

-3.4885e-02

XTmiles

2.1660e+02 -2.7189

4280.0

Std. Error t-value

184.0

Estimate

-90.9

(Intercept) -5.8890e+02

Coefficients :

-2940.0

Median 3rd Qu.

Residuals :
Min. 1st Qu.

Residuals :

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Max.

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "pooling")

Median 3rd Qu.

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "within")

Call:

Min. 1st Qu.

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model
Call:

Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model

INFRASTRUCTURE MODEL

247

-326.0

-90.9

711.927

-428.990

-358.158

-543.799

883.620

XTmiles

XBaseMWs

XIntMWs

XPeakMWs

XRetMWs

4280.0

0.021407 *

9.5909 <
2.20E‐16 ***
‐1.8426 0.06617 .
‐4.5425 7.50E‐06 ***
‐1.1971 0.23203
4.8297 1.99E‐06 ***
0.5025 0.61561
5.6439 3.28E‐08 ***
5.3499 1.53E‐07 ***
2.4835 0.01344 *

759170000

:

0.7444
0.7249

Y ~ X

Y ~ X

Y ~ X

alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent

chisq = 59.708, df = 9, p-value = 1.526e-09

data:

Hausman Test

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

F = 14.543, df1 = 33, df2 = 376, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

F test for individual effects

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

normal = 18.703, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Honda)

F-statistic: 119.116 on 10 and 409 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 194040000

Total Sum of Squares:

:

F-statistic: 127.389 on 9 and 376 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.67415

0.75304

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 85240000

345150000

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Total Sum of Squares:

Signif. codes:

---

XDemand

170.815
630.38
131.351
223.408
88.572
37.977
603.136
164.246
67.923

Pr(>|t|)

476.1 0.515

0.7149

-256.0

XIntMWs

XBaseMWs

XTmiles

(Intercept)

1209.941

633.026

175.0

9.4041 < 2.2e-16 ***

59.080

119.848

420.473

0.004065 **
1.0546

4.0537 6.037e-05 ***

4.6948 3.648e-06 ***

5.1430 4.202e-07 ***

0.660448

0.292251

7.6632 1.330e-13 ***
106.435 -0.4396

37.306

72.847

139.295 -2.8894

123.217 -4.6853 3.811e-06 ***

378810000
0.7287
0.70961
F-statistic: 109.854 on 10 and 409 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

Adj. R-Squared :

:

Pr(>|t|)
7.3792 8.964e-13 ***
345.963 -6.1903 1.461e-09 ***

128.660

85.785

Residual Sum of Squares: 102770000

Total Sum of Squares:
R-Squared

Max.
3120.0

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

239.490

562.660

2162.501

-46.791

39.341

558.237

-402.479

-577.311

-2141.625

Signif. codes:

---

XElecPrice

XImpExp

XDemand

XPtMWs

XPPA

-54.2

Median 3rd Qu.

Estimate Std. Error t-value

Coefficients :

-2150.0

Min. 1st Qu.

Residuals :

theta:

462.0 0.485

std.dev share

213484.0

var
individual

idiosyncratic 226703.0

Effects:

XRetMWs

2.3096

19.084
3404.037
XImpExp
878.698
XElecPri
168.69

XPeakMWs ‐267.436
XRetMWs
427.775
XPPA

Max.
2610.0

XPeakMWs

50.153

0.713148

0.062813 .

0.003448 **

0.288326

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

115.834

1.8656

2.9419

1.0632

86.500 -0.3679

343.486

51.315

42.086

61.249 14.4267 < 2.2e-16 ***

1638.261

XBaseMWs ‐1161.55
XIntMWs ‐596.662

XTmiles

199.0

Estimate Std. Error t-value

-31.1

Signif. codes:

XElecPrice

0.001526 **

82.582 -6.5850 1.400e-10 ***

112.231 -3.1913

0.101053

7.5149 3.625e-13 ***

261.026 -1.6435

94.735

33.610 18.8347 < 2.2e-16 ***

Pr(>|t|)

-218.0

Coefficients :

-1590.0

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "random")

Call:

(Swamy-Arora's transformation)

Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model

---

-31.822

640.808

XDemand

XImpExp

150.962

XPtMWs

44.745

633.026

(Intercept)

XPPA

184.0

Estimate Std. Error t-value

Coefficients :

-2940.0

Median 3rd Qu.

Residuals :

Residuals :
Min. 1st Qu.

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Max.

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "within")

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "pooling")

Median 3rd Qu.

Call:

Call:

Min. 1st Qu.

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model

SCALED INFRASTRUCTURE MODEL

248

-338.0

3930.0

-7.1125e-02
-1.5379e-01

XBaseMWs

XIntMWs

XPeakMWs
1.5741 0.1162566

0.398186
0.054268 .

2.8912e+00

6.8182e-03

8.7082e-03

2.0198e+00

5.9367e-02

0.150013
0.719375

1.9075

0.057224 .

6.3421 6.597e-10 ***

5.8140 1.316e-08 ***

0.3596

4.3461 1.792e-05 ***

6.5925e-02 -1.4425

2.1501e-02 -5.6569 3.084e-08 ***

5.2267e-02 -1.9308

9.6450 < 2.2e-16 ***

3.7286e-03 -0.8458
5.4101e-02

0.015910 *

0.063640 .

0.001461 **

0.320666

Pr(>|t|)

759170000

:
0.73869

0.76985

Y ~ X

F test for individual effects

Y ~ X

Y ~ X

alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent

chisq = 53.719, df = 14, p-value = 1.435e-06

data:

Hausman Test

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

F = 13.369, df1 = 33, df2 = 371, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

normal = 17.428, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Honda)

F-statistic: 84.2542 on 16 and 403 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 174720000

Total Sum of Squares:

0.67782

F-statistic: 87.4039 on 14 and 371 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

Adj. R-Squared :

4.5948e+00

7.9782e+00

:

2.6894 0.0074563 **

3.7703 0.0001874 ***

1.2140 0.2254458

9.3082 < 2.2e-16 ***

2.5127e+00

5.0932e-03

6.0968e-03

1.9916e+00

5.0865e-02

3.1751 0.0016129 **

5.8479 1.030e-08 ***

6.1789 1.581e-09 ***

0.1295 0.8970518

5.7909 1.411e-08 ***

3.2448e-04 -0.1176 0.9064823

4.2532e-02 -3.1855 0.0015575 **

2.0180e-02 -5.7662 1.615e-08 ***

2.8333e-02 -7.0384 8.422e-12 ***

4.2431e-02

3.0033e-03 -0.5434 0.5871625

6.2779e-06 -0.7302 0.4656921

1.1693e+02 -1.1322 0.2582086

1.1356e+02

1.1219e-02

3.7848e+00

373100000

F-statistic: 74.2686 on 16 and 403 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.71652

0.74675
Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Pr(>|t|)
2.6813e+02 -4.0029 7.448e-05 ***

Residual Sum of Squares: 94489000

Total Sum of Squares:

Signif. codes:

2890.0

Std. Error t-value

189.0

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

2.9785e-02
---

XElecPrice

3.7671e-02

2.5785e-01

2.9456e-01

-3.8143e-05

-1.3549e-01

-1.1636e-01

-1.9942e-01

3.9496e-01

-1.6320e-03

-4.5841e-06

-1.3239e+02

3.0539e+02

4.2298e-02

XImpExp

XDemand

XPPA

XPeakMWs

XIntMWs

XBaseMWs

XTmiles

XRTOISO

XFedLand

XPropTx

XSalesTx

XRPS

XPTC

XPtMWs

0.76735

Estimate

-45.9

Max.

499.2 0.535

Median 3rd Qu.

(Intercept) -1.0733e+03

Coefficients :

-251.0

Min. 1st Qu.
-2020.0

XRetMWs

:

0.7402

Residuals :

theta:

Residual Sum of Squares: 80301000

345150000

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

5.5150e+00

4.3242e-02

5.0630e-02

7.2626e-01

2.5801e-01

-9.5095e-02

Signif. codes:

---

XElecPrice

XImpExp

XDemand

XPPA

XRetMWs

XPeakMWs

-1.2163e-01

-1.0092e-01

5.2180e-01

-3.1538e-03

1.4208e+02 -2.4221

1.8603

3.2063

0.9944

249157.1

465.2 0.465

individual

std.dev share

var
idiosyncratic 216445.0

Effects:

R-Squared

2.4535 0.0145695 *

1.5006 0.1342349

2.2597 0.0243716 *

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

2.1374e+00

3.6444e-03

4.8081e-03

2.2523e+00 -0.3218 0.7477730

4.5443e-02 10.2514 < 2.2e-16 ***

1.4962e-04

2.3836e-02 -6.4522 3.165e-10 ***

1.7387e-02 -4.0907 5.195e-05 ***

XIntMWs

XBaseMWs

XTmiles

XRTOISO

-3.4413e+02

1.3148e+02

1.1432e-02

3.8241e+00

Std. Error t-value

2460.0

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Signif. codes:

5.2440e+00

XElecPrice

7.6502 1.493e-13 ***

0.4500 0.6529775

2.0928e-02 -2.2705 0.0237037 *

3.2356e-02

1.8928e-03

XPropTx

2.4458e+02

3.6654e-02

3.8028e+00

203.0

Max.

Total Sum of Squares:

5.4688e-03

XImpExp

0.8068 0.4202686

2.9017 0.0039150 **

2.7653e-06 -0.8267 0.4088856

7.1151e+01

8.0627e+01

XSalesTx

XRPS

XPTC

-18.5

Median 3rd Qu.

Estimate

-238.0

Coefficients :

-1440.0

Min. 1st Qu.

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "random")

Call:

(Swamy-Arora's transformation)

Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model

---

1.0865e-02

-7.2479e-01

XDemand

XPPA

4.6585e-01

-4.7518e-02

XTmiles

XRetMWs

2.4753e-01

XRTOISO

2.3551e-04

8.5168e-04

XFedLand

XPtMWs

5.7403e+01
-2.2861e-06

XPropTx

2.3396e+02

XSalesTx

4.5572 6.882e-06 ***

1.9805 0.0483290 *

5.2005e-02

1.1411e-02

4.7216e+00

9.3511e+00

XRPS

Pr(>|t|)

XPTC

Std. Error t-value

205.0

2.3087e+02 -3.3567 0.0008638 ***

Estimate

-80.4

(Intercept) -7.7496e+02

Coefficients :

-2870.0

Max.

Residuals :
Median 3rd Qu.

Residuals :

Min. 1st Qu.

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "within")
Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Call:

Call:

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "pooling")

SCALED MODELS BELOW

Infrastructure, Policy and Contextual Model

Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model
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-338.0

205.0

3930.0

0.116257

Signif. codes:

74.743

169.944

617.239

38.748

90.586

0.150013
0.719375

1.9075

0.057224 .

6.3421 6.597e-10 ***

5.8140 1.316e-08 ***

0.3596

4.3461 1.792e-05 ***

226.697 -1.4425

345150000

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

142.574

1077.801

0.054268 .

145.123 -5.6569 3.084e-08 ***

759170000

:

Y ~ X

F test for individual effects

Y ~ X

Y ~ X

alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent

chisq = 54.083, df = 14, p-value = 1.243e-06

data:

Hausman Test

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

F = 13.632, df1 = 32, df2 = 371, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

normal = 17.226, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Honda)

F-statistic: 84.2542 on 16 and 403 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.73869

0.76985

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 174720000

Total Sum of Squares:

F-statistic: 87.4039 on 14 and 371 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.67782

0.76735

Adj. R-Squared :

:

:

Pr(>|t|)

2.6894 0.0074563 **

3.7703 0.0001874 ***

1.2140 0.2254458

1.8037 0.0720194 .

9.3082 < 2.2e-16 ***

64.9588

126.9489

432.1421

38.2074

77.6133

3.1751 0.0016129 **

5.8479 1.030e-08 ***

6.1789 1.581e-09 ***

0.1295 0.8970518

5.7909 1.411e-08 ***

136.8883 -0.1176 0.9064823

146.2560 -3.1855 0.0015575 **

136.2064 -5.7662 1.615e-08 ***

348.4204 -7.0384 8.422e-12 ***

133.1655

141.0631 -0.5434 0.5871625

99.2758 -0.7302 0.4656921

116.9263 -1.1322 0.2582086

113.5556

60.5997

29.7970

252.6088

373100000

0.71652

0.74675
F-statistic: 74.2686 on 16 and 403 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Max.
2890.0

Residual Sum of Squares: 94489000

Total Sum of Squares:

Signif. codes:

189.0

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

206.2517

XElecPrice
---

742.3852

2670.1589

4.9466

449.4505

-16.0913

-465.8974

-785.3963

-2452.3115

1239.5349

-76.6521

-72.4912

-132.3882

305.3914

228.4793

36.1745

455.6396

XImpExp

XDemand

XPPA

XPeakMWs

XIntMWs

XBaseMWs

XTmiles

XRTOISO

XFedLand

XPropTx

XSalesTx

XRPS

XPTC

(Intercept)

-45.9

Median 3rd Qu.

Estimate Std. Error t-value

-251.0
Coefficients :

-2020.0

Min. 1st Qu.

Residuals :

XRetMWs

0.014570 *

0.134235

---

XElecPrice

XImpExp

0.398186

0.015910 *

0.063640 .

0.001461 **

0.320666

9.6450 < 2.2e-16 ***

642.743 -1.9308

169.789

175.129 -0.8458

142.081 -2.4221

1.8603

3.2063

0.9944

R-Squared

2.4535

1.5006

0.024372 *

0.747773

3588.629

13.932

393.691

-327.004

-820.948

-1241.019

1637.611

-148.132

-344.133

61.752

30.107
131.478

0.7402

499.2 0.535

465.2 0.465

theta:

XPtMWs

55.255

90.835

2.2597

43.208 -0.3218
340.801

XDemand

29.939
244.583

197.994

Pr(>|t|)

std.dev share

249157.1

var
individual

idiosyncratic 216445.0

Effects:

Residual Sum of Squares: 80301000

135.569

XElecPrice

1.5741

69.339 10.2514 < 2.2e-16 ***

63.120

XPPA

XRetMWs

XPeakMWs

XIntMWs

XBaseMWs

XTmiles

XRTOISO

XPropTx

2460.0

Total Sum of Squares:

136.310

XImpExp

0.023704 *

81.964 -6.4522 3.165e-10 ***

117.356 -4.0907 5.195e-05 ***

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

770.117

0.652978

0.408886

0.420269

7.6502 1.493e-13 ***

0.4500

0.003915 **

XSalesTx

XRPS

XPTC

203.0

Estimate Std. Error t-value

-18.5

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Signif. codes:

-13.904

0.8068

2.9017

257.363 -2.2705

101.545

88.902

0.048329 *

0.107284

4.5572 6.882e-06 ***

1.9805

1.6141

43.729 -0.8267

71.151

80.627

61.641

37.173

156.646

Pr(>|t|)

-238.0

Coefficients :

-1440.0

Max.

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "random")

Call:

(Swamy-Arora's transformation)

Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model

---

710.822

-528.855

XPeakMWs

XDemand

-480.068

XIntMWs

XPPA

-584.345

XBaseMWs

XRetMWs

776.836

XTmiles

99.356

40.003

XRTOISO

XPtMWs

57.403
-36.151

XFedLand

233.957

XSalesTx

XPropTx

73.620
280.911

XRPS

252.846

XPTC

(Intercept)

-80.4

Estimate Std. Error t-value

Coefficients :

-2870.0

Median 3rd Qu.

Residuals :

Residuals :
Min. 1st Qu.

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Max.

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "within")

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "pooling")

Median 3rd Qu.

Call:

Call:

Min. 1st Qu.

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model

SCALED POLICY INFRASTRUCTURE CONTEXT MODELS

250

-26.1

4.0852e-02

2.9262e+00

XImpExp

XElecPrice

3.0076e+00

6.6958e-03

8.8410e-03
0.9729 0.3312371

6.1011 2.715e-09 ***

6.7175 7.210e-11 ***

0.8127 0.4169384

3.6648 0.0002847 ***

XElecPrice

XImpExp

XDemand

XPPA

XRetMWs

XPeakMWs

XIntMWs

XBaseMWs

XTmiles

XRTOISO

3.5805e-02

2.4920e+00

5.9286e-03

7.5054e-03

1.7419e+00

5.1100e-02

Total Sum of Squares:

311440000

F-statistic: 91.2013 on 14 and 361 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.68641

0.77958

0.8158
0.71982

F-statistic: 113.886 on 14 and 360 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

Adj. R-Squared :

:

R-Squared

:

2.0161 0.0445342 *

5.4873 7.710e-08 ***

5.9442 6.566e-09 ***

0.7556 0.4503831

4.3383 1.868e-05 ***

5.6903e-02 -2.2658 0.0240591 *

1.8505e-02 -5.8764 9.556e-09 ***

R-Squared

Adj. R-Squared :

0.7117 0.4771017

4.5179e-02 -3.2370 0.0013202 **

4.6581e-02 11.6766 < 2.2e-16 ***

3.2571e-03

1.2222e+02 -2.0824 0.0380116 *

Residual Sum of Squares: 57367000

332140000

3.6464 0.0003052 ***

0.5909 0.5549612

1.2447e+02 -1.5302 0.1268472

9.8193e-03

3.3283e+00

Pr(>|t|)

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

5.0241e+00

3.2532e-02

4.4614e-02

1.3161e+00

2.2168e-01

-1.2893e-01

-1.0875e-01

-1.4624e-01

5.4391e-01

2.3181e-03

-2.5451e+02

-1.9046e+02

1630.0

Max.

Std. Error t-value

182.0

Residual Sum of Squares: 73209000

Total Sum of Squares:

Estimate

-24.3

Median 3rd Qu.

1.9667e+00

Signif. codes:

5.9389e-02

XDemand

1.9875e+00

6.2616e-02

6.5622e-02 -1.7566 0.0798354 .

2.1021e-02 -5.4906 7.565e-08 ***

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

1.6152e+00

XPPA

7.8638 4.355e-14 ***

5.0899e-02 -2.0221 0.0439043 *

5.5425e-02

3.6172e-03 -0.9092 0.3638597

XPropTx

XSalesTx

XRPS

XPTC

Coefficients :

-219.0

Signif. codes:

2.2948e-01

XRetMWs

2.1588 0.0315264 *

4.4557 1.117e-05 ***

1.0539 0.2926402

1.3789e+02 -2.7624 0.0060313 **

1.2764e+02

2.5401e-02

3.7386e+00

Pr(>|t|)

-1670.0

---

-1.1527e-01

XPeakMWs

2500.0

Std. Error t-value

204.0

---

-1.1542e-01

XIntMWs

-3.2887e-03

XRTOISO

4.3585e-01

-3.8091e+02

XPropTx

-1.0292e-01

2.7555e+02

XSalesTx

XBaseMWs

1.1318e-01

XRPS

XTmiles

3.9400e+00

XPTC

Estimate

-240.0

Coefficients :

-1260.0

Min. 1st Qu.

Residuals :

Residuals :
Max.

Balanced Panel: n=34, T=12, N=408

Unbalanced Panel: n=35, T=2-12, N=410

Median 3rd Qu.

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "within")

Min. 1st Qu.

Call:

Call:

Call:

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "within")

Pr(>|t|)

1.2381 0.2165002

5.0458 7.182e-07 ***

1.4754 0.1409811

2.3129 0.0212927 *

6.9295 1.957e-11 ***

3.5555 0.0004277 ***

2.8413e+00

6.6808e-03

9.7752e-03

3.0335 0.0025928 **

5.6483 3.294e-08 ***

4.0395 6.550e-05 ***

1.9193e+00 -0.0438 0.9651109

6.4167e-02

6.3747e-02 -0.6925 0.4890781

2.5395e-02 -4.3763 1.583e-05 ***

7.1565e-02

5.5921e-02

3.5057e-03 -1.6509 0.0996410 .

1.3753e+02 -1.6416 0.1015472

1.2469e+02

1.1485e-02

3.6346e+00

142620000

F-statistic: 28.3601 on 14 and 360 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.46276

0.52446
Adj. R-Squared :

:

Residual Sum of Squares: 67823000

Total Sum of Squares:
R-Squared

Max.
2420.0

Std. Error t-value

194.0

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

8.6191e+00

3.7736e-02

3.9487e-02

-8.4011e-02

2.2814e-01

-4.4144e-02

-1.1114e-01

1.6552e-01

3.8751e-01

-5.7873e-03

-2.2576e+02

1.5438e+02

5.7952e-02

5.3625e+00

Signif. codes:

---

XElecPrice

XImpExp

XDemand

XPPA

XRetMWs

XPeakMWs

XIntMWs

XBaseMWs

XTmiles

XRTOISO

XPropTx

XSalesTx

XRPS

XPTC

-26.6

Median 3rd Qu.

Estimate

-251.0
Coefficients :

-1220.0

Min. 1st Qu.

Residuals :

Balanced Panel: n=34, T=12, N=408

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "within")

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Model without Texas

Model without Iowa

Model without California

STATE TESTS ‐ Fixed Effects
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-325.0

3720.0

-1.2931e-06

2.1950e-03

1.6005e-01

-5.8380e-02

-6.4020e-02

-1.7420e-01

XFedLand

XRTOISO

XTmiles

XBaseMWs

XIntMWs

XPeakMWs

1.4569 0.1459353

3.3350 0.0009324 ***

4.4413 1.157e-05 ***

1.1806 0.2384674

1.3646 0.1731458

1.5024 0.1337846

3.4048 0.0007288 ***

1.3673 0.1723527

3.0485 0.0024650 **

7.8749 3.826e-14 ***

6.4751 3.016e-10 ***

5.3861 1.283e-07 ***

0.0425 0.9661113

4.8490 1.830e-06 ***

759170000

:

Y ~ X

Y ~ X

Hausman Test

Y ~ X

alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent

chisq = 49.35, df = 15, p-value = 1.537e-05

data:

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

F = 14.043, df1 = 32, df2 = 370, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

F test for individual effects

alternative hypothesis: significant effects

normal = 17.731, p-value < 2.2e-16

data:

Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Honda)

F-statistic: 85.4129 on 17 and 402 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.74961

0.78317

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 164610000

Total Sum of Squares:

0.69124

F-statistic: 89.8748 on 15 and 370 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

Adj. R-Squared :

1.1258e+02

1.0833e-02

1.4568 0.1459578

3.3490 0.0008876 ***

6.6839 7.790e-11 ***

6.4432 3.349e-10 ***

0.2080 0.8353227

5.5501 5.191e-08 ***

7.5017 4.079e-13 ***
2.9727e+00 -0.6728 0.5014488

4.9556e-03

6.0172e-03

1.9247e+00 -0.5185 0.6043929

4.9353e-02

3.2024e-04

4.2754e-02 -4.4779 9.835e-06 ***

1.9527e-02 -6.5156 2.169e-10 ***

2.7414e-02 -7.3223 1.341e-12 ***

4.4662e-02

2.9197e-03 -0.8379 0.4025742

6.2287e-06 -0.9686 0.3333134

1.1550e+02 -2.2913 0.0224601 *

371090000

F-statistic: 77.7309 on 17 and 402 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.73388

0.76674
Adj. R-Squared :

:

Pr(>|t|)
5.7966 1.370e-08 ***
3.8336e+00 -0.6650 0.5064376

1.3483e+01

2.6844e+04 -5.8363 1.100e-08 ***

Residual Sum of Squares: 86560000

Total Sum of Squares:
R-Squared

2650.0

Std. Error t-value

203.0

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

-2.0001e+00

2.7504e-02

4.5140e-02

-9.9797e-01

3.1799e-01

6.6614e-05

-1.9145e-01

-1.2723e-01

-2.0073e-01

2.9852e-01

-2.4465e-03

-6.0333e-06

-2.6466e+02

1.6400e+02

3.6281e-02

-2.5493e+00

7.8154e+01

Signif. codes:

---

XElecPrice

XImpExp

XDemand

XPPA

XPeakMWs

XIntMWs

XBaseMWs

XTmiles

XRTOISO

XFedLand

XPropTx

XSalesTx

XRPS

XPTC

XTime

XRetMWs

0.78465

Estimate

-34.3

Max.

500.5 0.555

Median 3rd Qu.

(Intercept) -1.5667e+05

R-Squared

:

-237.0
Coefficients :

-2020.0

Min. 1st Qu.

Residuals :

XPtMWs

345150000

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

3.6221e+00 -1.9626 0.0504401 .

6.5699e-03

8.4426e-03

1.9495e+00

5.7310e-02

6.5155e-02 -2.6762 0.0077763 **

2.0843e-02 -6.4420 3.672e-10 ***

5.1346e-02 -3.0317 0.0026030 **

5.4721e-02

3.6110e-03 -1.4305 0.1534131

1.3895e+02 -3.4146 0.0007096 ***

1.2732e+02

1.1028e-02

0.7497

250453.3

448.2 0.445

theta:

individual

Residual Sum of Squares: 74330000

Signif. codes:

---

5.4521 9.117e-08 ***

3.7776e+00 -0.1988 0.8425225

1.5154e+01

Pr(>|t|)

std.dev share

var
idiosyncratic 200890.9

Effects:

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Total Sum of Squares:
0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

4.2541e-02

4.5473e-02

8.2881e-02

2.7790e-01

-1.7437e-01

-1.3427e-01

-1.5567e-01

4.3092e-01

-5.1656e-03

-4.7447e+02

1.7409e+02

3.3618e-02

XElecPrice -7.1087e+00

XImpExp

XDemand

XPPA

XRetMWs

XPeakMWs

XIntMWs

XBaseMWs

XTmiles

XRTOISO

XPropTx

XSalesTx

XRPS

8.2618e+01
-7.5102e-01

2230.0

Std. Error t-value

201.0

Max.

Signif. codes:

2.3660e+00 -0.1628 0.8707356

3.5418e-03

4.8012e-03

2.2309e+00 -1.2851 0.1994945

4.4188e-02 10.7098 < 2.2e-16 ***

1.4560e-04

2.3526e-02 -7.4047 7.786e-13 ***

1.6958e-02 -3.7753 0.0001839 ***

2.0456e-02 -2.8539 0.0045418 **

3.6037e-02

1.8592e-03

2.6948e-06 -0.4798 0.6315989

7.0568e+01 -0.1788 0.8582159

8.1699e+01

1.1436e-02

5.0827e+00 -0.2973 0.7663852

XTime
XPTC

-20.1

Median 3rd Qu.

Estimate

-238.0

Coefficients :

-1570.0

Min. 1st Qu.

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "random")

Call:

(Swamy-Arora's transformation)

Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model

---

-3.8525e-01

5.3212e-03

XImpExp

XElecPrice

1.6347e-02

-2.8670e+00

XDemand

XPPA

4.7324e-01

-1.2615e+01

XPropTx

XRetMWs

1.1902e+02

XSalesTx

1.9868e-04

3.8138e-02

XRPS

XPtMWs

-1.5111e+00

XPTC

4.9693 9.960e-07 ***

3.0252e+04 -4.9948 8.798e-07 ***
1.5169e+01

Pr(>|t|)

7.5378e+01

Std. Error t-value

213.0

XTime

Estimate

-64.5

(Intercept) -1.5110e+05

Coefficients :

-2850.0

Max.

Residuals :
Median 3rd Qu.

Residuals :

Min. 1st Qu.

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "within")
Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Call:

plm(formula = Y ~ X, data = pdata, model = "pooling")

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model
Call:

Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model

MODELS INCORPORATING TIME AS A VARIABLE
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"5.3207179878344e-42"

"3.74823005433783e-24"

"2.76236997201566e-22"

"1.48862760807362e-82"

"0.001586148370362"

"7.85543529066194e-50"

"0.846258948040921"

[2,] "BaseMWs"

[3,] "IntMWs"

[4,] "PeakMWs"

[5,] "RetMWs"

[6,] "PPA"

[7,] "Demand"

[8,] "ImpExp"

"0.437844504573037"

"0.79058063255876"

"0.0383907203373089"

"1.78465416342607e-05"

"5.47369196361202e-06"

[2,] "IntMWs"

[3,] "PeakMWs"

[4,] "PPA"

[5,] "Demand"

[6,] "ImpExp"

"0.000144771169802697"

"0.297182071660615"

"0.530663398924441"

[2,] "IntMWs"

[3,] "PeakMWs"

[4,] "PPA"

[5,] "ElecPrice" "0.21903135089705"

"0.158431049070798"

pvec

[1,] "BaseMWs"

nam

STEP 5 - Remove 1, 2, 3 , 4 and ID 5

[7,] "ElecPrice" "0.199890218115209"

"0.946141220692861"

pvec

[1,] "BaseMWs"

nam

STEP 3 - Remove 1, 2 and ID 3

[9,] "ElecPrice" "1.29804615929333e-13"

"6.16033525565183e-92"

pvec

[1,] "Tmiles"

nam

STEP 1 ‐ ID First Signficance

"3.52257502293142e-07"

"2.92124311087937e-10"

"0.233410412273627"

"1.33696621223975e-14"

"0.418999431497602"

"0.0701265164357699"

"1.42944703050394e-05"

pvec

-211.0

-28.6

190.0

Median 3rd Qu.

Max.

0.044594

:

nam

"0.0945864963166826"

"0.39043109477056"

ImpExp 0.0301867

RetMWs 0.3334583

Tmiles 0.6060894

4.6110 5.474e-06 ***

345150000

-222.0

-37.4

208.0

Median 3rd Qu.

0.0452652
0.0064400
0.0074988

RetMWs 0.2748140
ImpExp 0.0279950
Demand 0.0304947

5.3688 1.383e-07 ***

5.0005 8.753e-07 ***

345150000

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

F-statistic: 264.895 on 4 and 381 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.66722

0.73552

:

0.7454
0.67441
F-statistic: 222.503 on 5 and 380 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 87878000

:

Adj. R-Squared :

Pr(>|t|)
6.8235 3.520e-11 ***

0.018651 -3.8388 0.0001448 ***

0.008118

0.006416

0.045391

R-Squared

Signif. codes:

Max.
2610

0.051038 11.0531 < 2.2e-16 ***

Total Sum of Squares:

345150000

197

Residual Sum of Squares: 91286000

Total Sum of Squares:

---

0.043584

0.032083

0.309726

0.564127

Signif. codes:

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

-38

Median 3rd Qu.

Estimate Std. Error t-value

IntMWs -0.071599

Demand

ImpExp

RetMWs

Tmiles

Coefficients :

-225

Min. 1st Qu.
-1630

---

4.0666 5.799e-05 ***

4.3470 1.773e-05 ***

6.0712 3.072e-09 ***

0.0518898 10.6903 < 2.2e-16 ***

Tmiles 0.5547156

Pr(>|t|)

2650.0

Estimate Std. Error t-value

Coefficients :

-1720.0

Min. 1st Qu.

Residuals :

data = pdata, model = "within")

plm(formula = Y ~ Tmiles + RetMWs + ImpExp + Demand + IntMWs,

Call:

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Model with Tmiles‐Ret MWs‐ImpExp‐Demand ‐ Signficance Check

F-statistic: 334.092 on 3 and 382 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.65853

0.72404
Adj. R-Squared :

:

Pr(>|t|)
7.6183 2.045e-13 ***

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

0.0065466

0.0437704

Residual Sum of Squares: 95248000
R-Squared

Max.
2680.0

0.0513418 11.8050 < 2.2e-16 ***

Total Sum of Squares:

Signif. codes:

---

200.0

Estimate Std. Error t-value

-34.6

Median 3rd Qu.

Residuals :

[4,] "ElecPrice" "0.018039785963785"

[3,] "PPA"

[2,] "PeakMWs"

"0.119044530977942"

pvec

STEP 6 - Remove 1, 2, 3 , 4, 5 and ID 6
[1,] "BaseMWs"

-223.0

Coefficients :

-2090.0

Min. 1st Qu.

Residuals :

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

plm(formula = Y ~ Tmiles + RetMWs + ImpExp, data = pdata, model = "within")

Call:

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Model with Tmiles‐Ret MWs‐ImpExp ‐ Signficance Check

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

Max.

"5.79897997916245e-05"

"0.0837599372803563"

"0.938682621165499"

"0.0928396235756391"

"0.317838308815029"

pvec

[6,] "ElecPrice" "0.172773168324075"

[5,] "Demand"

[4,] "PPA"

[3,] "PeakMWs"

[2,] "IntMWs"

[1,] "BaseMWs"

nam

STEP 4 - Remove 1, 2, 3 and ID 4

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

model = "within")

plm(formula = Y ~ Tmiles + RetMWs + ImpExp + Demand, data = pdata,

Call:

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Model with Tmiles‐Ret MWs‐ImpExp‐Demand ‐ Signficance Check

F-statistic: 465.862 on 2 and 383 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16

0.64625

0.70868

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 100550000

345150000

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Total Sum of Squares:

Signif. codes:

8.0159 1.337e-14 ***

0.051674 10.8371 < 2.2e-16 ***

RetMWs 0.357466
---

Tmiles 0.560003

Pr(>|t|)

2860.0

Estimate Std. Error t-value

Coefficients :

-2410.0

Min. 1st Qu.

Residuals :

Balanced Panel: n=35, T=12, N=420

plm(formula = Y ~ Tmiles + RetMWs, data = pdata, model = "within")

Call:

Oneway (individual) effect Within Model

Model with Tmiles‐Ret MWs ‐ Signficance Check

[8,] "ElecPrice" "0.837249900711015"

[7,] "ImpExp"

[6,] "Demand"

[5,] "PPA"

[4,] "RetMWs"

[3,] "PeakMWs"

[2,] "IntMWs"

[1,] "BaseMWs"

nam

STEP 2 - REMOVE 1st, ID 2nd
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[7,] "IntMWs"

---

[10,] "Demand"

[9,] "PPA"

[8,] "RetMWs"

0.0002382

0.0226114
4.8551 3.252e-05 ***

6.2428 6.161e-07 ***

0.02214 *

0.62855

Pr(>|t|)

[11,] "Demand"

[10,] "PPA"

[9,] "RetMWs"

[8,] "PtMWs"

"0.0689736076468352"

[7,] "RetMWs"

"0.0699636368365606"

Estimate

F-statistic: 26.0289 on 3 and 31 DF, p-value: 1.3215e-08

:

0.7817

3.0090

0.005269 **

34501000

0.67003
F-statistic: 26.857 on 4 and 30 DF, p-value: 1.5501e-09

Adj. R-Squared :

R-Squared

Residual Sum of Squares: 7531400

0.63401

0.71582

Adj. R-Squared :

:

0.005535 **

0.744216

0.040783 *

Pr(>|t|)

5.3597 8.435e-06 ***

2.9895

0.3293

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

1.0247e-02

2.1231e-04

2.7855e-02

4.8748e-03

1.3524e+02 -2.1380

Std. Error t-value

Total Sum of Squares:

Signif. codes:

---

3.0834e-02

1.1379e-03

8.3273e-02

1.6053e-03

Residual Sum of Squares: 9804400

"0.791514741347667"

"0.00980057600655152"

BaseMWs

PtMWs

RPS

ImpExp

R-Squared

[9,] "Demand"

"1.74600080708792e-05"

"0.260589094847083"

"0.748199097340785"

"0.102655963537406"

[6,] "PeakMWs" "0.00158943064794011"

[5,] "IntMWs"

[4,] "Tmiles"

[3,] "RTOISO"

(Intercept) -2.8914e+02

Coefficients :

F-statistic: 15.9833 on 2 and 32 DF, p-value: 1.5387e-05

"0.00653566111983095"

pvec

34501000

0.4569

0.49974
Adj. R-Squared :

:

Residual Sum of Squares: 17260000

Total Sum of Squares:
R-Squared

5.4957 4.696e-06 ***

0.003221 **

0.219524

Pr(>|t|)

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

1.5990e-01 2.9095e-02

3.1849

1.2523

Estimate Std. Error t-value
1.7179e-02 5.3938e-03

Signif. codes:

---

RPS

ImpExp

(Intercept) 1.8785e+02 1.5000e+02

Coefficients :

[2,] "FedLand" "0.00493183685448766"

[1,] "PTC"

nam

"0.0385393819757409"

"6.35183337483924e-07"

"0.117210604247752"

"6.16100702574794e-07"

[7,] "PeakMWs" "0.000163372806684646"

[6,] "IntMWs"

"0.000740126725883541"

34501000

"0.00414414020480304"

"0.044503176863476"

[5,] "BaseMWs" "0.0145557291370682"

[4,] "Tmiles"

[3,] "RTOISO"

[8,] "PPA"
Total Sum of Squares:

"7.02159921939447e-06"

pvec

[2,] "FedLand" "5.19794663843594e-06"

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

0.0011565

0.1411582

nam
[1,] "PTC"

"8.97594282486781e-05"

[7,] "PeakMWs" "3.20105797172812e-05"

Signif. codes:

PtMWs

[6,] "IntMWs"

"0.000327349714450021"

[5,] "BaseMWs" "8.43547331428274e-06"

RPS

2.4088

"0.00682416393351034"

0.0043542

[4,] "Tmiles"

0.0104881

ImpExp

Std. Error t-value

"0.0853097730172833"

Estimate

"0.391910693596931"

"0.400878719548664"

[3,] "RTOISO"

Coefficients :

[12,] "Demand"

[11,] "PPA"

"0.989551132185806"

"0.994690899677763"

(Intercept) -61.4770935 125.8180249 -0.4886

"4.0776445643623e-05"

[9,] "PtMWs"
[10,] "RetMWs"

[2,] "FedLand" "5.81834195229978e-05"

[1,] "PTC"

pvec

"0.00370762039495496"

nam

"0.550842832080516"

"0.0236623625130214"

[11,] "PPA"

[13,] "ImpExp"

"0.0565210082890646"

[12,] "Demand"

"0.221388726062398"

[9,] "PtMWs"

[10,] "RetMWs"

[8,] "PeakMWs" "0.239849543668685"

"0.957177216934261"

[6,] "BaseMWs" "0.584401367922662"

[8,] "PeakMWs" "0.29427206014241"

"0.204584620338845"

[7,] "IntMWs"

"0.483000714395366"

[6,] "BaseMWs" "0.503012585825068"

[5,] "Tmiles"

"0.0223264024113854"

[5,] "Tmiles"

"0.575339813296885"

[4,] "RTOISO"

"0.523692106886679"

"0.00322099316311271"

[4,] "RTOISO"

[2,] "RPS"

"0.338696399764489"

pvec

[3,] "FedLand" "0.311020064774928"

"0.0106447357341449"

[2,] "RPS"

nam
[1,] "PTC"

[3,] "FedLand" "0.00789386643492578"

"0.523228929602289"

pvec

[1,] "PTC"

nam

Forward Analysis ‐ Between Estimator

APPENDIX E
Lead-Lag Analysis Plots
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Correlation of Deployment and RPS Requirements

Deployment (black) vs RPS Requirements in GWhrs (red)

255

Correlation of Deployment and Transmission

Deployment (red) vs Transmission (black)

256

Correlation of Deployment and Intermediate Generation

Deployment (black) vs Intermediate Generation (red)

257

Correlation of Deployment and Retirement of Facilities

Deployment (black) vs Retirement of Generation (red)
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Correlation of Deployment and Demand

Deployment (black) vs Demand (red)
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Correlation of Deployment and Import-Export

Deployment (black) vs Import-Export (red)
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APPENDIX F
Scatterplots of Dependent Variables vs Independent Variables
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269

Deployment vs IVs by State (States of AZ to MA)
Deployment vs PTC by State

Deployment vs RPS

270

Deployment vs Federal Lands

Deployment vs RTO-ISO Territory

271

Deployment vs Transmission

Deployment vs Baseload Generation

272

Deployment vs Intermediate Generation

Deployment vs Peaking Generation

273

Deployment vs Wind Resource

Deployment vs Retired Generation

274

Deployment vs PPA Price

Deployment vs Demand

275

Deployment vs Import-Export

Deployment vs Electricity Price

276

Deployment vs IVs by State (States of MI to OK)
Deployment vs PTC

Deployment vs RPS

277

Deployment vs Federal Lands

Deployment vs RTO-ISO Territory

278

Deployment vs Transmission

Deployment vs Baseload Generation

279

Deployment vs Intermediate Generation

Deployment vs Peaking Generation

280

Deployment vs Wind Resource

Deployment vs Retired Generation

281

Deployment vs PPA Price

Deployment vs Demand

282

Deployment vs Import-Export

Deployment vs Electricity Price

283

Deployment vs IVs (OR to WY)
Deployment vs PTC

Deployment vs RPS

284

Deployment vs Federal Lands

Deployment vs RTO-ISO Territory

285

Deployment vs Transmission

Deployment vs Baseload Generation

286

Deployment vs Intermediate Generation

Deployment vs Peaking Generation

287

Deployment vs Wind Resource

Deployment vs Retired Generation

288

Deployment vs PPA Price

Deployment vs Demand

289

Deployment vs Import-Export

Deployment vs Electricity Price
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